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NOTES
Admiralty Law/Workmen's Compensation-On the Waterfront:
The Fourth Circuit Draws the Line at the Point of Rest in a Nar-
row Interpretation of the LHWCA Amendments of 1972
The primary objectives of workmen's compensation systems are to
provide certainty of employee benefits and to limit employer liability;'
however, past attempts to provide such a system for shore-based mari-
time employees have entirely failed. A leading cause of confusion has
been the inability of both Congress and the courts to solve the jurisdic-
tional problems of an industry in which the employees must engage in
repeated crossings of the shoreline between land and navigable waters,
the traditional boundary between federal and state workmen's compen-
sation acts. The 1927 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act (LHWCA) contained a bright line test of coverage based on
the admiralty law concept that federal jurisdiction stops at the shore-
line.2 Subsequent attempts to provide federal remedies according to
the site of claimant's injury, rather than by the nature of his duties,
have often led to harsh and incongruous results.3
Despite the apparent rigidity of this shoreline coverage test, courts
have proved ingenious in blurring the lines among three possible ave-
nues of recovery for injured harborworkers: the LHWCA, state work-
men's compensation statutes and the admiralty tort law cause of action
for unseaworthiness. Uncertainty of coverage and competing remedies
that offer significantly different levels of relief have resulted in an
endless stream of litigation together with unacceptably high insurance
costs for the industry.
In response to the inadequacies of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, Congress enacted extensive
1. See Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 521 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir.
1975).
2. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat 1426 (codified at 33 U.S.c. §
903(a) (1970)).
3. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). In this case,
benefits were denied three longshoremen who were injured or killed when cargo hoisted
by the ship's crane swung back and knocked them to the pier or crushed them against the
side of a railroad car, while the widow of a fourth longshoreman whose decedent had a
similar accident, but was knocked into the water, was able to recover.
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amendments in 19721 in an effort to resurrect a viable compensation
scheme for the industry.5 In I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Boardc the
Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court to determine the extent
to which the 1972 amendments extend benefits under the Act to per-
sons engaged in necessary steps in the overall process of loading and un-
loading a vessel, but who under prior law could only claim benefits for
accidental injury or death under state law. The court concluded that
coverage was limited to "those persons, including checkers, who unload
cargo from the ship to the first point of rest at the terminal or load
cargo from the last point of rest at the terminal to the ship.' '1
t.T.O. and its two companion cases arose on appeal from three
Benefits Review Board decisions which awarded relief under the Act to
shore-based workers involved in various tasks in the overall process of
loading and unloading ships.8 Plaintiffs Adkins, Brown and Harris
were forklift operators who were injured while transporting cargo, each
working at a different stage of the loading process. The Benefits Review
Board concluded that each of these workers was a maritime employee
covered by the 1972 amendments.
Coverage under the 1927 Act was based solely on the place of
injury; recovery was granted if the injury occurred over navigable
waters.9 The present Act, as a result of the 1972 amendments, estab-
lishes a dual test for coverage. The situs test, the requirement that the
injury occur over navigable waters, remains, but the definition of navi-
gable waters has been expanded by amendment to include adjoining
land areas that are customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing or
4. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (Supp. 1976), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
5. See generally IA BENEDICr, ADnmnLLTY § 15-30 (7th ed. 1973, Supp. 1975);
G. GIMoRE & C. BLAcK, Tssn LAw or ADMIRALTY § 6-48 to -61 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as GiLMORE & BLACK]; Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARrTIME L. & CoM. 1
(1974); Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683
(1973); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972: An End of Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for
Modern Benefits, 27 U. MAMI L. REv. 94 (1972); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and
Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
6. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for rehearing en banc granted, (4th
Cir., March 12, 1976). Judge Winter wrote the majority opinion with Judge Haynsworth
concurring. Judge Craven dissented.
7. 529, F.2d at 1091.
8. Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 301 (.1975); Brown v. Maritime
Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 212 (1974); Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 1 BRBS 199 (1974).
9. "Compensation shall be payable . . .in respect of disability or death of an
employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock). . . ." Act of Mar. 4,
1927, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1426 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970)).
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building a vessel.1" The second part of the coverage test under the
amendments is the requirement that the injured employee be engaged in
maritime employment. 1
In light of the new definition of navigable waters, the Benefits
Review Board held in I.T.O. and its companion cases that each of these
employees, having been injured over navigable waters, satisfied the situs
test.12  As to whether these employees were engaged in maritime em-
ployment (the status test), the Board held that any task that is an integral
part of the total process of loading or unloading cargo satisfies the status
requirements that the employee be engaged in maritime employment.1 3
According to the Board, the fact that the cargo does not move directly
between the ship and the storage area is of no consequence in determin-
ing whether claimants qualify as employees under the Act.'"
The Fourth Circuit concurred in the Board's resolution of the situs
issue,' 5 but rejected the administrative board's facile resolution of the
status question."' The court noted that Congress did not define what
constituted maritime employment" although it did include "any long-
shoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations."' 8 Since
none of these terms have fixed meanings, the court refused to accept
them as reliable guides in ascertaining which tasks or functions are of a
sufficiently maritime nature to be covered by the Act.'9 The case law
dealing with these terms is, according to the court, not particularly
helpful since the former test of coverage contained no requirement that
injured employees be engaged in maritime employment.20 The amend-
10. 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976) provides:
Compensation shall be payable ... in respect of disability or death of
an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
bifilding a vessel).
11. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976) provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,
but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel,
or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small
vessel under eighteen tons net.
12. 1 BRBS at 305; 1 BR.BS at 214; 1 BR-BS at 203.
13. 1 BRBS at 304; 1 BRBS at 214; 1 BRBS at 202.
14. 1 BRBS at 202.
15. 529 F.2d at 1083-84.
16. Id. at 1084.
17. Id.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976), set forth in note 11 supra.
19. 529 F.2d at 1084.
20. Id.
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ments utterly change the significance of the terms "maritime employ-
ment," "longshoreman," and "longshoring operations." These terms have
become determinative of coverage for the first time.
Unable meaningfully to interpret the Act on its face, the I.T.O.
court considered the legislative history of the Act to ascertain congres-
sional intent.2 Prior to 1972 coverage under the Act stopped at the
water's edge. 2 The congressional committees28 felt that this coverage
provision was conducive to anomalies2 4 since "[t]he result is a disparity
in benefits. . . for the same type of injury depending on which side of
the water's edge and in which state the accident occurs."2" The House
Committee noted that this disparity in benefits was becoming a greater
problem because of advances in technology that have enabled many
longshoring operations traditionally performed on ship to be transferred
to shore.28  The Committee indicated that compensation for longshore-
men should no longer "depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of
whether the injury occurred on land or over water."27  Although the
committee expressed an intention to create a uniform compensation
system, 28 its illustration of this scheme established that Congress did not
intend to cover all employees engaged in any activity on the water-
front.29  Thus, employees involved in unloading the ship and those
immediately transporting the cargo to its storage area on land are
covered by the Act for any injuries sustained during these tasks.8 0
However, the committee emphasized that it did not intend to cover
employees who are not engaged in loading or unloading vessels. Mere
injury on navigable waters and adjoining land area was not sufficient in
itself to come within the coverage of the Act. Thus, the reports contain
the caveat that "employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored
21. Id.
22. The prior Act read: "Compensation shall be payable ... in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States ... " 33 U.S.C.
§ 903(a) (1970).
23. The House and Senate Reports are virtually identical. Compare SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, . REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), with HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
24. See, e.g., note 3 supra.
25. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10-11.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
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cargo for further transshipment would not be covered, nor would purely
clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the
loading or unloading of cargo."'31
The court considered the committee reports to be explicit in deline-
ating which portions of the overall loading and unloading process were
covered by the Act.32 Those employees who transport cargo immedi-
ately from the ship are covered, according to the committee reports;
however, those employees engaged in transshipment activities are expli-
citly excluded. The court interpreted transshipment to mean any inter-
mediate movement of cargo after it reaches its initial storage point.33
Checkers directly involved in the loading and unloading functions would
be eligible for benefits but clerical employees not intimately involved
with these functions would be excluded under the court's interpreta-
tion. 4 The court concluded that Congress intended to cover only those
employees involved in unloading cargo to the first "point of rest" as the
term is generally understood in the industry. 5 The court inferred that
this limitation would apply when workers are loading vessels, so that
employees moving cargo from the last point of rest to the vessel are
provided protection by the Act. 6 Applying this interpretation of the
coverage provisions, the court found that at the time of injury all three
claimants were performing duties landward of the last point of rest.37
The court's resolution of what constitutes maritime employment has
31. Id.
32. 529 F.2d at 1087.
33. Id. at 1087-88.
34. Id.
35. Id. The "point of rest" is defined by the Federal Maritime Commission
in its regulations governing terminar operators: "'MPloint of rest' shall be defined as that
area on the terminal facility which is assigned for the receipt of inbound cargo
from the ship and from which inbound cargo may be delivered to the consignee,
and that area which is assigned for the receipt of outbound cargo from shippers for vessel
loading." 46 C.F.R. § 533.6(c) (1975). See American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Bd., 317 F.2d 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DiPaola v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 311 F. Supp. 685, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see the proposed guidelines
for coverage under the LHWCA which the Department of Labor has issued:
Based on procedures normally utilized in the maritime industry, the loading
process may include certain terminal activities which are incidental to the
placement of cargo on the vessel. Conversely, the unloading process may also
include certain terminal activities. Terminal activities to be included in cov-
erage under the amended Act are employees engaged in loading or unloading
breakbulk, containerized or Lash ships and lighters, or passenger ships. Activ-
ities which may be covered include employees engaged in stuffing and stripping
of containers, employees working in and about marine railways, and other em-
ployees engaged in processing water-borne cargo.
20 C.F.R. § 710.4(b) (1975).
36. 529 F.2d at 1087.
37. Id. at 1087-88.
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been termed the "point of rest" doctrine. 38  It is based on the presump-
tion that waterborne cargo leaves the chain of maritime commerce
when it is taken off the ship and brought to its first point of rest.
Likewise, maritime employment commences when cargo is picked up
from its last "point of rest" and loaded onto the ship. 0
The dissent in I.T.O. disagreed with fundamental aspects of the
majority's holding and with the analysis employed by the court in
reaching its decision. Judge Craven objected to the ready use of the
committee reports in the face of statutory language amenable to inter-
pretation.40  He argued that the key terms "maritime employment" and
"longshoremen" have established meanings which preclude reliance on
the legislative history to achieve a contrary interpretation.4 According
to the dissent, both "maritime employment" and "harbor workers" are
generic terms that include, but are not limited to, longshoremen,42 while
"loading and unloading" is an extremely narrow term and indisputably
maritime. Thus, a demonstration that these claimants were engaged in
loading or unloading operations, as these terms were understood at the
time the amendments were enacted, constituted sufficient proof to the
dissent that the status prerequisite had been met.
43
Prior to the 1972 amendments, "loading and unloading" was often
a necessary element in a cause of action in admiralty against a shipown-
38. Id. at 1096 (dissenting opinion).
39. Id. at 1095.
40. Id. at 1090.
41. Id. at 1094.
42. Judge Craven points out that the greatly expanded definition of "navigable wa-
ters" can be used to ascertain the meaning of "maritime employment." Id. at 1090 (dis-
senting opinion). As one commentator states: "Inhere can be nothing more maritime
than the sea, every employment on the sea or other navigable waters should be consid-
ered as maritime employment. . . . [IMt would be well to adopt a criterion which takes
into account the undoubted jurisdiction of admiralty in matters of all injuries on naviga-
ble waters." IA BENEDICr, ADMnRALTY § 17 (7th ed. 1973, Supp. 1975) (emphasis
added); similarly, Judge Craven suggests that longshoremen can properly be considered
a sub-category of harbor workers. 529 F.2d at 1090 n.4 (dissenting opinion). Another
leading commentator has stated:
First in the catalogue of harbor workers is the longshoreman. The longshore-
man, as the name implies, is a shoreside worker whose principle activity is the
loading and unloading of ship's cargo....
Outside of the cargo work area in the holds, longshoremen are engaged
in various tasks in connection with voyage preparation or termination. The
work may consist of carrying ship's stores or passenger's baggage aboard ship.
Or the work may be performed entirely on the pier in the handling of me-
chanical equipment, or the storing, moving, or loading of goods on the dock.
1 M. NoRmis, TnE LAw oF MArIME INjURMs § 3 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis added).
43. 529 F.2d at 1097 (dissenting opinion).
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er for injuries sustained in ship's service.4 4 Thus, the courts had
numerous opportunities to explore the dimensions of the term and,
Judge Craven asserts, "loading and unloading' had acquired a settled
meaning at the time Congress considered the amendments. The majority
of courts construed "loading and unloading" in a pragmatic, realistic
sense. Rejecting mechanistic, hypertechnical approaches akin to the
point of rest theory,45 the prevailing construction used by courts includ-
ed all employees engaged in the total operation of moving cargo from
the waterfront to the ship or vice versa.46 The dissent emphasized that
recently the Fourth Circuit had adopted this approach.47
Accepting arguendo that the plain language of the statute is ambig-
uous, Judge Craven suggested that four considerations taken together
require affirmance.48 First, as a remedial statute,49 the language should
be interpreted liberally to achieve its avowed purpose of eliminating the
disparity of benefits received, depending on the side of the water's
edge on which employees sustained an injury. Given this goal of uni-
formity, those employees engaged in similar tasks and exposed to the
same risks would be afforded the same remedy when injury occurs. Sec-
ond, Judge Craven argued that all doubt should be resolved in favor of
coverage. 0 The Act incorporates this presumption in section 920 by
directing that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a
44. Id.
45. One case adopting such a narrow approach is Drumgold v. Plova, 260 F. Supp.
983 (E.D. Va. 1966).
46. See Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970); Law v.
Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); Hagans
v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963); McNeil v. Havtor, 326 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Byrd
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
47. Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974). The court noted:
The [district] court apparently concluded that "unloading" ceases when
the cargo is no longer in contact with the ship, i.e., when the bales were de-
posited on the pier and discharged from the ship's gear ... [W]e believe
that the case law rejects such a narrow definition of "unloading."
• • . In view of the obvious trend to fully develop the humanitarian pur-
poses of the warranty of seaworthiness we find no reason to apply a hyper-
technical definition to the terms loading and unloading.
Id. at 234-35.
48. 529 F.2d at 1094 (dissenting opinion).
49. See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328
(1953); Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1951); 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissent-
ing opinion).
50. 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion). See, e.g., Friend v. Britton, 220 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
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claimant shall be considered to fall within the provisions of the Act.5 1
Third, "[a] consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference
by the courts."52 The Benefits Review Board has consistently held that
coverage can reasonably be extended to all those employees who are
engaged in integral and essential steps in the overall loading and un-
loading process. Moreover, the Board has considered and rejected the
contention of employers and carriers that a point of rest doctrine is feas-
ible or permissible.53 The majority decision, in effect, overruled the
Board's conception of "shoreward coverage," as set forth in thirty-two
administrative decisions.54 Finally, the dissent argued that the scope of
review for these cases is a narrow and restricted one.55 Thus, the dissent
would have held that the Board's rulings are conclusive except in cases
in which the record does not warrant the opinion reached or a reason-
able basis in law does not exist.56
The dissent admitted that the majority's reliance on legislative,
history might have been more palatable if it contained clear and unam-
biguous language concerning the issue.57 Instead, Judge Craven con-
sidered the committee reports to be inconclusive, and therefore, useless
as an interpretive tool.58
The critical passage relied on by the majority is interpreted differ-
ently by the dissent. Transshipment Judge Craven argued, does not
51. 33 U.S.C.A. § 920 (Supp. 1976).
52. 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion), quoting NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67,
75 (1973).
53. E.g., Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 BRBS 31
(1975); Ford v. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 1 BRBS 367 (1975); Avvento v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 1 BRBS 174 (1974).
54. The Board had indicated subsequent to the LT.O. decision that it is "well
aware of the restrictive interpretation given the status requirement by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.... However, we are of the opinion that our interpretation with
regard to coverage is more in keeping with the amended statute and the legislative
history, and we will continue to follow the line of reasoning developed in previous
decisions. .. ." Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthey Inc., 3 BRBS 195 (Jan. 26, 1976).
55. 529 F.2d at 1093-94 (dissenting opinion). Prior to the 1972 amendments, the
review of compensation orders was assigned the federal district courts, 33 U.S.C. § 921
(b) (1970), where a very narrow scope of review was adopted. On appeal, the circuit
court of appeals adhered to a similarly restricted scope of review. The amendments di-
rect the Benefits Review Board to review the Administrative Law Judge's findings with
appeal to the court of appeals for the circuit where the injury occurred. The amendments
codify a narrow review for the Benefits 'Review Board, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 (b) (3) (Supp.
1976), and remain silent concerning the court's scope of review. Judge Craven construes
this language to mean that the same narrow review exercised by the district courts prior
to the amendments remains the proper standard. 529 F.2d at 1093 (dissenting opinion).
56. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. Parker, 163 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1947).
57. 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id.
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refer to intermediate handling of goods once they are placed on the
terminal. Rather, the term refers to teamsters who normally are not
involved in the loading process at all and whose function is to transport
goods away from the shoreside terminal.!9
More importantly, the point of rest theory is found in neither the
legislative history nor the statute.6 ° This concept, which in effect
defines which employees are to be covered, is conspicuous by its ab-
sense. Such a doctrine, unsupported by the weight of prior case law or
administrative precedent, is unfairly imputed to Congress in the absence
of a clear indication of such intent."1
Understanding the origins and interpretations of the first Long-
shoremen's Act is prerequisite to understanding the purpose of the
amendments. One of the first questions to arise when workmen's
compensation laws were promulgated in the various states was whether
these laws encompassed those harbor workers who regularly boarded
ships to unload cargo.6 2  Since these workers were engaged in an
extremely hazardous occupation 3 it seemed equitable that they at least
not be left to the not-so-tender mercy of traditional negligence doctrines
in case of injury.64 This search for equity was stymied by the Supreme
Courts insistence in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen65 that all things
maritime must be uniform.66 The effect of the Court's -ruling was to
thrust on Congress the responsibility of providing coverage for those
employees who passed over the shoreline, the Jensen line, as courts
labeled it, onto navigable waters. Enacted in 1927, the Longshoremen's
59. Id. Accord, GiMoRE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-51, at 430, where it is
stated: "Ihe line which the Committee Reports evidently sought to draw was between
workers who participate directly, or physically, in the specified activities and workers
whose jobs require them to be in the same area but who (like clerical workers) do not
physically 'participate' or who (like truckers) can be thought of as only indirectly
involved in the strictly maritime phase of the activity."
60. 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
61. Id. at 1096.
62. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-45, at 404-05.
63. There is no doubt that the occupation was (and is) a dangerous one. See
Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1972) (union spokesman
citing National Safety Council reports describing the longshore accident rate as more
than ten times the national average). See also appendix to Justice Douglas' dissent in
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 218-25 (1971).
64. See W. PRossER, HANDBooK oF TH LAw OF ToRTs § 80, at 531 (4th ed. 1971),
in which the author refers to "Ctihe three wicked sister of common law-contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule."
65. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
66. Id. at 215. See also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewait, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
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and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act67 was designed to provide
coverage to those workers who crossed the Jensen line into admiralty
jurisdiction. Judicial interpretation of the Act proved a difficult task.
Jurisdictional problems have plagued the courts from the begining.
Prior to the Act, courts sought to soften the harshness of the Jensen
line by extending state jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. The so-
called "maritime but local" exception that followed was intended to
cover those harbor workers injured seaward of the Jensen line, but
engaged in activities of such local character that the Supreme Court's
insistence upon admiralty law uniformity would not be offended by
permitting such workers coverage under local compensation acts.08
Considerable confusion arose concerning whether these cases were
still viable after the Act became law. Initially, the courts proceeded on
the assumption that the "maritime but local" exception was within the
intention of Congress, 9 with the result that certain claimants had no
idea in advance whether they were covered by -the state or the federal
compensation schemes. Instead of swift compensation, these claimants
were faced with uncertain court battles. A wrong guess meant, at best,
a loss of time and money for the injured employee, and at worst, a total
preclusion due to the statute of limitations.
The practical consequences of the doctrine that state and federal
jurisdictions were mutually exclusive was obviously intolerable. Final-
ly, the court in Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries"°
suggested that rather than mutual exclusivity, there existed an area
of overlapping jurisdiction, which Justice Black characterized as "a
twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights determined
case by cas,."'
The effect of Davis was to give those employees in the "maritime
but local" category the option of proceeding under either the state!s
workmen's compensation statute or the federal Act.72 This concurrent
67. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970).
68. See, e.g. Grand Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia 257 U.S. 33 (1921).
69. "'he 'may not validly be provided by state law' limitation in LHWCA §
903 (a) was generally-indeed, universally-taken to have built the Garcia-Rohde 'mari-
time, but local' category into the Act's coverage." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-
49, at 419.
70. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
71. Id. at 256.
72. See Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683,
688-89 (1973).
934 [Vol. 54
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
state and federal jurisdiction that existed for certain injuries allowed
employee freedom to elect the preferred remedy.73
At the time the Act was passed it was viewed as a substitute for
state workmen's compensation acts and accordingly contained the stan-
dard language of such legislation that the employer's liability was to be
"exclusive and in place of all other liability.' 74 Despite this language,
the Supreme Court in 1946 allowed a harbor worker who was injured
aboard ship to bring a suit in admiralty against the shipowner based on
an unseaworthiness claim.75  An unseaworthiness cause of action was
originally devised for seamen and included elements of no fault and
unlimited liability. Longshoremen were granted this cause of action
against shipowners on the theory that since they performed tasks tradi-
tionally engaged in by seamen, they should be afforded the remedies
that all seamen had in the event of injury.76 Third party indemnifica-
tion was allowed in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,77
whereby shipowners collected from stevedores. Thus, circular suits
akin to three-party donnybrooks became a standard feature of long-
shoremen's unseaworthiness claims.78
In 1948 the Admiralty Extension Act79 was enacted to alleviate
some of the inequity created by the Jensen doctrine. This Act granted
admiralty jurisdiction to those injuries to persons or property on land
that were caused by vessels. In this fashion, the unseaworthiness
doctrine as well as the Longshoremen's Act marched ashore though only
in a limited fashion.80 After some wavering, the Supreme Court took a
narrow approach to the interpretation of the Admiralty Extension Act;
it demanded a clearer congressional mandate before the doctrine could
be liberally applied to all longshoremen injured while engaged in the
73. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114. (1962). See also 529 F.2d at
1085 n.2.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1970).
75. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
76. Id. at 96.
77. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
78. "By the late 1960's further elaborations of the Sieracki-Ryan sequence had led
to the result that the longshoreman's employer had become, despite the exclusive liability
provision of LHCA § 905 (or the corresponding provision of a state compensation act),
ultimately liable for full damages in connection with injuries to his employees." GiLMoRE
& BLACk, 6-53 supra note 5, § 6-53, at 437.
79. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The Act provides: "'The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury,
to persons or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
80. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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loading process.""
Congressional inertia in increasing benefits under the Act and
liberal awards in unseaworthiness claims encouraged litigants to sue in
admiralty rather than go the compensation route. The resulting spiral
in costs caused employers in the industry to clamor for relief.8 2  The
rush to the courthouse also caused at least one federal district court to
complain that unseaworthiness suits were becoming a serious problem
because of their number.8 3
The short, sad history of the pre-amendment case law indicates the
problems that overwhelmed the courts in applying the original Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The amendments
can be seen as a direct response to this history. 4  Thus, the most
important change is a modernization in benefits and an elimination of
unseaworthiness claims for injured longshoremen. 5 The other signifi-
cant innovation is the extension of coverage shoreward.
The majority in I.T.O. professed to do neither more nor less than
the committee reports would allow8 6 and concluded that Congress in-
tended to extend coverage for employees engaged in loading (or unload-
ing) from last (or first) point of rest. 7 The dissent relied on an
interpretation of the Act itself,88 but even after examining the reports it
concluded that an expansive theory of coverage was required by the
statute.
89
As the first appellate interpretation of the Act's coverage provisions
as applied to shoreside employees, the decision is one of great impor-
tance. Virtually every circuit is considering appeals to Benefits Review
Board decisions. 90 The I.T.O. decision presents two approaches to the
question and differing answers to the problem.
81. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
82. Thus, an employer representative stated: "When insurance costs amount to
40% of a company's payroll, it is elementary that something is radically wrong and that
corrective action is mandatory." Hearings on HR. 247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006 and
HR. 15023 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1972).
83. Turner v. Transportation Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). See also Hearings on S. 915 and H.R. 6111 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, "Crisis in
the Federal Courts-1967," 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1967).
84. See House Report, supra note 23, at 1.
85. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 905-06 (Supp. 1976).
86. 529 F.2d at 1088.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1094 (dissenting opinion).
89. Id. at 1095.
90. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 2 BRBS 99 (July 30, 1975), appeal
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Those who subscribe to a risk distribution theory might applaud
the majority result since the nearer to the water the employees are
working the more they are exposed to peculiarly "maritime' risks, which
historically are protected under federal law. Conversely, further inland,
the risks appear to be similar to those faced by any other warehouse
employee, and accordingly should fall under typical state workmen's
compensation statutes.91 Undoubtedly, this risk analysis would offer
small solace to an injured employee, for injury or death is equally tragic
on either side of the point of rest.
Employers will undoubtedly be relieved to discover that under
I.T.O. the number of employees covered by the Act will be far fewer
than that reached by the Benefits Review Board's interpretation of the
Act. The effect of this holding will be to lessen the amount of employ-
ee-employer contribution necessary to sustain. workmen's compensation
protection since state workmen's compensation statutes offer lower ben-
efits than the Longshoremen's Act.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of coverage will also avoid
some issues that a more liberal construction would encounter.92 Specif-
docketed, No. 75-1360 (1st Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1975); Johns v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 2
BRBS 65 (July 11, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2039 (3d Cir., filed Sept. 9, 1975);
Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 BRBS 31 (June 26, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 75-1786 (7th Cir., filed Aug. 25, 1975); Skipper v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 1 BRBS 533 (June 11, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2833 (5th Cir.,
filed July 11, 1975); Powell v. Cargill, Inc., 1 BRBS 503 (May 30, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-2655 (9th Cir., filed July 28, 1975); Nulty v. Halter Marine Fabrica-
tors, Inc., 1 BRBS 437 (May 2, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2317 (5th Cir., filed
May 20, 1975); Ford v. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 1 BRBS 367 (March 21, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-289 (5th Cir., briefs filed Oct 2, 1975); Ronan v. Maret School, Inc. 1
BRBS 348 (March" 10, ,1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1445 (D.C. Cir., filed May 5,
1975); Kelley v. Handcor, Inc., 1 BRBS 319 (Feb. 28, 1975), appeal docketed, No.
75-1943 (9th Cir., filed April 28, 1975); Perdue v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1
BRBS 297 (Jan. 31, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1659 (5th Cir., briefs filed June 4,
1975); Herron v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 1 BRBS 273 (Jan. 23, 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 75-1538 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 7, 1975); Gilmore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1
BRBS 180 (Nov. 12, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-3384 (9th Cir., oral argument
Oct. 17, 1975).
91. In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), Justice Douglas argues
in his dissent that "because loading and unloading of vessels are abnormally dangerous
such risks ought to be placed . . . upon the shipowners ...... Id. at 218. He later
states: "Statistical evidence suggests that the great bulk of high-risk maritime activity
occurs on the ship and the adjoining pier." Id. at 225. See generally Comment, Risk
Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966).
92. The Chairperson of the Benefits Review Board has stated that "[the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act had such
far reaching implications in the areas of increased jurisdiction or coverage, benefits and
procedure that, even today, we have not been able to assess their full effects." R.
Washington, The Benefits Review Board and Its Role in the New Appellate Process
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and Its 1972
Amendments, 5 BRBS 29, 34 (Rel. 30, Maich 1976).
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ically, when is an employee's relationship with the overall loading and
unloading process so tenuous as to preclude coverage?
On the whole, however, the point of rest doctrine used in I.T.O.
creates more problems than it solves. Automation has dramatically
changed the workplace at the waterfront: 9 "[w]ith the advent of
modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use
of LASH-type vessels, more of the longshoremen's work is performed on
land than heretofore." 4  The Court's point of rest doctrine will have
the effect of excluding from coverage under the Longshoremen's Act
large numbers of employees who perform necessary and integral tasks in
the overall loading and unloading process. Thus, the following employ-
ees will be precluded from obtaining relief under the Act: "some
checkers, some hustler drivers, some tractor drivers, all members of
container stuffing and stripping gangs, and other terminal labor all of
whom are longshoremen and all of whom are hired through the union
hiring hall to participate together in the integrated process of the move-
ment of cargo across the water-front terminal.""5 This result appears to
clash with the stated congressional policy that compensation should "not
depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on
land or over the water."96
One of the most difficult problems with the majority's point of rest
theory is that there is no particular place where cargo is immediately put
at rest. Wherever it touches the ground it "rests" though only for an
instant. The point of rest will vary from day to day and from port to
port; depending on the type of cargo, the sophistication of available
cargo-handling facilities and even the whim of the employer.97 Em-
ployees have cause for suspicion when the limts of their federal
coverage, determined by the point of rest, are a matter of managerial
discretion. Ever shifting and amorphous in character, the exact point of
rest is bound to be a serious source of dispute. Rather than a guide for
administration of the Act it will be a starting point for litigation since no
93. "[Clontainerization saw the historical locus of longshore work moved further
inland on the waterfront in order to provide for huge equipment and parking areas to
accommodate containers .... It is through the use of containers that the complete
turnaround time for a ship in port has been reduced from 8 daysto 36-48 hours." Brief
for International Longshoremen's Association as Amicus Curiae at 11, I.T.O. Corp. v.
Adkins, 529 F.2d 108) (4th Cir. 1975).
94. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
95. Brief for Director, Office of Workers' Compensatic.n Programs at 60-61, I.T.O.
Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975).
96. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
97. 529 F.2d at 1096 (dissenting opinion).
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one can be certain of the dividing line between coverage and noncover-
age. The Jensen line was undoubtedly too rigid and mechanical, but the
point of rest doctrine suffers from being so flexible, uncertain and
elusive that it borders on fiction.9"
Additionally, the point of rest theory is inadequate in that it has the
effect of erecting another "situs" requirement for coverage.99 The
status of maritime employment is ascertained by determining the loca-
tion of the employee's work, not the nature of his duties. The point of
rest doctrine "means that workers performing the same function, han-
dling the same cargo, will be treated differently depending on where
they work, even though they are all working on the premises of a
terminal conceded to be within the Act's definition of 'navigable wat-
ers' "100 Under this anomalous result there will be times when em-
ployees moving the same cargo will be treated differently, though both
were injured in the same manner and in similar stages of the loading and
unloading process. 10'
Courts faced with the task of interpreting the 1972 amendments
would do well to keep in mind the jurisdictional problems that bedeviled
the Act in earlier years. A modem compensation system loses its
efficacy to the extent that coverage is uncertain and conducive to costly
and time-consuming litigation. The court's resolution of the status issue
creates in effect a second situs requirement for coverage. The point of
rest theory advanced by the court draws an arbitrary line around some
longshoremen while excluding others on the basis that the cargo move-
ment past this line is not sufficiently maritime in nature. This is a
fiction that can not be fairly found in either the statute or the committee
reports. The report so heavily relied on by the majority is singularly
98. Judge Craven argues that "tithe legislative history standing alone cannot
support the majority position. At best, the House Report matches its own ambiguity
against that of the statute. The majority opinion makes sense only when the legislative
history is paired with the 'point of rest' theory, a concept which appears nowhere in the
legislative history or the statute, and one which, I predict, will confound and perplex this
court for years to come." 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
99. Id. at 1096.
100. Id. at 1097.
101. To illustrate this anomaly, imagine a longshoreman operating a forklift trans-
porting cargo from one point on the terminal to make room for recently arriving cargo
which is being placed at its immediate point of rest after being unloaded from a ship. If
he loses his brakes and collides with another forklift operator, the two employ-
ees would receive differing benefits by virtue of their being covered by different
compensation schemes. Despite the fact that they were engaged in the same work
(forklift operation) and exposed to similar risks (in this case, collision), they would not
be treated equally because at the time of injury they were assigned to tasks on different
sides of the "point of rest."
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unimpressive as a guidepost to statutory meaning. The crucial language
cited by the court is capable of differing interpretations. A leading
commentator, in rejecting the committee reports, explains that "as essays
in statutory construction, they do not commend themselves.' 10 2  In
contrast to its indulgent attitude towards the ambiguities that abound in
the committee report, the court exhibited an unnecessarily rigid ap-
proach to the statutory language itself. Maritime employment includes
those tasks that take place over navigable waters. The coverage provi-
sions can be fairly read to encompass all employment-related injuries that
occur within the Act's territorial limits. At the very least, maritime
employment must include all employees engaged in the overall process
of loading and unloading vessels. An affirmation of the Benefits Re-
view Board in these three cases would come closer to accomplishing the
congressional intention of creating a modem, fair and workable long-
shoremen's compensation scheme.
BRIAN A. POWERS
Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary
Judgment
[PROLOGUE
As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held
in Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976), that summary judg-
ment may be granted for the party with the trial burden of proof even when
he carries that burden, at least in part, with his own affidavits. Cutts v.
Casey was expressly rejected as not controlling since it involved a directed
verdict motion upon conflicting evidence on a strenuously contested issue of
fact.
In an excellent analysis that appears to adopt the federal construction,
Chief Justice Sharp concluded that a movant with the trial burden of proof
is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of his own affidavits when:
(1) there are only latent doubts concerning the credibility of his affidavits;
(2) the non-movant has failed to introduce any materials which support his
opposition to the motion or which point to specific areas of contradiction or
impeachment in the movant's materials and the non-movant has failed to
utilize rule 56(0; and (3) summary judgment is otherwise appropriate-
102. GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-51, at 450.
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that is, the movant must succeed on the basis of his own materials. The
Chief Justice clearly articulated that to succeed on his own materials the mov-
ant must show: (1) that there are no genuine issues of material fact; (2)
that there are no gaps in his proof; (3) that no inferences inconsistent with
his recovery arise from his evidence; and (4) that there is no standard that
must be applied to the facts by a jury. With equal clarity she noted that
summary judgment must be denied if the movant's affiants are inherently
incredible, if the circumstances are suspect, or if the need for cross-examina-
tion appears. Thus, she concluded that when a movant's only materials were
his own affidavits, ordinarily he will not be able to meet the above standards.
However, interest in the outcome of the case on the part of an affiant, by
itself, was said to raise only latent doubts as to his credibility which do not
preclude summary judgment.
Despite the Kidd opinion we feel that this Note warrants publication
for several reasons. First, it provides a vehicle by which the North Carolina
Law Review can timely disseminate information concerning the important
Kidd decision. Second, this note presents arguments that the pronouncement
in Cutts is obiter dictum. There is some language in the Kidd decision that
supports these arguments. In light of the Kidd decision, these arguments
may prove particularly useful. Additionally the court in Kidd expressly re-
jected the argument that the constitutional right to jury trial compelled the
preclusion of summary judgment for the movant with the trial burden of
proof. A similar argument was the basis of the Cutts rationale. Thus the
court in Kidd rejected the argument it thought persuasive in Cutts. This
express rejection certainly weakens Cutts even as it applies to directed ver-
dict cases and supports the conclusion of this note that the Cutts rule may be
only dictum. Third, the policy arguments for not applying the Cutts decision
to summary judgment cases presented in this note are quite similar to those
expressed by the court in Kidd. Finally, we think this Note, though some-
what pre-empted, will provide a useful research tool when read in conjunction
with the Kidd decision.
THm BOARD OF EDITORS]
When the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Cuts v. Casey,'
the decision was met with a less than favorable reaction.2  Cutts denies
the availability of a motion for directed verdict to the party with the
burden of proof when his right to recover depends upon the credibility
of his witnesses.' Some critics of this opinion, like Jeremiah predicting
1. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L REv. 729, 746-54 (1972); Comment, Directing the Verdict
in Favor of the Party with the Burden of Proof, 50 N.C.L REV. 843, 84.7-52 (1972).
3. 278 N.C. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311. The rationale for this decision was that
to direct a verdict based on testimonial evidence for the party with the burden of proof
would violate the non-movants constitutional right to jury trial. Id. at 417-18, 180
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doom to the peoples of Judah, prophesied that the decision not only
forced an unintended and restrictive interpretation on the use of the
directed verdict, but also that its application to summary judgment
motions would be compelled by force of logic.4 It appears that such
things have come to pass. In Shearin v. National Indemnity Co., the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reluctantly concluded that the Su-
S.E.2d at 311. The constitutional provision relied upon provides: "In all controversies
at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities
of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable." N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 25. From this statement of constitutional policy, it was concluded by the Cutts
majority that the presentation of testimonial evidence raises an issue of credibility that
must be submitted to the jury. 278 N.C. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311. This conclusion
is clearly at odds with federal and most state precedent. See cases cited by Huskins,
J., concurring, id. at 427, 180 S.E.2d at 319. See also Comment, 50 N.C.L. Rnv., supra
note 2, at 848 & n.29. Generally, the federal courts will allow a directed verdict based
upon testimonial evidence for the party with the burden of proof if that evidence is un-
contradicted, unimpeached, and if no conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom.
5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAMcCE 50.02[1], at 2318-19 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Under this approach, when a judge directs a verdict based upon such
evidence, he has not deprived the non-movant of his right to jury trial because the pre-
liminary question---"Is there a genuine issue of fact for the jury?"-is a question of law
for the judge that may be decided against the non-movant. See 2 A. McINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRAcricE AND PRGOCEDURE § 1488.20 (Phillips Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Phillips]. The majority in Cutts distinguished this precedent by relying upon N.C.R.
Civ. P. 51(a), North Carolina's "no comment" statute, which forbids a judge from
commenting on the sufficiency of the evidence during his charge to the jury. It
has been pervasively argued that this reliance was neither appropriate nor compelled.
See 278 N.C. at 427, 180 S.E.2d at 319 (Huskins, J., concurring); Phillips § 1488.20;
authoritites cited note 2 supra.
This note proceeds upon the preliminary conclusion that the Cutts decision was un-
fortunate for two reasons. First, under Cutts, an entire class of potential movants
(those with the burden of proof who must rely upon testimonial evidence) are denied
access to the directed verdict procedure. Thus, even if the non-movant has presented
no evidence and regardless of the strength of the movant's case, the issues created by
denials in the pleadings must be submitted to a jury if the movant's right to recover de-
pends upon the credibility of his witnesses. Second, to the extent that the Cutts holding
is extended to summary judgment, the primary purpose of that procedure-to preview
the evidence so that a trial may be avoided if there is no genuine issue of material fact
-is frustrated. If the movant bears his burden of proof with testimonial evidence (affi-
davits), there is no compulsion on the non-movant to come forward with materials of
his own since, under Cutts, summary judgment cannot be entered against him on the
basis of the movant's testimonial evidence. If he does not come forward, it is impossible
for a judge to predetermine if the non-movant can present triable issues of fact. This
is clearly at odds with the language of rule 56(e). See note 38 infra.
During these days of crowded dockets it seems inappropriate to deny the availabil-
ity of two procedures and to frustrate their clear purpose of promoting judicial economy
for less than compelling reasons. Since the constitutional infirmity propounded in Cutts
has been rejected by the vast majority of jurisdictions using virtually identical procedural
rules, and since the factor used by the Cutts majority to distinguish this precedent is
less than persuasive, until overruled, Cutts should be limited. This note proceeds upon
that premise.
4. E.g., Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 426-27, 180 S.E.2d 297, 321 (1971) (Hus-
kins, J., concurring); Louis, supra note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
5. 27 N.C App. 88, 218 S.E.2d 207 (1975).
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preme Court's reasoning in Cutts applied to summary judgment
motions.,
In Shearin plaintiff-insured sought to recover from defendant-
insurer for accidental damage to his airplane. The insurer denied
liability on two grounds. First, it alleged that at the time of the accident
the airplane was not being used for a "use" covered in the policy.7
Second, it alleged that the aircraft was not being operated by a "quali-
fied" pilot as that term was defined in the policy.8 Plaintiff's answers to
interrogatories issued by defendant tended to show that at the time the
airplane was damaged, it was being used by a friend of plaintiff who
was receiving flight instruction from a certified instructor.9 On the
basis of the pleadings and plaintiff's answers to the interrogatories,
defendant moved for summary judgment.' 0
Plaintiff responded with an affidavit by his friend, an affidavit by
the flight instructor and two affidavits of his own. These materials
tended to show that plaintiff had made his airplane available at no
charge so that his friend could get flight instruction; that the instructor
was certified and was a "qualified" pilot under the policy definitions;
and that although his friend was operating the plane from the pilot's
chair, the instructor had "continuous ready access to a set of controls
during the entire flight . . . ."' On the basis of these affidavits
plaintiff made a cross-motion for summary judgment to which defend-
ant did not respond.
The trial judge determined that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and concluded as a matter of law that the "use" in question
was covered by the policy and that the airplane was being operated by a
6. Id. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
7. Insurer admitted in its answer that it had issued an accident policy to plaintiff
and that the policy was in effect at the time of the mishap. Its defenses were defini-
tional in nature. Id. at 88, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
8. Id. Item six of the Policy Declarations provided that the airplane would be
used for "[pleasure and fb]usiness." This was defined as "[plersonal and [pileasure
use and use in direct connection with the [insured's business, excluding any operation
for which a charge is made." "Qualified [plilot" as defined in the policy referred to
Federal Aviation Administration certifications and ratings. Id. In addition, the policy
provided that it did not apply to any loss occurring while the airplane was being oper-
ated by a student-pilot unless the student was under the direct supervision of a certified
instructor. Id. at 89, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
9. Id. at 89, 218 S.E.2d at 208.
10. Summary judgment is authorized for either "claimant" or "defending party"
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (b). All references in this Note to specific rules
of civil procedure will be, unless otherwise indicated, to the North Carolina rules.
11. 27 N.C. App. at 90, 218 S.E.2d at 209.
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"qualified" pilot.12  Plaintiff's summary judgment motion was granted
on the issue of liability and a trial on the issue of damages was
ordered.13 The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals clearly articulated the narrow issue:
"[W]hether . . .a summary judgment may be granted in favor of the
party having the burden of proof when his right to recover depends
upon the credibility of his witnesses." The holding is equally clear: "On
authority of Cutts v. Casey, we conclude that the answer is NO." 14
Judge Parker, writing for the majority,' 5 was unable "to see why the
principle announced in Cutts v. Casey [did] not apply with at least
equal force when the question is presented by a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56."1-6 Judge Vaughn, in dissent, acknowledged
that Cutts was controlling precedent in directed verdict cases, but con-
cluded that since a summary judgment motion comes at a different
"stage" of a. proceeding, different responsibilities could be placed on
the parties. 7 Therefore, failure to meet the responsibilities imposed at
one stage could result in a party losing "the shield that would otherwise
be available for the next [stage]."' s
Before considering the import of the Shearin decision, it is neces-
sary to examine briefly the development and application of summary
judgment, a procedure new to North Carolina.'" Summary judgment
represents the most drastic change in our procedural system wrought by
the new rules.20  The procedure outlined in rule 56 is clearly available
to any party and is not limited in its application to any particular type of
action.2 ' Its purpose is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings and to
12. Id. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 209. Although the court of appeals reversed the trial
judge on the basis of Cutts, both the majority opinion and the dissent concluded that,
but for Cutts, the trial judge's conclusions of law were correct. Id. at 91-93, 218 S.E.2d
at 210-11.
13. Rule 56(c) specifically allows summary judgment on the issue of liability even
though a genuine issue exists as to the amount of damages. See note 29 infra.
14. 27 N.C. App. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 209, 210 (citation omitted).
15. Britt, J., concurred without opinion. Vaughn, J., dissented. Id. at 92, 218
S.E.2d at 210.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 93, 218 S.E.2d at 210-11.
18. Id.
19. W. SHUFORD, NoRTH CAROLINA CIVIL PR.AcTIcE AND PROCmumR § 56-2 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as SHuFoRD]. Prior procedure did allow certain issues of fact raised
by the pleadings to be stricken if they were irrelevant or redundant, if a "sham" defense
was raised, or if an answer, reply or demurrer was "frivolous." Where these procedures
did not apply, any issue raised by the pleadings required a trial. Id.
20. SHuFoRD, supra note 19, § 56-3, at 467.
21. E.g., McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 234, 192 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1972); Kes-
sing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971); Prid-
gen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 638, 177 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1970).
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determine if there are any issues of material fact for trial. 2 If no such
issue exists, the court can dispose of a case on the merits by applying the
appropriate law without incurring the cost or delay of further proceed-
ings.
While North Carolina practitioners have utilized summary judg-
ment extensively,23 the state courts have considered it a drastic remedy
that should be granted sparingly.24 Great pains have been taken by the
appellate courts to describe the situations in which summary judgment is
not appropriate. It is absolutely clear that the trial judge hearing the
motion is not to decide issues of fact.25 It is equally clear that although
a judge may have before him many materials,"6 and may even hear oral
testimony, 27 he is not to let the hearing develop into a "trial.) 28
Rule 56 contains a statement of the standard that must be met
before summary judgment can be granted. Only when the allowable
materials "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
22. E.g., Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972); cf.
cases cited note 21 supra.
23. It has been suggested that more summary judgment motions have been the sub-
ject of appeal than any other procedure available under the new rule. SHuroRD, supra
note 19, § 56-3, at 467.
24. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 51, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513,
518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972).
25. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Houck v. Overcash, 282 N.C. 623, 627, 193 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1973); Singleton
v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464, 186 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1972). Some North Carolina
judges persist in listing "findings of fact" in their summary judgment orders. Although
this practice is not appropriate, it does not constitute reversible error if the judge did
not decide issues of material fact and only listed stipulated or admitted facts and conclu-
sions of law. See Wall v. Wall, 24 N.C. App. 725, 729, 212 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1975).
26. Rule 56(c) specifically -names pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, affidavits, and admissions on file as appropriate materials. See note 29 infra.
However, the scope of available materials is broader. In addition to the materials listed
in rule 56(c), the court can consider admissions in the pleadings and admissions on file,
whether obtained under rule 36 or otherwise, and any other material which would be
admissible in evidence or of which judicial notice may be taken. E.g., Kessing v. Na-
tional Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971). Oral testimony
is also available. See note 27 infra. In addition, stipulations of fact are considered as
admissions and any presumptions that would be available at trial can be considered.
Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 705, 190 S.E.2d 189, 194 (1972) (stipulations of fact);
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972) (pre-
sumptions).
27. Oral testimony, by virtue of rule 43(e), can be heard at a summary judgment
hearing. However, such testimony should be used sparingly to prevent the hearing from
developing into a "trial" to determine if a trial is necessary. Chandler v. Cleveland Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 24 N.C. App. 455, 461, 211 S.E.2d 484, 489 (1975); Walton v. Meir,
14 N.C. App. 183, 188-89, 188 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1972).
28. See note 27 supra.
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that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...- is
summary judgment appropriate. Interpreting this statutory standard,
North Carolina courts have stated that an issue is "material" if the facts
alleged constitute a legal defense, or are of such a nature as to affect the
result of the action, or if the resolution of the issue is so essential that the
party against whom it is resolved cannot prevail.30 Similarly, a "genu-
ine issue" has been defined as one that can be supported by substantial
evidence.3" Thus neither a material issue that cannot be supported by
substantial evidence nor an issue of immaterial fact will preclude sum-
mary judgment. 32  In applying these standards, directed verdict has
developed into somewhat of a touchstone. It has been repeatedly stated
that summary judgment is appropriate when only legal issues are in-
volved and when a party would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial.13
These interpretations of rule 56 have not caused substantial contro-
versy. The difficult task for any court is application of the evidentiary
standards that each party must meet either to be entitled to or to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Consistent with the present interpreta-
tion of the equivalent federal rule,3 4 the burden in North Carolina is on
the movant to establish the lack of a triable issue of material fact,
regardless of which party bears the burden of proof at trial. 3 General-
29. Rule 56(c) states in full:
Motion and proceedings thereon.-The motion shall be served at least 10
days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in char-
acter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Summary judgment, when ap-
propriate, may be rendered against the moving party.
30. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901
(1972).
31. E.g., cases cited note 30 supra.
32. E.g., Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823,
830 (1971).
33. Long v. Long, 15 N.C. App. 525, 526-27, 190 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (1972);
Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 179 S.E.2d 865, 867
(1971).
34. There are four minor differences between the North Carolina rule and the fed-
eral rule. SHUFORD, supra note 19, § 56-1, at 466-67. For discussion of the present fed-
eral interpretation see Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis,
83 YALE L.J. 745, 748 & n.13.
35. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 51, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 206, 210
S.E.2d 289, 291 (1974).
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ly, this burden will be met by proving the non-existence of an essential
element of the opposing party's claim or by showing through discovery
that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support one of the
essential elements of his claim. 6 To determine whether this burden has
been met, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, accepts his evidence as true and regards his papers indul-
gently. 7  If the movant meets this initial burden, rule 56(e) specifically
provides that unless the non-movant produces specific facts showing the
existence of a triable issue, the movant is entitled to summary judg-
ment.3
8
Applying these standards to the Shearin facts, both the trial court
and the court of appeals believed that plaintiff had met his burden.39
They were equally in agreement that defendant had failed to set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue. The court of
appeals concluded: but for Cutts v. Casey, summary judgment was
appropriate for the plaintiff.40 Given this conclusion, it is unfortunate
that the court of appeals did not take the opportunity in Shearin to
distinguish Cutts.
There were several options available to the court of appeals. The
majority opinion indicates that the court felt compelled to apply the
36. Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974).
37. E.g., Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); Hall v. Funderburk, 23 N.C. App. 214, 216, 208 S.E.2d 402, 403 (1974). In
addition, it is often said that the movant's papers will be closely scrutinized. Id.
38. Rule 56(e) provides in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
North Carolina courts have interpreted this provision to mean that if the movant's
materials are not sufficient, summary judgment in his favor is not "appropriate" and
must be denied even if the non-movant does not respond at all. Thus it has been held
that the non-movant does not incur the burden of coming forward with evidence of a
triable issue until the movant produces evidence of the necessary certitude which negates
the non-movant's claim in its entirety. Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 206,
210 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1974); see Tolbert v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 22 N.C.
App. 491, 494, 206 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1974).
39. 27 N.C. App. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
40. Id. The court's reliance on Cutts appears justified. There, as in Shearin, the
movant with the burden of proof met that burden with testimonial evidence. Credibil-
ity conceivably could be questioned at trial. Thus the Cutts conclusion that credibility
of witnesses is for the jury, combined with the substantial precedent equating the tests
for the two motions, provides some justification for the extension of the Cutts reasoning
to summary judgment proceedings.
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Cutts reasoning to the Shearin facts even though it was unanimous in its
opinion that summary judgment was proper.4 If stare decisis was the
force behind that compulsion, the court of appeals need not have yielded
so readily. Though the doctrine of stare decisis is "fully established" in
North Carolina, 42 it was not necessarily applicable in Shearin for two
reasons. First, while the North Carolina Supreme Court has spoken to
the credibility question in relation to directed verdict motions, there has
been no decision in that court applying the Cutts rationale to summary
judgment cases. By refusing to apply the Cutts doctrine to the Shearin
facts, the court of appeals would not be committing the verboten act of
overruling a supreme court decision since there is little factual similarity
between the two cases." In addition, it must be remembered that
Shearin and Cutts, cases of statutory interpretation, deal with different
statutes. Though the similarity of the motions authorized by the two
statutes is undeniable," there are technical differences upon which a
court could reasonably rely in distinguishing them. 45  Second, at least
theoretically, the pronouncement in Cutts that credibility is always for
the jury can be considered obiter dicta." Justice Sharp, in the Cutts
41. Id.
42. Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N.C. 302, 305, 98 S.E. 830, 831 (1919); cf. Bulova
Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors, 285 N.C. 467, 472-73, 206 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1974).
43. Stare decisis is a doctrine based on similarity of fact patterns. Cf. Dennis v.
City of Albemarle, 243 N.C. 221, 223, 90 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1955). Cutts, an action
to try title to land, has little in common with Shearin, an action to recover under an
insurance contract.
44. See text accompanying note 33 supra. The similarity is such that it has led
one commentator to suggest that, analytically, the motions are identical. Louis, supra
note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
45. Distinction at this level of analysis is not difficult since stare decisis is a doc-
trine based on recurring fact patterns. See note 43 supra. Several differences between
the two motions are apparent. First, they appear at different stages of a proceeding.
As a result, the materials a judge considers when ruling on a summary judgment motion
are not "evidence" as they are in a directed verdict setting, but are "evidence of evi-
dence." In addition, granting a summary judgment can avoid a needless trial while
granting a directed verdict cannot. Second, there are differences in the language of the
two rules upon which a distinction could be forced. Although rule 50 is less than ambig-
uous in its references to who may move for directed verdict, rule 56(a) specifically
provides for a summary judgment for a "party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-
claim, or crossclaim . . . ." In the normal situation such a party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. For a comparison of the language of the two rules see Cutts v. Casey,
278 N.C. 390, 425-26, 180 S.E.2d 287, 320-21 (1971) (Huskins, J., concurring). These
"technical differences," while perhaps unacceptable as distinctions upon which to allow
a summary judgment for the party hearing the burden of proof with testimonial evidence,
certainly are substantial enough to reject Cutts as controlling in summary judgment
cases. See generally Louis, supra note 2, at 749 & nn.132-33.
46. Statements in the text of a judicial opinion unnecessary to the determination
of the case have to be regarded as obiter dicta. Cf. Washburn v. Washburn, 234 N.C.
370, 373, 67 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1951).
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majority opinion, noted that granting summary judgment was doubly
error since the movant's evidence was contradicted. 47 It can be argued
that this factor was dispositive of the case.48  If it was dispositive, then
the statement in Cutts concerning the movant with the burden of proof
and credibility must be dictum. The credence of this argument is en-
hanced by an important qualification in the Cutts opinion; despite the
pronouncement that credibility is always for the jury, Chief Justice
Sharp conceded that there may be a few situations in which credibility as
a matter of law seems compelled.49 In light of this equivocation, it
would not be unreasonable to confine Cutts to its own facts for stare
decisis purposes. Certainly it should not be extended to control a
different statute. And certainly any decision to extend it at all should
not be made by an intermediate court that finds the extension contrary
to the clear language of the statute. 0
If the court of appeals was not compelled to apply the Cutts
rationale to summary judgment by the doctrine of stare decisis, what was
the basis for its decision to do so? It is submitted that the court was
47. 278 N.C. at 422, 180 S.E.2d at 314. Even under the more liberal federal inter-
pretation of directed verdict for the party with the burden of proof, the motion must
be denied if the movant's testimonial evidence is contradicted or impeached. 5A
MoORE, supra note 3, 50.02[l], at 2318-19 (2d ed. 1975). North Carolini case law is
consistent with this interpretation. See cases cited notes 55-56 infra.
48. See note 47 supra. An additional dispositive factor, not recognized by the
court, was that the plaintiff in Cutts apparently did not move at the close of all the
evidence for a directed verdict on his own claim. Such a motion is an absolute pre-
requisite to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under rule 50(b), the mo-
tion the trial court erroneously granted. See Louis, supra note 2, at 747 & nn.116 &
117.
49. 278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314. The Cutts opinion did not elaborate upon
the situations in which credibility as a matter of law would be compelled. The federal
courts accept credibility as a matter of law when the movant's evidence is uncontra-
dicted, unimpeached, and no conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom. See note
3 supra. Dean Phillips, cited by Chief Justice Sharp in Cutts, suggests that credibility
could be accepted where the movant's evidence is entirely documentary or where it is
uncontradicted and the facts to contradict it, if they exist at all, are within the non-
movant's peculiar knowledge. Phillips, supra note 3, § 1488.20, at 26. Other jurisdic-
tions accept credibility when the non-movant "admits" facts that establish the movant's
case, when the controlling evidence is documentary and its construction is a matter of
law for the court, or when the movant's oral evidence is unimpeached and uncontra-
dicted. See Comment, 50 N.C.L. Rnv., supra note 2, at 844-48. In addition most courts
will deny directed verdict if the movant's evidence is inherently suspect by reason of
interest, internal inconsistencies, equivocation, or scientific impossibility. Id. at 849.
The negative implication from North Carolina case law is that the movant's evidence
must be from a disinterested witness whose testimony is not contradicted or impeached.
See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
50. The Shearin majority noted, 'Therefore, were we at liberty to give full scope
to Rule 56, we would agree with the trial court in the present case that, upon the basis
of plaintiffs uncontradicted affidavits, there is here no genuine issue as to any material
fact." 27 N.C. App. at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
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misled concerning the scope of Cutts and missed the opportunity to free
summary judgment from its shadow.
One possible ground for distinction is suggested by Judge Vaughn
in his dissent. In considering the fact that rule 56 clearly contemplates
the availability of a summary judgment for any party,"1 regardless of
burdens of proof, he seemed to be raising a question as to what policy is
contravened when the movant has the burden of proof and carries that
burden with testimonial evidence. The Cutts opinion suggests that the
policy violated in directed verdict cases is the right to have a jury
observe the demeanor of the movant's witnesses and pass upon their
credibility. Even if this policy is effectuated in Cufts,52 it is still possible
to distinguish the two motions by considering the stages at which they
are available. To preserve the right to have a jury pass upon the
credibility of an adversary's witnesses, a party must file the necessary
pleadings in accordance with the statutory requirements. The proce-
dural system thus imposes a condition precedent to this "constitutional"
right r3 at the pleading stage. If preservation of the right can be
conditioned upon requiring a certain response at the pleading stage, it
follows that preservation of that right can be similarly conditioned when
an adversary moves for summary judgment.
Another possible ground for distinction lies in North Carolina
case law concerning summary judgment. Some early decisions did deal
directly with the credibility question when summary judgment was the
procedural posture of the case. Before the Cutts decision came down,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals purported to follow federal prece-
dent in reversing the grant of summary judgment when the movant's
affidavits were made by interested parties.5 4  Similar North Carolina
decisions have held that the motion is not available to a party who bears
his burden of proof with testimonial evidence when that evidence is con-
tradicted5 5 or when the knowledge of the facts is largely within the
51. See note 45 supra.
52. It is submitted that this policy does not compel or justify the Cutts result. See
note 3 supra.
53. This right is articulated in N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 25. See note 3 supra.
54. Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970). The court
in Shor also suggested that a trial court should never resolve an issue of credibility. Id.
Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 98-99, 209 S.E.2d 734, 739
(1974); Shook Builders Supply Co. v. Eastern Assoc., Inc., 24 N.C. App. 533, 537, 211
S.E.2d 472, 475 (1975).
55. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 98, 209 S.E.2d 734,
739 (1974); Reavis v. Campbell, 27 N.C. App. 231, 236, 218 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1975).
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movant's control.56 These holdings are consistent with federal prece-
dent.57 It is contended that in Shearin, the court of appeals bolted from
this established line of cases which follows federal precedent when it
applied the Cutts reasoning to a summary judgment case.5 s
The Shearin departure from North Carolina and federal summary
judgment precedent even stands in marked contrast with other post-
Cutts decisions by the court of appeals. In Brooks v. Smith 9 the
defendant successfully supported his summary judgment motion with
the affidavit of an eyewitness. The court found that the "deposition
clearly establishe[d] contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
which was the proximate cause of his injuries." '  This unimpeached
and uncontradicted affidavit of a disinterested witness carried the de-
fendant's burden as movant upon an issue for which he would have the
burden of proof at trial. Since the plaintiff did not respond to defend-
ant's motion, the court of appeals held that summary judgment was
proper."' Similarly, in Bogle v. Duke Power Co.62 the same result was
reached in a wrongful death action. In that case the defendant carried
his burden as movant for summary judgment with the affidavit of a
disinterested witness. The affidavit clearly showed that plaintiff's de-
ceased was contributorily negligent.6 3  Since plaintiff did not respond to
these materials, the court of appeals held that summary judgment prop-
erly was granted against her.
From these two cases it can be concluded that the court of appeals
does not feel compelled to apply the Cutts reasoning to all summary
judgment cases in which the movant carries his trial burden with testi-
monial evidence. It is submitted that in Shearin the court was not
56. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Wemer Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 88, 98-99, 209 S.E.2d
734, 739 (1974); Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235-36, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970).
57. See 10 C. WPIjr & A. MILLR, ,FEDERAL PRACTICE AN]) PRocXDuRE § 2726,
at 521-24 (1913); notes 3 &49 supra.
58. It is difficult to imagine why these limitations on the availability of summary
judgment to the party who bears his burden of proof with testimonial evidence were ever
articulated if Cutts were controlling.
59. 27 N.C. App. 223, 218 S.E.2d 489 (1975).
60. Id. at 226, 218 S.E.2d at 491.
61. Id. at 227, 218 S.E.2d at 491-92.
62. 27 N.C. App. 318, 219 S.E.2d 308 (1975).
63. Id. at 322, 219 S.E.2d at 311. It should be noted that in Bogle, an alternative
ground for the grant of defendant's motion was "no negligence," an issue upon which
defendant did not bear the trial burden of proof. Id. This was pointed out by Parker,
J., who concurred in the result since defendant had shown that plaintiff could not prove
negligence. However, he rejected contributory negligence as an alternative ground for
granting defendant's summary judgment since "Etihe credibility of defendant's witness
is involved." Id. at 323, 219 S.E.2d at 311.
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compelled to do so by the doctrine of stare decisis. It also appears that
the court missed the opportunity to limit the Cutts opinion to its own
facts as obiter dictum. Also present and missed was the opportunity to
narrow its scope by assigning credibility as a matter of law in Shearin or
at least recognizing the availability of that action on other facts. 6"
Finally, available to and never mentioned by the majority were several
possible distinctions between the two motions. 65
In light of Brooks and Bogle, it is difficult to evaluate the signifi-
cance of the Shearin holding. The danger in the court's blind applica-
tion of Cutts is that Shearin will become the same rigid touchstone in
summary judgment cases that Cutts has become in directed verdict
cases. Unfortunately, it appears that this process has already begun."
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.
Construction Lending-General Contractor v. Lender
Any number of complex legal relationships may be generated by a
building construction project.' Even within the framework of an ordi-
nary situation with standard contracts, small factual variations can
produce very different legal consequences. The relationship between
64. Since Shearin was basically a case of contract interpretation, granting summaryjudgment for plaintiff seems appropriate. See note 49 supra. However, in Shearin the
option was certainly available to deny plaintiff's summary judgment motion since two
of his affiants (the plaintiff and his friend) were interested parties. See text accom-
panying note 11 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 44-58 supra. One final distinction is particularly
troublesome. The impact of the Cutts opinion is somewhat ameliorated by the availabil-
ity of a peremptory instruction to the movant. In this procedure the jury is instructed to
find for the movant if it believes the movant's evidence. No such procedure is available
in summary judgment proceedings.
66. Shearin was decided on October 1, 1975. Twice before the end of that year
it was referred to in conjunction with Cutts concerning the propriety of summary judg-
ment for the party having the burden of proof when the credibility of his witnesses is
at issue. See Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Kingsmen Prod., 27 N.C. App. 661, 663, 220
S.E.2d 95, 97 (1975); Alpine Village, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fiu-Corp., 27 N.C.
App. 403, 405, 219 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975).
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the following situation is assumed: The owner of
the property finances the project through a lender, for example, a savings and loan
association. The owner contracts with a general contractor to build the building and
agrees to pay him accordingly. The general contractor in turn employs various subcon-
tractors and material suppliers. These subcontractors may similarly employ other
subcontractors and material suppliers. The chain of subcontracts may become quite long
on a major project.
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the construction lender and the general contractor is one that has caused
courts a great deal of difficulty. It is a relationship influenced by
statutory law, common law, equity and contract. An especially difficult
question, unresolved in North Carolina,' is what circumstances give rise
to a claim for relief by a general contractor against a construction lender
when the former has been unable to obtain payment from the party with
whom he is in privity, namely, the owner.
The owner of property who wants to erect a building thereon
normally obtains temporary financing to cover the costs of construc-
tion.' When the construction is complete, he obtains a long term loan
secured by a new mortgage on the property and pays off the construc-
tion mortgage. The construction loan is normally disbursed in
"progress payments" keyed to various stages of completion of the
project.4 The idea is that the borrower will be able to pay the general
contractor and that the contractor will pay the various subcontractors
and material suppliers in such a way that no one will go unpaid for
completed work for very long.5 Also, under this arrangement the
various parties are supposedly motivated to complete the work soon so
that they can be paid. A problem arises when the funds are somehow
diverted from flowing smoothly to their proper destination. Work
comes to a halt when payments are unreasonably delayed, and the
scramble to get paid begins. If the lender forecloses and then seeks to
complete the project without satisfying the unpaid parties, he may have
difficulty getting people to do the work for various reasons. 6 Mean-
while, the partially completed building is exposed to weather and van-
dalism.
Statutory remedies are available to the unpaid parties to the
project, but those remedies are often of no practical value. Generally
speaking, the mechanics lien law in North Carolina7 grants the claim-
ants the right to assert liens against funds payable by the owner, but not
2. Urban Systems Dev. Corp. v. NCNB Mortgage Corp., 513 F.2d 1304, 1305
(4th Cir. 1975).
3. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERALS ON REAL ESTATE
FINANCE AND DEVELOP ENT 553-58 (1976).
4. Id. at 555; Lefcoe & Schaffer, Construction Lending and the Equitable Lien, 40
S. CAL. L. REV. 439 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lefcoe].
5. The payments may not cover all of the costs of the in-place work for various
reasons, including the possibility of a retainage provision. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 439
n. 1.
6. "When work stops, the suppliers and laborers who had participated are in a
strong bargaining position. Union rules, camaraderie, and skepticism about the likely
future of the project deter others from replacing them." Id. at 456.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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against funds in the hands of the construction lender." The claimants
may also, through subrogation, enforce a lien against the land.0 How-
ever, the liens on funds payable by the owner may well be worthless, as
the owner probably was diverting funds already because of insolvency.
Similarly, the lien on the property may be valueless as it only
relates back to the beginning of construction and is probably subordi-
nate to the construction loan mortgage.10
The North Carolina statute provides no remedy against the con-
struction lender or the funds in his hands." Those funds normally
cannot be attached in a proceeding against the owner since the loan
agreement and the owner's right to the funds have been terminated by
his diversion of funds and the discontinuance of work. Lawyers for
these claimants of undisbursed loan funds have advanced various theo-
ries, mostly without success.'" In Urban Systems Development Corp. v.
8. Id. §§ 44A-17(3),-18. First tier subcontractors have a direct right to liens on
funds due to the contractor; second and third tier subcontractors may claim through
subrogation to the rights of the party with whom they dealt. Although the language of
section 44A-18(1) arguably reaches loan funds wherever they are if they are 'owed to
the contractor," id. § 44A-19, which deals with notice to the "obligor," a term which by
definition (id. § 44A-17(3)) cannot mean the lender, when coupled with section 44A-
18(6) requiring such notice, makes it clear that such a result was not intended. See
text accompanying note 64 infra.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8,-23 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The general contractor
may enforce such a lien directly.
10. Id. § 44A-10; Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 440-41. The land may be subject to
other prior encumbrances as well, for example, a purchase money mortgage. Miller v.
Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288
(1st Dist. 1965). For a discussion of priorities under the California statutes, see Com-
ment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF. L. Rnv. 331, 341-44 (1963). See also
Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem-The
"Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. IRv. 311 (1974).
11. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 44A-17(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The lender is not an
"obligor." See note 8 supra.
12. The opinions reflect overlapping and ill-defined theories. One suspects that
only a small fraction of the cases of this type have been appealed. The following are
some of the theories advanced in cases relating to the instant fact situation: (1)
Equitable assignment theory, Pratt Lumber Co. v. T.H. Gill, 278 F. 783, 789-90
(E.D.N.C. 1922); (2) reliance theory, G.L. Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Leatherwood, 268 F.
Supp. 609 (W.D.N.C. 1967), Wahl v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Ariz. App. 90,
102-03, 467 P.2d 930, 942-43 (1970), Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wettcrling
Constr. & Realty, Inc., - Minn. -, 223 N.W.2d 418, 422 (1974), First Nat'l State Bank
v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch. 1968), Demharter v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963); (3) third party beneficiary
claim, Avco Delta Corp. Canada v. United States, 484 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1973),
Demharter v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra, Clardy v. Barco Constr. Co., 205 Pa.
Super. 218, 208' A.2d 793 (Super. Ct. 1965); (4) priority for liens over lenders'
mortgages sought based on various principles of equity, Ash v. Honig, 62 F.2d 793 (2d
Cir. 1933), J.L Kislak Mfg. Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., - Del. -, 303
A.2d 648 (1973), Bedford Lake Park Corp. v. Twelve Linden Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 962,
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NCNB Mortgage Corp.,'3 which originated in North Carolina,' 4 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the general contractor's claims
against the construction lender which were based on detrimental reli-
ance, 5 third party beneficiary status, 6 and a trust fund theory.' 7 In
similar cases, unpaid claimants have asserted claims based on negli-
gence."" They have also sought to have the lenders estopped on equita-
ble grounds from asserting the priority of their mortgages to the claim-
ants' mechanics liens.' 9
If diversion of construction loan proceeds is to give rise to a claim
for relief against the lender, the theory the courts select is of minor
consequence since several theories could be adapted to the situation. The
equitable lien theory used by the California courts, before the legislature
intervened and eliminated it, is probably the most flexible and appropri-
ate. The California equitable lien doctrine is also the only theory that
has generated a substantial number of judicial opinions and reached a
190 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1959); (5) negligence theory, Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. West-
ern Pac. Fin. Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist, 1975),
Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wetterling Constr. & Realty, Inc., supra at 422-23,
First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., supra. (The writer has found no cases in
which this last theory has been successful, seemingly because the courts have not found
the duty of the lender to the plaintiffs that a negligence claim requires.) See also the
California cases discussed in text accompanying notes 22-39 infra.
13. 513 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1975).
14. Other North Carolina cases have been settled, avoiding appeals on similar
claims. Letter from Edward C. Winslow I, an attorney in Greensboro, N.C., to
Elizabeth Gibson, June 3, 1975, on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
15. 513 F.2d at 1306-07. Special circumstances, namely the allegation of an
express promise, gave rise to this claim. Reliance on the fund is generally treated as an
element of an equitable lien claim, rather than an independent ground of recovery. See
note 17 and text accompanying notes 23-34 infra.
16. 513 F.2d at 1306.
17. Id. at 1305-06. Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp., 44
Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975), was apparently not yet available
to Judge Haynsworth when he wrote this opinion. See text accompanying notes 56-62
infra. It is not clear what he meant by the California "trust fund" theory. See 513 F.2d
at 1305. He cited two cases; one, Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 216
Cal. App. 2d 433, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (2d Dist. 1963), predicated its holding on certain
contractual provisions and third party beneficiary principles and found that the loan
funds constituted a trust for the benefit of the lender and the claimants. The project
having been completed, the lender had received his benefit, and liens were granted to the
claimants. The second case, Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App.
2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965), insofar as it relates to this type of claim, is
really an equitable lien theory case, which is discussed beginning with note 22 infra. If
Judge Haynsworth intended to state the requirements for recovery under the equitable
lien theory in Urban Systems, he made an overstatement. See text accompanying notes
22-39 infra.
18. See cases cited note 12 supra.
19. Id.
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significant level of development.20 In Urban Systems, Judge Hayns-
worth alluded to the California "trust fund theory"2' without determin-
ing its applicability in North Carolina. Because of 'the degree of
development of the California theory, North Carolina can benefit from
an analysis of the California experience.
A basic statement of the California equitable lien theory is found in
the 1965 case of McBain v. Santa Clara Savings & Loan Association.22
In McBain an equitable lien on undisbursed construction loan funds
held by the lender was granted to subcontractors who had dealt directly
with the owner-borrower.2 3  Relying on older California equitable lien
cases,24 the court stressed that the claimants were entitled to senior liens
on the fund because they had justifiably relied on the fund for pay-
ment,2 even though the complaining subcontractors made no showing
of enrichment of the lender as was made in those older California
decisions. 26  The facts that the land was heavily encumbered prior to
construction and that the owner lacked personal resources made reliance
on the fund obvious.27 The court quoted from the case of Miller v.
20. The cases are collected in Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848 (1974). See text accompa-
nying notes 22-39 infra.
21. 513 F.2d at 1305; see note 17 supra.
22. 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (lst Dist. 1966).
23. Id. at 832, 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 86. The owner apparently acted as his
own general contractor.
24. Id. at 836, 51 Cal. Reptr. at 83. The older decisions were Smith v. Anglo-
California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928) and Pacific Ready Cut Homes v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510 (1932). Another important precedent
cited was Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965).
25. The rule required that the borrower or the lender have induced the reliance,
241 Cal. App. 2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 83, but the court also said: "Basically it is the
fund itself and the arrangement for progress payments therefrom, created by the mutual
agreement of the borrower and the lender, that constitiutes the material inducement
.... " Id. at 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
26. See Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d
460, 464, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701 (4th Dist. 1975).
In the older decisions granting recovery, supra note 24, the projects were completed
with loan funds remaining and the owner in default. Assuming the value of the
completed project to be at least the amount of the loan taken out initially, the lender had
been "unjustly" enriched to at least the extent of remaining loan funds. See MeBain v.
Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 845-46, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78, 89 (1st
Dist. 1966); Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444 n. 1. See also note 41 infra.
None of the cases discarding the requirement of a surplus after completion or even a
showing of any enrichment of the lender, see text accompanying notes 32 & 35 infra,
reached the California Supreme Court, where Smith and Pacific Ready Cut were decided.
27. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 844, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 88. The system of progress
payments and inspections constituted further inducement to rely. Id. at 843-44, 51 Cal.
Rptr. at 87-88. The lack of personal finances was inferred from the inability to
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Mountain View Savings & Loan Association, 2  cited also in Urban
Systems:29
"Where the lender has received the benefit of the claimant's per-
formance, and therefore a more valuable security for its note, it
is not justified in withholding or appropriating to any other use
money originally intended to be used to pay for such performance
and relied upon by the claimant in rendering its performance."30
The McBain court assumed that lenders are capable of preventing loan
misappropriations: "Respondent was therefore in a commanding position
to employ well known and commonly accepted. . . methods to prevent
the diversion . . . of the progress payments by the owners . ... 1
The court did not require the claimants to prove that the lender had
been unjustly enriched; indeed, there was no indication that the incom-
plete project was worth more than the amounts already disbursed from
the fund." Thus McBain gave an equitable lien on remaining funds to
any unpaid contributor to the project able to show reliance on the loan
fund.
Two subsequent cases sharpened three significant aspects of the
equitable lien theory. First, in Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Savings
& Loan Associationa3 the court pointed out that reliance on the fund
may be circumstantially proved with ease.3 4 Second, Doud specifically
rejected completion of the project as a prerequisite to recovery. 5 Third,
in Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank36 California granted recov-
ery under the equitable lien theory to a general contractor for the first
purchase the land or build the building without extensive credit. See text accompanying
note 34 infra.
28. 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965).
29. 513 F.2d at 1305 n.1.
30. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 83, quoting 238 Cal. App. 2d at
661, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
31. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87. See Miller v. Mountain View
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 659, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1st Dist. 1965).
32. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444 n.ll.
33. 254 Cal. App. 2d 585, 60 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1st Dist. 1967).
34. Id. at 589, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 96. "Both Smith and Ready Cut indicated that the
necessary elements of inducement and reliance could be inferred from the circumstances
of the transaction without great difficulty and suggested that an improver's knowledge
that a construction loan had been negotiated would be sufficient." Id.
35. Id. at 592, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 98, quoting Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 664, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 292 (1st Dist. 1965). "'he
reasoning behind Smith and Pacific Ready Cut Homes is as applicable to the claimant
putting in the foundation, or the rough plumbing, as it is to the carpenter driving the
last spike. All other factors being equal the rights of one contributing to the construc-
tion should not depend on the stage thereof at which his contribution was made."' Id.
36. 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 101 Cal. Rptr. 665 (2d Dist. 1972).
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time.ar The Swinerton court held that, in the equitable lien context,38
general contractors who were independent from -the borrower were in-
distinguishable from subcontractors in relation to the lender and to the
policies behind the equitable lien.3 9
An article analyzing the California equitable lien in construction
lending cases was published after McBain.40 The authors, Lefcoe and
Schaffer, point out that although the lenders in cases in which the
owners divert loan funds have gotten a more valuable security because
of the claimants' work, they have already disbursed funds once. There-
fore they have not been unjustly enriched, 4' and there must be some
reason to force them to pay twice instead of applying any remaining
funds against the borrowers' loan liabilities.42 Lefcoe and Schaffer
discredit fault and the prevention of loan diversions as supportable
rationales for granting equitable liens.43  These commentators dismiss
the court's assumption in McBain that lenders are more able to prevent
borrowers from diverting the loan funds than are contractors and sub-
37. The appellant bank claimed that such a recovery had not been allowed before,
and the court did not disagree. Id. at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
38. Swinerton distinguished Gordon Bldg. Corp. v. Gibraltar Say. & Loan Ass'n,
247 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 Cal. Rptr. 884 (2d Dist. 1966). 25 Cal. App. 3d at 263-64, 101
Cal. Rptr. at 667-68. Gordon denied the general contractor an "equitable lien" based on
a third party beneficiary claim, a contract theory, not an equitable lien theory as dis-
cussed herein. In addition, there was no proof of reliance in Gordon. Swinerlon held
that, "Since recovery in the present case is not grounded on contract but rather on equi-
table considerations arising out of estoppel and unjust enrichment, its disposition is not
controlled by. . . Gordon." Id. at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668. But see text accompany-
ing notes 26 & 32 supra, note 41 infra. The loan agreement in Swinerton contained a
provision denying the creation of an interest in the fund in the contractor. 25 Cal. App.
3d at 266, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
39. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668. The only possible basis of
distinction is that there are simply more parties between the lender and the subcontrac-
tors, and, hence, more possibilities for diversion of funds and a greater need for
protection of the subcontractors' rights. On the other hand, it is arguable that simply
because of the number of intervening parties, a general contractor may be more justified
in relying on a construction loan fund. Certainly it should not matter that the general
contractor's contribution may be largely of entrepreneurial and managerial effort rather
than of materials or physical labor.
40. Lefcoe, supra note 4.
41. "Unjustly enriched" is used in the traditional sense. Disbursing to the owner
according to contract can hardly be regarded as tortious behavior. RESTATEMENT O1
RFSnTurnON § 128 (1937). The lender may not have been enriched in any sense. The
term "unjust enrichment" is used liberally in the equitable lien context to indicate the
situation in which one party, the lender, has realized a gain, but another, the lien
claimant, has suffered a loss.
42. See Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444.
43. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 442-43. Actually, prevention is only one objective of
what Lefcoe and Schaffer termed an "allocation of resources" rationale. However, if
this was the courts' rationale, prevention was certainly the ultimate objective.
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contractors.4" They also point out a number of problems with lenders'
use of bonding or the voucher system as preventive measures. 4" In fact,
a survey of California lenders taken after McBain showed insignificant
movement to more sophisticated methods of supervising loans.46 The
mere threat of equitable lien liability was apparently insufficient to
induce the drastic alterations in lending practices necessary to avoid
liability under McBain.47
Lefcoe and Schaffer suggest a different basis for decision: the
desire to mitigate losses due to delay in resuming contruction after work
has stopped." Neither the allowance nor disallowance of equitable
liens in all cases is likely to affect lenders' decisions to take over and
complete disrupted projects.4" The remedy should be limited so as not
to put the various claimants in a position to be unreasonable about
completing the work because of their possession of a claim against the
lender.50 As McBain imposes no such limitations, its rule is too
broad.5' Lefcoe and Schaffer assert that, under this rationale, equitable
liens are justified in two situations:
44. Id. at 447-48. See text accompanying note 31 supra. The Miller v. Mountain
View Say. & Loan Ass'n court mentions this proposition. 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658-59,
48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1st Dist. 1965).
45. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 449-52. "Performance bonds" guarantee performance
of the contract; "payment bonds" guarantee payment of the subcontractors and material-
men. See G. NELSoN & D. WHrrmAN, supra note 3, at 664-65. "[Bonding companies] do
not seek to prevent losses by supervising the distribution of construction loan funds;
rather, they rely on the credit of the borrower as a source of indemnity. This much lend-
ers could do themselves. Bonding is efficient only for a lender less capable than a bond-
ing company of checking borrower credit." Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 449. Mandatory
bonding would inhibit certain small scale construction contrary to the public interest.
1d. at 450.
The voucher system calls for disbursements only upon receipt of bills for completed
work. The bookkeeping expense of paying each subcontractor is generally prohibi-
tive, and paying the borrower directly facilitates the presentation of forged bills. Id. at
451.
46. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 454. Greater selectivity of borrowers was attributed to
the then tight money situation. Id. n.48.
47. "As a determinant of lending policy, the threat of equitable liens seems
insignificant in relation to trends in the money market and demand for construction
loans." Id. at 455. One reason for the scarcity of appellate opinions may be that the
cost of litigation and appeal is simply too high compared to the amounts involved, which
tend to be small. Large projects with large costs are usually bonded, eliminating the
need for recourse to equitable liens for subcontractors and materialmen. Id. at 458 n.62.
But see notes 69-70 infra concerning general contractors.
48. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 456-58.
49. Id. at 456.
50. That is, if the remedy is allowed in all cases, the claimants are likely to get the
same compensation for what they have already done regardless of whether they resume
work. Id.
51. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
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First, when the lender forecloses and sells the incomplete project
to a purchaser who finishes and resells for a substantial profit, this
provides some evidence that the lender failed to act reasonably to
mitigate loss. In such a case the tender [sic] without a coherent
defense of its conduct (e.g., that materialmen and laborers capri-
ciously refused to stay with the job) might properly be held ac-
countable to unpaid materialmen on an equitable lien theory. Sec-
ond, an equitable lien might be imposed in order to avoid unjust
enrichment. Suppose the lender finishes after foreclosing mechan-
ics' liens and realizes a profit above normal entrepreneurial gains.
This surplus profit may be attributable to the earlier, uncompen-
sated contribution of materialmen.52
Having identified two situations in which it is clearly unfair to deny the
remedy to the claimants, the commentators also suggest that a reasona-
ble profit should be preserved for the lender.5
The liberal allowance of recovery against lenders under the rule of
McBain produced sufficient backlash to have the remedy legislated out
of existence, possibly completely. In 1967 the California legislature
enacted the following statute:
[N]o person may assert any legal or equitable right with respect to
such [construction) fund, other than a right created by direct
written contract between such person and the person holding the
fund, except pursuant to the provisions of [the California stop
notice54] chapters.55
In Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pacific Financial Corp.5 0 the
California Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the statute was
intended only to abrogate the extension of the equitable lien theory that
occurred in McBain and similar cases.57 Instead, the court construed the
new statute to abolish the equitable lien altogether 58 and expressed the
52. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 457.
53. Id.
54. The stop notice is a device whereby the unpaid materialmen may enjoin the
lender from making further disbursements. CAL. CIv..CODE § 3162 (West 1974). See
Ilyin, Stop Noticel-Construction Loan Officer's Nightmare, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 187
(1964); Comment, California's Private Stop Notice Law: Due Process Requirements, 25
HAsTiNGs L.J. 1043 (1974). In Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d
543, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191, 200 (5th Dist. 1974), the court held the bonded stop notice
statute to violate procedural due process.
55. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3264 (West 1974). In Swinerton, a 1974 decision, the
statute was held to be prospective only and, therefore, inapplicable to the events of 1965.
See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
56. 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975).
57. Id. at 464-65, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See text accompanying notes 24-26
supra.
58. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
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opinion that the mechanics liens and stop-notice statutes adequately
provided for contractors, subcontractors and materialmen.59 Concern-
ing lenders, the court said, "[Lenders] are relieved of the expense and
risk of policing the ultimate distribution of construction funds and can
concentrate on their primary duty of providing construction loans at
lesser expense to the borrower and ultimately to the consuming pub-
lic."' 0 The facts of the case did not compel the court to decide
expressly whether a claim for relief would be stated if there were an
allegation of unconscionable enrichment of the lender.0 1 Thus the
possibility of stating a claim under the circumstances that Lefcoe and
Schaffer suggest as justifying the equitable lien remedy has not been
properly foreclosed by stare decisis62
North Carolina's courts have the opportunity to discard the worst
of the California judicial theory and to retain and improve on the best.
Development of this area of the law in North Carolina should not be
impeded by her statutory scheme because it does not treat the construc-
tion lender's relationships with other parties, 3 and because there was no
legislative intent to foreclose such development.6 4 It is noteworthy that
at the time California legislated the equitable lien out of existence, 5 that
state still provided a statutory remedy against the lender.66 North
Carolina's statute is different.6 7 Her courts should apply the equitable
lien theory as Lefcoe and Schaffer recommend: (1) to prevent lenders
from taking unfair advantage of an unpaid contractor's, subcontractor's,
or materialman's contribution by granting recovery in such, cases and
(2) to assist in minimizing economic waste by not granting the remedy in
all cases in which mere reliance is shown.6"
Beyond that application, however, the North Carolina courts
should consider applying the theory to another situation based on a
prevention rationale, but should avoid the shortcomings of a McBain
59. Id.
60. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
61. Id. at 466, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
62. See generally Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 459, in which the authors described in
their Postscript how the statute can be read to allow still the equitable lien in those cases
in which they recommended its use. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A (Cum. Supp. 1975), especially id. § 44A-17.
64. At least, such was the opinion of Professor Smith, a member of the committee
that drafted section 44A. Interview with Richard M. Smith, Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina, February 11, 1976.
65. See text accompanying notes 54-62 supra.
66. The stop notice remedy was still available. See note 54 supra.
67. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
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type of rule. That situation occurs when the claim to the fund is made
by an unpaid general contractor (rather than by subcontracators or
materialmen) who simply proves that he relied on the fund for pay-
ment. This rule would encourage the lender to see to it that the
proceeds of the loan make it at least past the owner to the next party in
the chain of payment. 60 It may be that general contractors are just as
likely as owners to misuse funds, but if the lender does his job, at least
one party would be prevented from misusing the proceeds. Further-
more, by obligating the lender to supervise the distribution of funds to
the general contractor, the first tier subcontractors are better able to
protect themselves. The funds would at least make it to the party with
whom the first tier subcontractors are in privity, or else the general
contractor would have a claim against the lender that they could attach.
Lenders should not be overburdened by this type of obligation, though
they would be by an obligation to all possible claimants to the fund.
Hopefully, unlike the McBain rule,7 this approach, limiting recovery
based on mere reliance to general contractors, would make it economi-
cally advantageous for lenders to verify that the requisite progress has
been made prior to a disbursement and to obtain the owner's agreement
to disburse funds directly to the contractor. Although it does not
inhibit diversion further down the chain of payment, this rule would
provide a reasonable measure of prevention.
Construction lending cases are difficult because of their differing
fact situations and the problem of resolving disputes between two inno-
cent parties. The California lien theory in the limited form advocated
by Lefcoe and Schaffer, as opposed to the liberal view of McBain, would
69. Any deterrence of mitigation (see text accompanying note 50 supra) caused by
liberal allowance of the equitable lien to the general contractor should be outweighed by
the prevention accomplished. Besides, it is not so difficult to find a new general
contractor if the old one is unreasonable about finishing the job.
As for the fear that deterrence of mitigation of economic waste will result (as under
the McBain rule) if subcontractors are able to obtain subrogation to the general
contractor's claim by contract or otherwise, once the duty of the lender to get the
payments to the general contractor is clear, fault becomes the controlling consideration if
the lender fails in his simple duty.
Furthermore, when there is a payment bond guaranteeing payment to all sub-
contractors, the general contractor is an indemnitor of the surety and is the only
party who really stands to lose if he has no recourse against the lender. He has no
practical means of protecting himself from diversion by the owner. When he is granted
the equitable lien remedy against the lender, and when there is a payment bond every
innocent party is protected. The lender protects himself by getting the payments to the
general contractor.
70. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The lender's cost of compliance with
this rule is lower and the threat of lien liability is larger when the general contractor is
the claimant.
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not deter mitigation of loss and would prevent the lender from making a
supernormal profit while others go unpaid. North Carolina can go one
step further and reduce the number of loan misappropriation cases
without unduly burdening lenders by granting equitable liens to general
contractors who relied on construction loan funds but were not paid for
completed work.
WILLIAm H. HIGGINS
Consumer Protection-Hardy v. Toler: Applying the North
Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation-What Role for
the Jury?
Shortly after the enactment of the North Carolina unfair trade
practices legislation in 1969,1 the hope was expressed that the state had
taken a "unique approach" to consumer protection that might well
succeed in curbing deceptive trade practices: a consumer protec-
tion statute to be enforced in large part by consumers themselves.2 For
almost six years, however, the potential of these sections had remained
1. The main provisions of the legislation are to be found in the newly created
section 75-1.1 which provides as follows:
Methods of competition, acts and practices regulated; legislative pol-
icy.-(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal
means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in
business, and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public
within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers
and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher,
owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television sta-
tion, or other advertising medium in the publication or dissemination of an ad-
vertisement, when the owner, agent, or employee did not have knowledge of
the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement and when the
newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising me-
dium did not have a direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the
advertised product or service.
(d) Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section
shall have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975). In addition, the following sections were amended
to make them applicable to all potential defendants in a deceptive trade practice action:
id. §§ 75-9, -10, -11, -12, -16 (1975).
2. See Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Caro-
lina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 911 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
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untested.3 Finally, in Hardy v. Toler' the North Carolina Supreme
Court was squarely confronted with the case that necessitated an initial
judicial construction of the statute. Although in Hardy defendant's
actions were held to violate section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes,5 the court may well have vitiated the impact of these
provisions by its apparent ruling on the critical question whether it is
for the judge or the jury to decide if alleged conduct constitutes an un-
fair or deceptive trade practice.6 If Hardy is to be read as requiring a
determination of liability under the statute by the court alone, the cor-
responding lack of significant jury involvement could effectively de-
prive the legislation of much of its consumer orientation.
In 1971 plaintiff Hardy purchased a used car from defendants,
relying on representations that it was a low mileage, previously
unwrecked, one-owner vehicle carrying a transferable manufacturer's
warranty.7  Upon learning that in fact these representations were
untrue, and known by defendants to be false, plaintiff brought suit in
Craven County Superior Court seeking damages for breach of warranty,
punitive damages, and treble damages under section 75-16 of the Gen-
eral Statutes,8 alleging that defendant's actions amounted to unfair
or deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1.9 The trial court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the question of
punitive damages and refused to allow the jury to determine whether
defendant's conduct was indeed unfair or deceptive within the statute.10
After a jury verdict for plaintiff for breach of warranties, the judge
refused to treble the award, holding as a matter of law that "the acts
3. In no previous case had liability been found under section 75-1.1, and in only
three appellate opinions had the section even been noted: Harrington Mfg. Co. v.
Powell Mfg. Co., 26 N.C. App. 414, 216 S.E.2d 379 (1975); Smith v. Ford Motor Co.,
26 N.C. App. 181, 215 S.E.2d 376 (1975); State v. Dare to be Great, Inc., 15 N.C.
App. 275, 189 S.E.2d 802 (1972).
4. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
5. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
6. Id. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
7. Id. at 305-06, 218 S.E.2d at 344.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975) provides:
Civil action by person injured; treble damages.-If any person shall be
injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up,
destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person,
firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such
injury done, and if damages are assessed by a jury in such case judgment shall
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the
amount fixed by the verdict.
9. 28 N.C. at 304-05, 218 S.E.2d at 343-44.
10. Id. at 305, 218 S.E.2d at 344.
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of the defendants did not constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce, which are declared unlawful by
Section 75-1.1 (a) . . .,,
The court of appeals upheld the trial court on the issue of punitive
damages, but remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that the
issue of deceptive trade practices should have been presented to the
jury.12  The supreme court granted certiorari's to review the denial of
punitive damages, and presumably to address the question of the alloca-
tion of the decision-making responsibility between judge and jury as
to what constitutes an unfair trade practice. 14
After somewhat summarily disposing of plaintiffs claim for
punitive damages' 5 the court turned to the critical judge/jury issue.
Reviewing federal court decisions interpreting the provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,16 and language from two Massachu-
setts opinions discussing a similar statute,1 7 the North Carolina Supreme
Court declared that "traditionally" and "[o]rdinarily it would be for the
jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury's finding, the court
11. Record at 41, Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
12. 24 N.C. App. 625, 630-31, 211 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1975).
13. 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975).
14. Although in his petition for certiorari plaintiff raised only the question of puni-
tive damages, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4-5, the Attorney General asked the
court to resolve the conflict which had developed in the courts below on the judge/jury
issue. Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 2-4.
15. The entire court treated the question of punitive damages as though raised in
an action alleging common law fraud. Whereas the majority insisted that punitive dam-
ages were not warranted because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "insult, indignity,
malice, oppression or bad motive other than .the same false representations" upon which
his claim was based, 288 N.C. at 306, 218 S.E.2d at 344-45, the concurring Justices con-
tended that, even under the rigorous standard of the majority, defendant's conduct called
for the imposition of punitive damages. Id. at 312, 218 S.E.2d at 348. However, be-
cause the treble damages provision was thought to supersede any other recovery of puni-
tive damages, the concurring Justices joined with the majority in ordering that plaintiff's
judgment be trebled.
If, however, proof of fraudulent intent is not a requisite element of plaintiffs case
under this new statutory scheme, neither the majority nor the concurring opinion seems
particularly well founded. Not only is the majority's premise for denying punitive dam-
ages severely eroded; the concurring Justices' interpretation of legislative intent in pro-
viding for treble damages also becomes suspect, since in fact "oppressive" conduct need
not be shown to establish recovery under the statute. The legislature may rather have
intended that treble damages finance litigation costs or represent unprovable actual dam-
ages, leaving the availability of punitive damages for "willful" conduct undisturbed.
Thus, in an appropriate case both treble and punitive damages could be awarded.
16. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). See
note 28 infra for the language of this federal statute. See note 35 infra for the case
cited by the court.
17. Mss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (1975). See cases cited notes 49-50
infra.
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would then determine as a matter of law whether the defendant
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade
or commerce.' 18  But given the facts as stipulated by defendant in
Hardy,'9 the court concluded that there simply was never even a ques-
tionable role for a jury to have assumed: clearly section 75-1.1 had
been violated. The court held that such obviously unfair and deceptive
conduct must always be found to offend concepts of fairness and good
faith. 20  Therefore, the trial judge should have directed a verdict
against defendant as a matter of law and awarded treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16.21 With these instructions, the case was
remanded to the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiff.2 2
Prior to the passage of section 75-1.1 of the General Statutes, the
North Carolina consumer had been virtually without any meaningful
protection against, or remedy for, many unfair and deceptive trade
practices. This section was enacted by the legislature in part "to
declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain, ethical standards
of dealings . . . between persons engaged in business and the consum-
ing public within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings
between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this
State. 23  Perhaps recognizing that "[it is impossible to frame defini-
tions which embrace all unfair practices, '24 the legislature sought to
provide for a flexible maximum of deterrence and compensation.
Thus, in broadly declaring "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" unlaw-
ful,25 the legislature chose not to attempt to enumerate specific
prohibited conduct, 20 but rather to delegate to the judicial process the
18. 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47.
19. Defendant admitted that at the time of the sale to plaintiff Hardy the odometer
showed mileage of at mest 23,000 miles, well under actual mileage of almost 80,000
miles, that it, defendant, knew at that time that the car had been sold twice previously
and that therefore its representations as to the transferability of warranties were false,
and that it had knowingly failed to disclose to plaintiff that the automobile had been
involved in a wreck. Id. at 310-11, 218 S.E:2d at 347.
20. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975).
24. Although the words are those of tue United States Congress explaining its re-
luctance to enumerate specific standards in the Federal Trade Commission Act, H.R.
REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), the North Carolina legislature must have
appreciated the futility of any attempt to list all proscribed activities. See Comment,
supra note 2.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1975).
26. See note 24 supra. THE UNroRm DECEPTrVE TADE PRAcTcns AcT, §§ 2(a)
(1)-(12), and the UNioRM CONSUMER SALES PRAcrTcEs AcT, §§ 3(b)(1)-(11), do pro-
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responsibility for determining on a case by case basis whether in fact
a breach of "good faith and fair dealings" had occurred.27 Until Hardy
v. Toler, however, the potential scope of section 75-1.1 'had not been
explored.
Because the language of section 75-1.1 was drawn almost verbatim
from the Federal Trade Commission Act,28 it was reasonable to suggest
that the North Carolina courts turn to the federal court decisions inter-
preting that Act when faced with cases brought under the North Caro-
lina legislation.2 9 Indeed, several states having similar statutes have held
the federal interpretations to be incorporated into their statutes, either
explicitly by legislative provision,30 or through judicial construction.31
And the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated in Hardy that it too
would at least look to the federal opinions for "[s]ome guidance"
when construing section 75-1.1.32 On the judge or jury question, how-
ever, the court conceded that FTC cases involving administrative rather
than jury determinations on the issue of unfair trade practices are not
"directly in point."33  Policy considerations appropriate in the adminis-
trative agency context clearly differ from those important to an
appreciation of the jury's role in the judicial process.34
Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court did rely heavily
upon the United States Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions
which had held that judicial construction of the meaning of the phrase
"deceptive trade practices" is to be given priority over Federal Trade
Commission rulings.3 5 Because administrative agencies possess a
special expertise, they are "often in a better position than are courts
to determine when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the
pose to forbid a list of specified practices, and several states have adopted similar lists
in their consumer statutes. See note 88 infra.
27. See generally Comment, supra note 2.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful."
29. Comment, supra note 2, at 910.
30. E.g., Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974).
31. E.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 812
(1974).
32. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
33. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
34. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
35. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345, citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); and Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1974).
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[Federal Trade Commission] Act."30  Agency judgments therefore are
to be given extensive weight by reviewing courts before they are
rejected.3 7  But, "in the last analysis the words 'deceptive practices' set
forth a legal standard . . . ."I Thus it is for appellate courts to
correct administrative errors in statutory interpretation or application.""
Turning from the national model, the North Carolina Supreme Court
must have then reasoned that the fact-law distinction of the federal
analogy should translate into a judge/jury distinction in state court
litigation.40
It would seem that not only do the federal cases serve as poor
analogies, but also that the court in Hardy unnecessarily enmeshed
itself in the fact-law dichotomy which has so confounded numerous
courts and commentators in the past.41 It has been submitted that this
classification is nothing more than shorthand for a choice by the courts
of a particular standard of review. 42  Since the scope of review is
thought to differ depending upon the "label" applied,43 courts unwill-
ing to review administrative decisions "are tempted to explain by the
easy devise of calling the question one of 'fact'; and when otherwise dis-
posed, they say it is a question of 'law.' "" If then freedom of review
is the real goal, whether it is sought to avoid problems of delegation
36. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922), in which
the Court declared that "[tihe Commission, in the first instance, subject to the judicial
review provided, has the determination of practices which come within the scope of the
act."
37. The federal statutory scheme depends primarily upon agency expertise for ef-
fective enforcement:
It [the FTC] was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the administra-
tive functions committed to it in "a body specially competent to deal with them
by reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and eco-
nomic conditions of the industry affected," and it was organized in such a man-
ner, with respect to the length and expiration of the terms of office of its mem-
bers, as would "give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing
with these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience."
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934), quoting SENATE COMm.
ON INERsTATE COMMERCE, S. Doc. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1914).
38. FrC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
39. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1972); FTC v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
40. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); NLRB v.
Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1851); Weiner, The Civil Trial Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALiP. L. Rnv.
1867 (1966).
42. L. GREEN, Jtxm AND JURY 279 (1930).
43. W. GELLHoRN & C. BYsE, AnmimSrRATrvE LAW 380 (5th ed. 1970).
44. J. DIcKINsoN, ADMINiSTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THa
UNrrED STATES 55 (2d ed. 1955).
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and separation of powers,45 or merely to extricate appellate courts from
the limitations upon judicial review imposed by the "substantial evi-
dence" rule,46 resolutions of the fact-law debate in the field of adminis-
trative law cast little light on an analysis of the proper functions of judge
and jury in a civil case.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also noted that legislation
similar to section 75-1.1 had recently been interpreted by the courts
of other states.47 Unfortunately, the court chose to focus its attention
on Massachusetts cases which, arising in equity, "did not specifically
address . . . the division of function between judge and jury in deter-
mining whether a violation had occurred. 4 8  Furthermore, it seems
that the cases cited are better read as announcing reasons for setting
aside4' or directing5" verdicts, than as declaring any policy on the judge
or jury allocation. And most of the decisions from other jurisdictions
in which similar legislation was involved are likewise of little value on
the judge/jury issue, either because they too arose in equity,51 or
because the particular statute more specifically spelled out the conduct
proscribed.5 2
45. Although for many years the courts had resisted legislative attempts to delegate
legislative and "executive" power to administrative agencies, when the substantive due
process era came to an end, so in large measure did the courts' resistance to delegation.
Consistent with principles of separation of powers, courts today will not interfere with
agency determinations made within their delegated authority. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMrs-RA TIVE AcTroN 28-86 (1965). By the single expedient of
calling a particular conclusion a finding of fact, the court in many cases will have
avoided a potential confrontation with separation of powers concepts.
46. Since ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912), the United States Su-
preme Court has insisted that agency rulings are not to be displaced unless unsupported
by "substantial evidence." Id. at 547-48. The effect of this rule is to preclude courts
from an extensive review of agency findings, at least those that are classified as "of
fact."
47. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.,E.2d at 346. See cases cited note 88 infra.
48. 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
49. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E2d 748 (1974). The North
Carolina Supreme Court seems to have misinterpreted this Massachusetts opinion: the
quoted language (288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 346) simply reaffirms that plaintiff's
judgment will be overturned only if as a matter of law defendant should have had a di-
rected verdict even before the case was presented to the trier of fact. See text accom-
panying note 20 supra.
50. PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., - Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d 915
(1975). Again, the North Carolina Supreme Court may have misread the Massa-
chusetts decision, which did no more than sustain defendant's demurrer in the lower
court. Clearly, courts can, as a matter of law, exempt certain practices from statutory
attack if they are in no way "immoral, unethical, oppressive nor unscrupulous." Id. at
918.
51. E.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
App. 1973).
52. E.g., Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
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Significantly, the North Carolina Supreme Court had previously
held in Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray 3 that "'[unfair com-
petition is a question of fact. The universal test question is whether
the public is likely to be deceived."'" Although phrased in fact-
law terminology, it is clear that the court envisioned a definite jury
function. While Carolina Aniline was decided on a common-law
unfair competition claim some years before the enactment of section
75-1.1, the juxtaposition of the terms "unfair competition" and "unfair
trade practices" in that section evidences that the two concepts are of
similar import.55 The North Carolina legislation was drawn to encom-
pass any unfair or deceptive practice, whether between a merchant and
his competitors or the merchant and his customers.56 Should not the
court, therefore, have given consideration to the jury preference
implicit in Carolina Aniline as precedent when evaluating the judge or
jury issue posed by section 75-1.1? The State of Washington, as did
North Carolina, patterned its consumer protection statute after the
FTC Act.51' Yet when given the opportunity to construe its legislation
in the context of a jury trial, the Washington Court of Appeals was
emphatic about the jury's role: "We believe that whether defendant's
conduct amounted to an unfair method of competition was a factual
question for the jury and instructing as a matter of law was improper."5"
Instead of obfuscating analysis by couching its conclusions in the
language of the fact-law paradox, the court in Hardy v. Toler might well
have attempted to articulate the policies behind its decision to take from
the jury meaningful involvement in the application of section 75-1.1.
It has often been pronounced, for example, that statutory interpretation
is a function particularly within the special province of the courts."
53. 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
54. Id. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61, quoting 63 C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 112, at 414-15 (1933).
55. Section 75-1.1(a) reflects the parallel meanings of the two terms: "Unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
56. Section 75-1.1 effectively overrules Rice v. Asheville Ice Co., 204 N.C. 768,
169 S.E. 707 (1933) (per curiam). On the federal level, the Wheeler-Lea Amendment
of 1938 had brought otherwise prohibited conduct within FTC jurisdiction by removing
the requirement of actual competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
57. WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (1974) provides: "Unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or com-
merce are hereby declared unlawful."
58. Ivan's Tire Serv. Store, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Wash. App.
110, -, 517 P.2d 229, 238 (1973), afrd, - Wash. -, 546 P.2d 109 (1976).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
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Such a pronouncement certainly has validity in relation. to judicial
definition of the broad parameters of legislative intent"0 or constitu-
tional review. 6' On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
has frequently stated that agency determinations will not be overturned
unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. 62  And in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc.65 the United States Supreme
Court refused to allow a contrary state rule to prevent a jury from
determining if plaintiff were indeed an "employee" within the meaning
of South Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act." Perhaps the fact-
law distinction has again obscured "the real inquiry . . ., namely to
which decision-maker should the task of law application be entrusted,
and why."'65 It can be argued that Congress should allocate the job of
statutory application in administrative cases between courts and agen-
cies to reflect respective expertise, or lack of it, in specific areas. 6
When the allocation must be between judge and jury, "[a] basis for
differentiation [might be] whether the issue involves a sensitive area
that warrants a 'popular' or 'communal' judgment. '6 7  Moreover, just
as administrative rulings are generally considered to be competent as
long as the agency does not exceed its congressionally mandated
authority,66 legislative intent, if discernable, should dictate the proper
division of function between judge and jury when the application of
other statutes is at issue.
Since legislative intention on the judge/jury question is not clear
from the statute itself, 9 it must be inferred indirectly. Although the
court in Hardy must have presumed a particular legislative preference,
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1345-47 (tent. ed. 1958); Brown, Fact and
Law in Judicial Review, 56 HRv. L. REV. 899, 904-05 (1943); Stern, Review of Find-
ings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 H. v. L. REv.
70, 105-07 (1944).
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120, 129 (1944).
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct.
R. 596, 314 A.2d 333 (1973).
62. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1937).
63. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
64. Id. at 533-40.
65. Weiner, supra note 41, at 1873 (second emphasis added).
66. See note 37 supra.
67. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATE-
RILS 686 (1968).
68. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 43, at 380-81, quoting REPORT OF THE
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMImSTRATIVE PROCEDURE 87-91 (1941).
69. Even the Attorney General conceded in his brief that section 75-16 "may be
taken by some as tending to indicate that the jury should find not only the facts but
also as to whether or not there has been a violation of the statute." Brief for Attorney
General as Amicus Curiae at 4.
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fuller consideration might well have yielded a different conclusion. In
addition to electing not to attempt a listing of all forbidden practices, the
North Carolina legislature also declined to establish a special agency
to administer the statute.70 Presumably the legislature also intended
to create a new statutory tort that would not simply subsume the
common-law action of fraud.7 1 Although not independently indicative,
taken together these choices would seem to support an inference of a
legislative bias for jury determinations. The generality of the statutory
scheme necessitates that its prohibitions find specific meaning in its
application "to the facts of particidar cases arising out of unprecedented
situations. '7 2  No administrative agency was created to assume this
responsibility. Juries, however, are particularly adapted to ad hoc
decision making, and it has been contended that "courts should not take
it upon themselves to convert a deliberately flexible standard into some-
thing more concrete by preventing juries from determining the reason-
ableness of human conduct. ' 73  Juries are permitted to find "actionable
fraud and deceit,I74 as well as negligence. If then the gravamen of
this new statutory tort is unethical and unfair conduct,7 1 should not a
jury be allowed to find a deceptive trade practice as well? For as the
Hardy court admitted, deceptive trade practices amount in practical
effect to lesser included degrees of fraud.77  And because section
70. See Comment, supra note 2, at 899.
71. The court itself reached this conclusion. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346,
citing D.D.D. Corp. v. FEC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942) and Garland v. Penegar, 235
N.C. 517, 70 S.E.2d 436 (1952).
72. The quotation is from the United States Supreme Court opinion in FTC v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
73. Weiner, supra note 41, at 1904-05.
74. Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 519, 70 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1952).
75. "Even when the historical facts are undisputed, the jury rather than the judge
will normally decide whether they will be characterized as negligence." Weiner, supra
note 41, at 1876-77. Thus, in a negligence case it is the jury that makes the ultimate
determination of liability.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975).
77. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346. Ironically, the court quotes with approval
from Garland v. Penegar, a case whose facts were virtually identical to those before the
court in Hardy:
"Plaintiff alleged and offered evidence tending to show that the defendant,
an automobile dealer, falsely and fraudulently represented that the automobile
then being sold him was a 'new demonstrator,' that it had been driven only
1,000 miles as the speedometer apparently indicated, and that the automobile
was in perfect condition. Plaintiff testified that instead of it being as repre-
sented the automobile was not a new one but had been previously sold to an-
other person who drove it 8,000 miles and then turned it back to the defendant.
Plaintiff also testified the automobile was not in good condition, and that he
had incurred trouble and expense in repairs.
It is apparent from an examination of the record that the plaintiff offered
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75-1.1 was designed to accomplish more than a codification of existing
case law,78 it would not be appropriate to allow state judges to construe
the statute according to common-law concepts. However, if the jury
is to have no role in determining liability under the statute, it is likely
that trial judges may continue to require proof of a common-law tort
in consumer actions." Such a practice would undoubtedly frustrate the
legislative purpose of providing a potent statutory remedy for unfair or
deceptive trade practices.
In addition to the difficulties of discerning legislative purpose on
the issue, several other policies converge that must be reconciled before
deciding the judge/jury question. Foremost among these is the extent
to which "a fixed standard that applies to all members of the commu-
nity impartially" is to be valued over an ad hoc determination that
better takes into account the peculiar circumstances of an individual
case. 0 The North Carolina Attorney General argued in Hardy, as
amicus curiae, that a consistent interpretation of section 75-1.1 was vital
both to insure uniform application on a state-wide basis, and to encour-
age private actions by providing "guidance. .. to both courts and at-
torneys for the future trial of such actions."8" Implicit in such a position
must be the fear of a free-wheeling, plaintiff-consumer oriented jury,
especially when treble damages automatically accrue.82 Yet in Byrd the
United States Supreme Court rejected just such a contention as an insuf-
ficient justification for denying plaintiff the right to have a jury deter-
mine his status" in an analogous situation.
sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury on the issue of actionable fraud
and deceit, and that defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly
denied."
Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346, quoting Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 518-19, 70
S.E.2d 486, 487 (1952). The net effect of the court's ruling on the judge/jury issue
in Hardy, therefore, is to deny that which plaintiff would have had prior to the passage
of section 75-1.1: a jury judgment on defendant's conduct. Surely it was not the legisla-
ture's intent to deprive consumer plaintiffs of the considerable protection already pro-
vided by the prospect of a jury determination in the fraud cases.
78. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
79. The lower court judge in Hardy must have done so himself.
80. J. CouND, J. FRmDENTHAL, & A. MiLLER, supra note 67, at 685-86.
81. Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 4.
82. It has been argued that a jury can effectively impose strict liability upon any
defendant brought before it, unless its function is severely controlled. See J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRuL 110-11 (1949). And courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to
let a jury find liability when any award it returns will be tripled. In this context it
is important to note, however, that whereas the Federal Trade Commission Act makes
no provision for private actions or treble damages, the North Carolina legislation pro-
vides for both, and in the context of a jury trial. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975).
83. 356 U.S. at 538.
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Even were an extensive role assumed for the jury, the court would
in no way be displaced from an important supervisory function in the
administration of the statute. Certain specific practices, proven
through experience to be unfair, could still be declared deceptive by
rule of law. s4 Clearly, when such conduct is before the jury, courts
would be justified in directing a verdict for the plaintiff," or setting
aside a jury verdict clearly against the weight of common experience.80
For these purposes North Carolina courts should look to federal and
other state88 decisions for "some guidance." But when confronted with
84. See note 50 supra.
85. See Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974).
86. See PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., - Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d
915 (1975).
87. Since the enactment of the North Carolina legislation, the United States Con-
gress passed a federal odometer statute which makes it unlawful to sell any vehicle
whose actual mileage is not reflected on the vehicle's odometer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1984,
1989 (1970). Several cases have recently been reported in which liability has been
found under these sections. Coulbourne v. Rollins Auto Leasing Corp., 392 F. Supp.
1198 (D. Del. 1975); Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.W. Va. 1975);
Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury, 383 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Delay v.
Heam Ford, 373 F. Supp. 791 (D.S.C. 1974). In addition to suits brought under this
special statute, numerous cases have been decided under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act
which might reveal the potential scope of section 75-1.1. E.g., FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (door to door selling practices); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291
U.S. 67 (1934) (product misrepresentations); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (unsubstantiated product claims); Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (bait & switch advertising); All-State Indus., Inc. v. FrC, 423
F.2d 423 (1970) (failure to disclose that a promissory note would be transferable to
a holder in due course, cutting off buyer's defenses); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC,
379 F.2d 666 (1967) (misrepresenting warranties); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (deceptive advertising); Fresh Grown Preservo
Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942) (labeling).
88. The North Carolina legislature has also enacted an odometer statute since the
commencement of the litigation in Hardy, which provides that its violation constitutes
an unfair trade practice under section 75-1.1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-349 (1975). The
legislature has added further definition to the provisions of section 75-1.1 through the
passage of id. § 25A-44(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975), the Retail Installment Sales Act, which
declares that a violation of that section also violates section 75-1.1.
Furthermore, other conduct has been recognized to be unfair under the deceptive
trade practices legislation of several states. See, e.g., Scott Imports v. Orton, 27 Ariz.
App. 354, 527 P.2d 513 (1974) (turning back odometer); Nash v. Hoopes, 332 A.2d
411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (failure to disclose existing mortgage default and impending
foreclosure); In re Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., 306 A.2d 24 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)
(misrepresenting condition of automobile); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., - Mass. -,
322 N.E.2d 768 (1975) (automobile); PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
- Mass. -, 321 N.E.2d 915 (1975) (refusal to accept newspaper advertising not a vio-
lation); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, - Mass. -, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974) (resale fee
without furnishing services); State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. App. 1973) (automobile); Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332
N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974) (failure to honor warranties, misrepresenta-
tion of product qualities, failure to provide prior written estimates of repairs); Com-
monwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 812 (1974) (terms in
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
new and unique circumstances, the courts should give a jury the first
chance to pass on the "fairness" of the defendant's actions. Perhaps
the standard for a jury instruction on the meaning of "unfair and decep-
tive" practices should be that proposed by the court in Carolina Ani-
line: "Whether the public is likely to be deceived."8 9  Although less
freely reviewable, a jury finding in such a case would be supported by
the weight of a community judgment on a sensitive public issue.
Furthermore, rather than hampering the instigation of private actions
to enforce the statute, the prospect of a jury verdict would seem to en-
courage such actions. Indeed, if section 75-1.1 is to fulfill its promise,
a jury drawn from the consuming public must be given a substantial
involvement in the denunciation of unfair or deceptive trade practices.
The North Carolina Supreme Court need not be deterred from a
thorough reconsideration of the judge/jury question by its decision in
Hardy v. Toler. For the court in Hardy did no more than refer to the
historical functions of judge and jury, assuming without further analysis
that they were to be grafted into the statutory scheme of section
75-1.1. The ultimate disposition of the case, however, did not itself
depend upon a resolution of this issue, for even had the court decreed
a major role for the jury in determining liability under the statute in
future cases, a directed verdict was clearly dictated by the facts of this
case. In the face of defendant's stipulations, no reasonable jury could
have been allowed to find otherwise than that the statute had been vio-
lated. As a consequence, the court should feel free to undertake an
independent evaluation of the differing policies at issue before restrict-
ing itself to a superficial resolution of the judge/jury question. Hardy
need not be directly overruled; it certainly should continue to serve as
a declaration that the specific acts therein alleged constitute deceptive
trade practices as a matter of law. But as suggested above, the better
reasoned analysis on the more critical judge or jury issue must result
in a significant role for the jury in deciding whether particular conduct
amounts to an unfair or deceptive trade practice if the North Carolina
legislation is to have any real impact.
JAMES MCGEE PHILLIPS, JR.
an agreement); Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (misrepresentation of agent's authority). See also People v. Jack Dykstus Ford,
Inc., 52 Mich. App. 337, 217 N.W.2d 99 (1974) (violation of odometer statute).
89. 221 N.C. at 272, 20 S.E.2d at 61.
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Contracts to Devise Realty-Sufficiency of Will as Memo for
Statute of Frauds
Upon breach of a contract to devise realty, an aggrieved party may
be awarded specific performance of the contract or damages only if the
contract complies with the Statute of Frauds.' Consequently, courts are
often called upon to decide whether a certain contract to devise meets
with the Statutes requirements, especially the requirement of a writing.
In Rape v. Lyerly2 the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the first
time that a revoked will constituted a written memorandum of an oral
contract to devise sufficient to comply with North Carolina's Statute of
Frauds. 3  Through the legal fiction of a constructive trust, the court
granted specific performance of the contract. Upon examination, the
conclusions of the court appear to be sound ones.
The Rape case arose out of an alleged oral contract between James
Lyerly and the Rapes.' In return for the Rapes' living with him and
serving his needs, Lyerly promised to leave his property to Mrs. Rape,
his daughter, by will. In 1959 Lyerly executed and delivered to the
Rapes a will devising to Mrs. Rape all of his real property. 5 The Rapes
fully performed their promise; yet Lyerly in 1969 executed a second
will, revoking the 1959 will and devising only part of his real estate to
the Rapes." At Lyerly's death, Mrs. Rape's surviving children brought
suit to enforce specifically the provisions of the oral contract. The other
devisees under the 1969 will defended on the ground that the Statute of
Frauds makes void any oral contract to convey real estate. Afffirming a
1. North Carolina's Statute of Frauds is N.C. Gm. STAT. § 22-2 (1965). It
provides: "All contracts to sell or convey any lands . . . shall be void unless said
contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the party
to be charged therewith. .. ."
2. 287 N.C. 601, 215 S.E.2d 737 (1975).
3. Id. at 615, 215 S.E.2d at 746.
4. The Rapes are Mildred Lyerly Rape, deceased daughter of James Lyerly, and
Basil M. Rape. Id. at 610, 215 S.E.2d at 743.
5. 287 N.C. at 604, 215 S.E.2d at 739. The will stated:
"Fourth: It is my opinion that $16,000.00 is a fair market value of my real
property lying in Steele Township, Rowan County, N.C. Since my daughter,
Mildred Lyerly Rape and my son, Woodrow W. Lyerly have obligated them-
selves to care for my wife and myself during our lifetime, all of my real prop-
erty, I give and bequeath to Mildred Lyerly Rape upon payment by her to the
following: 1st. To my son, Woodrow W. Lyerly the sum of $6,000.00. 2nd.
To my son, Gray Lyerly the sum of $1,000.00 3rd. To my daughter, Kath-
erine Lyerly Mack the sum of $1,000.00."
6. Id. at 605, 215 S.E.2d at 740.
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superior court judgment for the Rapes, 7 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals determined that the 1959 will "provided a sufficient memoran-
dum of the agreement to comply with the Statute of Frauds."'8 On
appeal, Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the North Carolina Supreme
Court, agreed with the lower courts and ordered specific performance of
the contract for the plaintiffs' benefit.
Although the Statute of Frauds speaks only of contracts to "sell or
convey" land, North Carolina cases clearly establish that the scope of
North Carolina's Statute of Frauds9 includes contracts to devise.10 Thus
oral contracts to devise realty not evidenced by a sufficient writing,
memorandum, or note are void and unenforceable. 1 Upon breach of
parol contracts to devise, only actions in quantum meruit or implied
assumpsit will lie in favor of an aggrieved party.'2 In quantum meruit
actions, the promisee recovers only the value of the services that he has
rendered; the promisee cannot recover the benefit of his bargain or the
value of the realty that had been promised him.'8 The few North
Carolina cases that awarded money damages for the breach .of or
specifically enforced an oral contract to devise not evidenced by a
writing'14 have been expressly or impliedly overruled.1 5
7. Rape v. Lyerly, 23 N.C. App. 241, 208 S.E.2d 712 (1974).
8. Id. at 247, 208 S.E.2d at 716.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970); Jamerson v.
Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948); Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d
764 (1947); Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.C. 103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944);
Hicks v. Hicks, 13 N.C. App. 347, 185 S.E.2d 430 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962);
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Humphrey v. Faison, 247 N.C.
127, 100 S.E.2d 524 (1957); Clapp v. Clapp, 241 N.C. 281, 85 S.E.2d 153 (1954);
Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943); Grantham v. Grantham,
205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
12. See, e.g., Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962);
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540,
46 S.E.2d 561 (1948); Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Grady v.
Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760 (1944); Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224
N.C. 103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331
(1933); Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 241, 145 S.E. 233 (1928); Edwards v. Matthews,
196 N.C. 39, 144 S.E. 300 (1928); Faircloth v. Kinlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299
(1914); Miller v. Lash, 85 N.C. 45 (1881); Hicks v. Hicks, 13 N.C. App. 347, 185
S.E.2d 430 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Wells v. Foreman, 236 N.C. 351, 72 S.E.2d 765; Stewart v. Wyrick,
228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Grady v. Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760
(1944); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937).
14. Lipe v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 207 N.C. 794, 178 S.E. 665 (1935); Hager
v. Whitener, 204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 645 (1933); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150
S.E. 881 (1929); Lipe v. Houck, 128 N.C. 115, 38 S.E. 297 (1901).
15. Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962); Grantham v.
Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
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Other North Carolina cases on contracts to devise realty clearly
establish that a written contract to devise is enforceable."' Although an
aggrieved party to a written contract to devise is entitled to bring an
action to recover money damages, both according to the general rule1"
and to a few North Carolina cases,18 the more common remedy for
breach is in the nature of specific performance.1 9 North Carolina case
law often speaks of specifically enforcing a contract by making one of
the testator's devisees or heirs at law a constructive trustee of the realty
for the aggrieved plaintiff.2" Some cases purport to grant specific
performance only when it would be equitable to do so, 21 but North
Carolina courts have yet to deny a claimant recovery on equitable
grounds.
When a promisor performs his oral contract to devise realty by
executing a will and then revokes, the issue becomes whether a will can
constitute a memorandum of the contract sufficient for the Statute of
Frauds.22 Prior to Rape, no appellate court case in North Carolina had
held that a revoked will is a sufficient memorandum for this purpose.2
16. See, e.g., Schoolfield v. Collins, 281 N.C. 604, 189 S.E.2d 208 (1972);
McCraw v. Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Clark v. Butts, 240 N.C.
709, 83 S.E.2d 885 (1954); Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398 (1938);
Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Stockard v. Warren, 175
N.C. 283, 95 S.E. 579 (1918); Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N.C. 91, 49 S.E. 49 (1904);
Price v. Price, 133 N.C. 494, 45 S.E. 855 (1903); East v. Dolihite, 72 N.C. 562 (1875).
17. B. SPApms, CoNTRAcrs TO MAKn WLrs 136 (1956).
18. Halsey v. Snell, 214 N.C. 209, 198 S.E. 633 (1938).
19. The remedy is "in the nature of specific performance" because the effect of the
contract is carried out. Truly, there could not be specific performance of an act made
physically impossible by the promisor's death. Yet, as SPARKS, supra note 17, at 156
notes, it is pointless to say that specific performance actually is not being carried out.
20. See, e.g., Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 377-78, 199 S.E. 398, 401 (1938);
Stockard v. Warren, 175 N.C. 283, 285, 95 S.E. 579, 580 (1918), quoting from an
annotation following Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S.W. 117 (1912), in 31 Am. &
Eng. Ann. Cas. 1917A, 394, 399:
"[While a court of chancery is without power to compel the execution of a
will, and therefore the specific execution of an agreement to make a will can-
not be enforced, yet if the contract is sufficiently proved and appears to have
been binding on the decedent, and the usual conditions relating to specific
performance have been complied with, then equity will specifically enforce it
by seizing the property which is the subject matter of the agreement, and fas-
tening a trust on it in favor of the person to whom the decedent agreed to
give it by his will."
See also Clark v. Butts, 240 N.C. 709, 83 S.E.2d 885 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N.C. 91, 49 S.E. 49 (1904), requiring that
the contract be for a valuable and fair consideration, be fair and just and mutual, not be
procured by undue influence or imposition, be performed fully and faithfully by the
aggrieved, and not result in an oppressive or harsh or inequitable decree.
22. Where a promisor performs his oral contract to devise realty by executing a
will which is subsequently declared invalid, also at issue is whether the will can
constitute a memorandum of the contract sufficient for'the Statute of Frauds.
23. 23 N.C. App. at 246, 208 S.E.2d at 716.
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One North Carolina Supreme Court decision, McCraw v. Llewellyn,2 4
held that a particular revoked will did not of itself constitute a sufficient
memo and, in so holding, implied that a revoked will could constitute a
sufficient memo for Statute of Frauds purposes. As a general rule,
commentators25 and courts26 have agreed that a revoked will can serve
as a sufficient memo of a contract to devise. Courts in a substantial
number of other jurisdictions have implied, while holding that the
specific will at issue was not evidence of an oral contract, that a revoked
will could be a sufficient memo of a contract to devise.
In deciding whether a revoked will is a memo of the oral contract
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, at issue is the content of the
writing, not its form.18 Generally required are the names of the parties,
the signature of the party to be charged, the terms and conditions of the
contract, a description of the property, and all essential elements of the
undertaking. 2 North Carolina cases require the will to include a
written expression of the intent and obligation of the parties3 0-specifi-
cally, the price for the realty,31 a description of the realty,32 and the
24. 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962).
25. See e.g., Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 921 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Potter v. Bland, 136 Cal. App. 2d 125, 288 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Maddox v. Rowe, 23 Ga. 431 (1857); Holsz v. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200
N.E. 601 (1936); Falk v. Fulton, 124 Kan. 745, 262 P. 1025 (1928); Nelson
v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147 (1913); Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 147,
97 S.W. 901 (1906); Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 P. 1158 (1916); In re Anderson's
Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A.2d 301 (1944); Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54 A. 24
(1903); Upson v. Fitzgerald, 129 Tex. 211, 103 S.W.2d 147 (1937); In re Lube's Estate,
225 Wis. 365, 274 N.W. 276 (1937).
27. Brought v. Howard, 30 Ariz. 522, 249 P. 76 (1926); Kobus v. San Diego Trust
& Say. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Luders v.
Security Trust & Savings Bank, 121 Cal. App. 408, 9 P.2d 271 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932);
Southern v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 A. 132 (1932); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 66 N.J.
Super. 246, 168 A.2d 839 (App. Div. 1961); Hunt v. Hunt, 55 App. Div. 430, 66 N.Y.S.
957 (1900), afjfd, 171 N.Y. 396, 64 N.E. 159 (1902); Wilson v. Dunkle, 71 Ohio L.
Abs. 483, 132 N.E.2d 483 (Licking County C.P. 1955); Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn.
647, 235 S.W.2d 808 (1951); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 P. 479
(1913); Gray v. Marino, 138 W. Va. 585, 76 S.E.2d 585 (1953); Estate of Rosenthal,
247 Wis. 555, 20 N.W.2d 643 (1945).
28. Annot., supra note 25, at 926.
29. See, e.g., 72 AM. Jtr. 2d Statute of Frauds '§ 305 (1974); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF ComxncuS § 207 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); Annot., supra note 25, at
932.
30. McCraw v. Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Chason v.
Marley, 224 N.C. 844, 32 S.E.2d 652 (1945); Kluttz v. Allison, 214 N.C. 379, 199 S.E.
395 (1938); Keith v. Bailey, 185 N.C. 262, 116 S.E. 729 (1923).
31. Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N.C. 183, 49 S.E. 104 (1904).
32. Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964); Searcy v. Logan, 226 N.C.
562, 39 S.E.2d 593 (1946); Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723 (1940).
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names of both parties to the contract. 3 Those cases from other juris-
dictions which have considered the issue of sufficiency look most fre-
quently to one factor in their determination: whether the will in its
dispositions makes reference to the alleged oral contract. 84
In Rape v. Lyerly the North Carolina court held that a revoked will
could constitute a sufficient memorandum of an oral contract to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds; yet it may be argued that the will in Rape was not
a sufficient memorandum of the contract. For example, one might
argue that the actual words of disposition used by Lyerly in his will do
not refer to a contract to devise. Lyerly stated that he devised his realty
"since" Mildred Rape had "obligated" herself to care for him.85 Such
dispositive terms are amenable to two constructions. First, the testator
could be merely coupling his devise with an explanation for his generosi-
ty to Mildred Rape.36 Such a construction compels the finding that the
will is not a memo of the contract, because a memo must show not
merely the appreciation and intention of one of the parties, but rather
the promises and obligation running between the parties to the con-
tract.37
Under the second possible construction, the testator could be
recording the promises and obligations of each party to a contract to
devise. That the devise was to Mildred Rape "since" she served Lyerly
does not, of itself, show the contractual nature of the devise; "since"
merely shows the causal relation between the devise and the service. The
use of the words, "ha[d] obligated", in Lyerly's will, on the other hand.
does show the contractual nature of the devise. Obligation generally
refers to duty or promise arising from legal compulsion; here the only
legal obligation to which the testator could have intended to refer is that
of contract. Moreover, only infrequently or inadvertently does obliga-
33. Elliot v. Owen, 244 N.C. 684, 94 S.E.2d 833 (1956).
34. Kobus v. San Diego Trust & Say. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Busque v. Marcou, 147 Me. 289, 86 A.2d 873 (1952); Southern
v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 A. 132 (1932); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 66 N.J. Super. 246,
168 A.2d 839 (App. Div. 1961); In re Anderson's Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A.2d 301
(1944); Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn. 647, 235 S.W.2d 808 (1951); Upson v. Fitzger-
ald, 129 Tex. 211, 103 S.W.2d 147 (1937); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138,
137 P. 479 (1913); cf. Falk v. Fulton, 124 Kan. 745, 262 P. 1025 (1928); but see
Shroyer v. Smith. 204 Pa. 310, 54 A. 24 (1903).
35. See note 5 supra.
36. Explanatory clauses in wills are not uncommon and serve the useful purpose of
educating family members to the reasons behind the testator's dispositive scheme.
37. See Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 247, 145 S.E. 233, (1928), finding that a will
was not a memo of a contract to devise. See also Luders v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 121 Cal. App. 408, 9 P.2d 271 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932), holding that a devise for the
devisee's faithful service to the testator did not serve as a memo of a contract to devise.
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tion refer to an unenforceable, gratuitous promise or to a moral obliga-
tion; such a usage is not generally to be expected in a legal document.
The dispositive terms of the will record the promises and obligations of
the contract and, in doing so, make the reference to a contract that is
required by most cases38 deciding whether a revoked will serves as a
memo of a contract. 9
Lyerly's will identified both parties to the contract and stated the
contract's terms and conditions: devise in return for services. The
testator's signature at the will's excution served as the signature of the
party to be charged; his reference to the location of the realty was a
satisfactory description of it.40 Arguments that the will was not a
sufficient memo were properly rejected by the court.
An objection that can be made to the Rape case concerns that
portion of Chief Justice Sharp's opinion dealing with the right to revoke
a will executed pursuant to a contract.4 A will is ambulatory and
always revokable,42 regardless of a contract to devise or not to revoke.
However, the opinion in Rape, without stating that a will can never be
irrevocable, quotes extensively from sources explaining that a will can-
not be revoked to defeat contractual obligations. To say, as is some-
times said in courts of equity, that relief is granted because a will
becomes irrevocable when executed in compliance with an enforceable
contract 43 is incorrect.4" The meaning of such statements is that,
regardless of revocation, equity will impress a constructive trust upon
the devised realty in favor of the contractual promisee. 45
The distinction between one's right to revoke a will and one's right
38. See note 34 supra.
39. See also Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 P. 1158 (1916), where a devise in
return for the home and care of devisee was a sufficient reference to and definition of
the contract to devise.
40. For cases dealing with the sufficiency of the description of realty in a memo
for Statute of Frauds purposes, see, e.g., Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 173 S.E.2d
783 (1970); Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964); Searcy v. Logan, 226
N.C. 562, 39 S.E.2d 593 (1946); Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723
(1940); Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54A. 24 (1903).
41. 287 N.C. at 618, 215 S.E.2d at 748.
42. Cf. T. ATKiNSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WmLs 21S, 224 (1953); 94 C.J.S.
Wills §§ 117, 127(2) (1956); 1 H. UNDERHiLL, A TxAnSE ON THE LAw OF Wirs §
289 (1900).
43. Johnston v. Tomrme, 199- Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730 (1946); Annot., 3 A.LR.
172 (1919); B. SPARKs, CoNTRACTs TO MAKE WILLs 111 (1956); Costigan, Constructive
Trusts based upon Promises Made to Secure Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession,
28 H v. L. REv. 237, 250 (1915).
44. B. SPARKs, supra note 43, at 111.
45. Costigan, supra note 43, at 250.
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to rescind a contract needs to be drawn. The correct relation between
these rights is that the right to revoke does not give one the right to
rescind. The opinion in Rape fails to state this distinction and incor-
rectly implies that one's inability to rescind a valid contract bars revoca-
tion of the will executed pursuant to the contract. By citing cases"
from other jurisdictions that directly state that execution of a will
pursuant to a contract bars revocation of it,4 7 Rape v. Lyerly propounds
incorrect theories and promotes confusion about the justification for
specific performance of a contract to devise. The correct justification
rests simply upon the breach of contract to devise.
In conclusion, the North Carolina Supreme Court improperly justi-
fied the remedy that it awarded. Nonetheless, the remedy, conclusions,
and holding of the court in Rape v. Lyerly are proper ones. The
court's holding, that a revoked will can provide a sufficient memoran-
dum of an oral agreement for Statute of Frauds purposes, had no North
Carolina precedent but is supported by the weight of authority from
other jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the North Carolina courts' ability
to enforce an oral contract to devise realty evidenced by a will, promi-
sees are well advised to insist upon a separate written instrument con-
taining the promise to devise.
EVERETT B. SASLOW, JR.
Criminal Law-A Survey and Appraisal of the Law of En-
trapment in North Carolina
In attempting to apprehend persons involved in the so-called
victimless crimes,1 modem law enforcement officers have found it
necessary to set traps that are often quite elaborate to obtain evidence
needed for conviction. In setting a trap, it is often necessary for the law
officer or his agent to actually participate in the criminal act. The
46. 287 N.C. at 615, 215 S.E.2d at 748.
47. See, e.g., Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730 (1946). See also
In re Estate of Ranthum, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 337 (1958); Brock v. Noecker, 66
N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936).
1. "Victimless crimes" include crimes in which there is no "victim" or in which
the "victim" is a willing participant. Crimes relating to prostitution, homosexuality,
narcotics, liquor sales, and gambling are common examples. See Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L Rnv. 871, 874-75 (1963).
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amount of actual participation by the officer can vary substantially de-
pending on the nature of the crime and the surrounding circumstances,
as well as the aggressiveness of the officer himself. This participation
can range from a minimal role of observation to substantial overt solici-
tation. If the solicitation becomes so strong that the government could
be manufacturing criminal acts when none would have existed other-
wise, the validity of any subsequent criminal prosecution must be
questioned.
Courts have created the defense of entrapment in order to prevent
government law enforcement officials from creating crime when none
previously existed. The defense of entrapment is recognized in the
federal courts2 and in almost all state courts3 except Tennessee.4  Al-
though each jurisdiction has its own definition, entrapment is generally
recognized as a defense when government officials or agents, by
persuasion, trickery, or fraud, induce or incite a person to commit a
crime in order to prosecute that person. In particular, courts have
required that criminal intent and design originate with the government
officials or agents rather than with the defendant in order for the
defense to operate. 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently examined the
North Carolina law of entrapment in State v. Stanley,6 in which it found
for the first time the presence of entrapment as a matter of law. The
defendant in Stanley was a seventeen-year-old high school student
charged with felonious possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute, and felonious distribution of a controlled sub-
stance.7 At trial in superior court, Stanley, the defendant, admitted
that the alleged transaction had occurred, but he relied on the defense
of entrapment. Although the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the
charge of felonious possession, Stanley was acquitted on the charge of
distribution of a controlled substance.'
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
3. W. LAFA E & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 48, at 370 (1972);
A. LOEWY, CRiMINAL LAW IN A NuTsHELL § 13.06 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LOEwY];
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961). Although the status of the defense is unclear
in New York, entrapment has not been rejected as a defense there. People v. Williams,
38 Misc. 2d 80, 237 N.Y.S.2d 527 (County Ct. 1963).
4. Warden v. State, 214 Tenn. 398, 381 S.W.2d 247 (1964).
5. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Bumette, 242 N.C. 164,
87 S.E.2d 191 (1955). See also Annot., 62 A.LR.3d 110 (1975).
6. 288 N.C. 19, 215 S.E.2d 589 (1975).
7. The parties stipulated that the controlled substance was found to be lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD). Id. at 20, 215 S.E.2d at 590.
8. Id. at 20-25, 215 S.E.2d at 590-93.
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Upon appeal by defendant, the court of appeals found no trial
error; however, the issue of entrapment was not raised before the court
of appeals.' Defendant then petitioned for certiorari to the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, but again he did not raise the entrapment issue.1"
The supreme court granted certiorari" and, upon examination of the
trial court record, chose to consider the entrapment defense by exercis-
ing its general supervisory powers over inferior state courts.12  The
high court held that the uncontradicted evidence showed that the
undercover agent of the state, in establishing a "big brother" relation-
ship with the defendant, had induced the defendant to commit the
criminal act and that the intent to commit the crime originated with the
agent of the state rather than with the defendant. Therefore, the court
found that the evidence compelled a finding of entrapment as a matter
of law.13
While Stanley is the first North Carolina Supreme Court decision
to find entrapment as a matter of law, the defense has previously been
recognized in North Carolina. The first case to consider entrapment
was State v. Smith.' 4 In that case an agent of the police illegally bought
liquor from the defendant. Although the word "entrapment" was not
used to describe the defense, the defendant contended that the conduct
of the police agent in purchasing the liquor should be a bar to prosecu-
tion. The court rejected the defense, reasoning that this technique of
trapping the defendant was a reasonable method of confirming suspi-
cions of illegal conduct. The court stated that "[i]t is not the motive
of the buyer, but the conduct of the seller which is to be considered."15
The defendant had broken the law, and he could not complain "that the
law of the jungle was violated."'16
The court reached the same result in State v. Hopkins," a similar
case that arose one year after Smith. The conviction was upheld in
Hopkins, and although the court noted that the methods used by the
9. State v. Stanley, 24 N.C. App. 323, 210 S.E.2d 496 (1974). The court of ap-
peals, in affirming the trial court's ruling, held that possession of a controlled substance
was properly found to be a lesser included offense of distribution of a controlled sub-
stance.
10. 288 N.C. at 25-26, 215 S.E.2d at 594.
11. 286 N.C. 547, 212 S.E.2d 169 (1975).
12. 288 N.C. at 25-27, 215 S.E.2d at 593-94 (1975).
13. Id. at 32-33, 215 S.E.2d at 597-98.
14. 152 N.C. 798, 67 S.E. 508 (1910).
15. Id. at 800, 67 S.E. at 509.
16. Id.
17. 154 N.C. 622, 70 SE. 394 (1911).
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officers of the law had been criticized, it was held that "the transaction
is, so far as [the] defendant is concerned, a violation of law."' 8
Almost forty years after Smith and Hopkins, the North Carolina
Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the defense of entrapment in
State v. Love.19 The court held that for entrapment to exist, the offi-
cer's conduct must amount to more than mere initiation, invitation,
or exposure to temptation, but must constitute trickery, fraud, or
persuasion. Although the improper conduct of the officer is an essential
element of the defense, the crucial factor in establishing entrapment
is the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. The Love court
found that, for entrapment to exist, the trickery, fraud, or persuasion
must be "practiced upon one who entertained no prior criminal
intent. ' 20
The North Carolina rule on entrapment crystallized into its present
form in State v. Burnette.2' The court held in Burnette that entrapment
exists when an officer or agent of the government, by persuasion,
trickery, or fraud, induces or incites a person to commit a crime in order
to prosecute. The court found it essential that the criminal intent and
design originate in the mind of one other than the defendant, and also,
that there be a finding that the defendant would not have committed
the act but for the inducement. 22 In utilizing this definition, the court
made clear that the major issue is the defendant's predisposition. It
follows that under this test of predisposition, the government's conduct
assumes importance only because the degree of inducement or incite-
18. Id. at 624, 70 S.E. at 394.
19. 229 N.C. 99, 47 S.E.2d 712 (1948). See also State v. Godwin, 227 N.C. 449,
42 S.E.2d 617 (1947) (problems related to entrapment discussed, but decision reached
on other grounds).
20. 229 N.C. at 101, 47 S.E.2d at 714.
21. 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955).
22. In order for there to be entrapment, the officer or agent of the government
must do more than merely offer the accused an opportunity to commit the criminal act.
See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 270 N.C. 357, 154 S.E.2d 485 (1967); State v. Kilgore, 246
N.C. 455, 98 S.E.2d 346 (1957) (per curiam); State v. Greenlee, 25 N.C. App. 640,
214 S.E.2d 246 (1975); State v. Stanback, 19 N.C. App. 375, 198 S.E.2d 759, cert. de-
nied, 284 N.C. 258, 200 S.E.2d 658 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974); State
v. Hendrix, 19 N.C. App. 99, 197 S.E.2d 892 (1973); State v. Williams, 14 N.C. App.
431, 188 S.E.2d 717 (1972). In narcotics cases, such facts as inquiring to purchase,
arranging a meeting for sale, ready acquiescence in sale, and admission of at least one
prior illegal sale have probative value in establishing an inference that the intent orig-
inated with the defendant. State v. Salame, 24 N.C. App. 1, 210 S.E.2d 77 (1974), cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 286 N.C. 419, 211 S.E.2d 800 (1975). For other entrap-
ment cases see State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832
(1960); State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958); State v. Wallace, 246
N.C. 445, 98 S.E.2d 473 (1957); State v. Bradshaw, 12 N.C. App. 510, 183 S.E.2d 787
(1971).
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ment helps establish the amount of active participation by the accused
in the crime: governmental participation is simply used as a means of
measuring the defendant's predisposition.
In order properly to analyze entrapment, it is essential first to
establish the legal basis as well as the policy rationale for allowing the
defense. Entrapment does not rest on constitutional grounds. The
United States Supreme Court has considered the constitutional status
of entrapment principally on due process grounds, but the Court has
refused to reverse a conviction allegedly involving entrapment on con-
stitutional grounds.2 3 Although the due process argument has not been
totally ruled out, it seems unlikely that a case of entrapment will ever
be decided on constitutional grounds. Since entrapment is recognized
as a valid defense in almost all jurisdictions in the United States,2 4 it
appears that even in extreme cases courts will acquit on the ground of
entrapment before reaching the constitutional question.
Since the entrapment defense does not rest on constitutional
grounds, courts have utilized a number of legal theories and policy
statements to justify the defense. One such theoretical justification is
that the government is estopped from prosecution because entrapment
is unconscionable and contrary to public policy,25 deriving from "a spon-
taneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent, though ductile, persons into lapses which they might
otherwise resist."2 It should be noted, however, that general state-
ments of public policy fail adequately to distinguish whether the ulti-
mate purpose of the defense is to protect a right of the accused or to
prohibit intolerable government activity.
In support of the position that the purpose of the entrapment
defense is to protect a substantive right of the accused, certain courts,
interpreting criminal statutes, have held that the defense is based on
an inference that the legislature did not intend for the given statute
to apply to a victim of entrapment.2 7  Consequently, if this unwritten
purpose of the statute is intended to protect a substantive right of the
accused rather than being a deterrent to improper government activity,
23. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United Statet, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
24. Lonwy, supra note 3, § 13.06; 22 C..S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961).
25. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932), citing Newman v. United
States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924).
26. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (Learned Hand,
J.).
27. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445-49 (1932).
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the defense should be available without regard to the identity of the
entrapper. However, it has uniformly been held that entrapment is
available as a defense only when the entrapper is an officer or agent
of the government.2 s
Beyond considerations of the identity of the entrapper, courts that
have attributed the entrapment defense to an unwritten legislative pur-
pose have indulged in judicial inventiveness unless, of course, entrap-
ment itself has been defined by statute. While some ciimes require
a form of specific intent, most victimless crimes only require general
intent.2 9  For example, in the prosecution of an illegal drug sale, it is
enough for the state to show that the accused made the sale. No fur-
ther proof of intent is usually necessary. Since this minimal degree of
intent is present even when the accused is a victim of entrapment, the
transaction clearly falls within the scope of the statute.3 A search of
the statutes fails to provide any objective evidence that the legislative
intent requires the exclusion of the accused from the scope of the
statute.
Although there is general agreement that a victim of entrapment
should not be convicted, the reasons for such a position go beyond con-
cern for the interests of a particular defendant. An examination of sig-
nificant entrapment cases reveals the concern of the courts over the de-
gree of government participation and encouragement in the offenses.
Although drug-related crime as well as other offenses may be generally
recognized as harmful to society, the practice of setting traps for poten-
tial violators "is . . .a repugnant practice, distasteful at its best and
intolerable at its worst."'" The North Carolina court first expressed
its concern for such government tactics in State v. Godwin when it
observed that the state's case relied on a "broken reed" since the
28. State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E.2d 507 (1955); State v. Yost, 9 N.C.
App. 671, 177 S.E.2d 320 (1970), cert. denied, Yost v. Ross, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971).
See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415,
281 N.E.2d 803 (1972).
29. See State v. Love, 229 N.C. 99, 102, 47 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1948).
30. In considering the offenses in which entrapment might be available as a de-
fense, it should be noted that entrapment is not limited to liquor and narcotics cases,
although problems of entrapment arise most often in such cases. See, e.g., State v. Cole-
man, 270 N.C. 357, 154 S.E.2d 485 (1967) (using profane language over the tele-
phone); State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958) (conspiracy to dynamite
a school building). Although North Carolina courts have not ruled on the point, the
better view holds that entrapment is not available when the offense involves the inflic-
tion or threat of bodily harm. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
31. Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 418, 281 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1972).
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criminal act "was brought about by persistent entreaty and duplicity. 8 2
North Carolina's policy supporting the entrapment defense as a
deterrent to police misconduct was explained in State v. Love:
Considerations of the purity and fairness of the courts and the
agencies created for the administration of justice gravely challenge
the propriety of a procedure wherein the officers of the State en-
visage, plan and instigate the commission of a crime and proceed to
punish it on the theory that a facile compliance with the officer's in-
vitation confirms the accuracy of the suspicion of an unproved
criminal practice,-for which the defendant is in reality punished. 33
In light of this reasoning it is clear that entrapment was created to deter
government officials from manufacturing crime where none existed
before. Since the main purpose of the entrapment defense in North
Carolina is to regulate governmental activity in investigating crimes that
often require no form of specific intent, the focus of judicial inquiry
should be the conduct of the officers and their investigative methods
rather than the state of mind of a particular defendant.
To implement this purpose of regulating governmental activity,
courts have -taken two divergent approaches; the principal difference
between these approaches relates to the importance to be given the
predisposition of the accused. The federal courts84 and the majority
of state courts,35 including North Carolina,3" have held that entrapment
focuses on the intent of the accused. Under this view no amount of
improper governmental activity37 is sufficient unless it is shown that the
defendant had no previous intent to commit the crime and that the
criminal intent and design originated with the government officials or
agents rather than with the defendant.3 8
32. 227 N.C. 449, 452, 42 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1947).
33. 229 N.C. 99, 101, 47 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1948), quoted in State v. Stanley, 288
N.C. 19, 28, 215 S.E.2d 589, 595 (1975) (emphasis added).
34. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
35. LoEwY, supra note 3, § 13.06; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(1) (1961). See,
e.g., State v. Bagemehl, 213 Kan. 210, 515 P.2d 1104 (1973).
36. 288 N.C. at 28, 215 S.E.2d at 595.
37. In considering the problem of improper governmental conduct, it should b
noted that there have been attempts at requiring government officials to obtain approval
in advance of setting traps in a manner analogous to fourth amendment search require-
ments. These attempts, in recognizing the scope of the problem, also illustrate the need
for reevaluating the role of the defendant's prior intent in the entrapment defense. See
Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 418, 281 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1972) (requiring probable cause
before setting a trap); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49
VA. L. REv. 871 (1963).
38. State v. Crandall, 23 N.C. App. 625, 209 S.E.2d 834 (1974), appeal dismissed,
286 N.C. 417, 211 S.E.2d 797 (1975). Defendant's evidence went to the conduct of
the officers and their investigative methods. Since the evidence did not relate to the
defendant's intent, it was held that such evidence was neither material nor relevant.
[Vol. 54988
1976] ENTRAPMENT 989
The second approach to entrapment has been adopted by a minor-
ity of state courts,3 9 the Model Penal Code,40 and dissenting United
States Supreme Court justices.41 This approach uses a form of the
"reasonable man" test, a more objective means of applying entrapment
to a particular case. Rather than examining the predisposition of the
particular person on trial, these authorities hold that entrapment exists
when the conduct of the government agent creates a substantial risk
that the crime would be committed by a person who would not other-
wise have committed the criminal act.
The objective test used by the minority has the advantage of
conforming more closely to the policy of entrapment as a check on
governmental misconduct. The crucial factor in the minority rule is
the measure of participation by agents and officers of -the government.
Since it establishes a more clearly ascertainable standard that does
not vary from case to case depending on the predisposition of various
defendants, it is more likely that this method will be perceived by gov-
ernment officials as a viable limit upon their ability to set illegal traps.
The majority approach, with its preoccupation with the predisposition
of the accused and the necessity for a jury's determination of that factor,
is more likely to be viewed by government officials as more of a trial
-tactic than as a limit on police discretion.42
39. LOEWY, supra note 3, § 13.06, at 253-54; see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 3, § 48, at 371.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The relevant por-
tions are as follows:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another
person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by...
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.
See also the proposed statute in State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11,
14 (1970).
41. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-50 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas,
Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-
85 (1958) (Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in result). Al-
though the dissent in Russell reasoned that the defendant should be acqtuitted by reason
of entrapment, it is arguable that on the facts of that case the rationale of the dissent
could be applied to reach the result of the majority. It seems unlikely that an offer
to supply a person with an essential ingredient of methamphetamine ("speed") would
create a substantial risk that the drug would be produced by a person who would not
otherwise have committed the criminal act.
42. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. Rnv.
871, 899-902 (1963).
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Beyond these basic policy considerations, it is necessary to con-
sider all the elements of entrapment, especially as they are applied in
North Carolina. In considering the definition of entrapment48 it is
important to distinguish this affirmative defense from those in which
the consent of the victim negates an essential element of the offense.
In such offenses, if the victim consents, there is no criminal act.44
Entrapment, on the other hand, is a defense to a completed criminal
act.46
Generally, entrapment is a question of fact for the jury to deter-
mine.46  In North Carolina the accused has the burden of proof and
must prove entrapment "to the satisfaction of the jury.' '1 7  The court
has reasoned that entrapment is an exception to criminal liability, and
that the defendant should have the burden of bringing himself within
the exception; however, not all jurisdictions place the burden of proof
on the accused. The federal courts4 as well as some state courts4'
require the prosecution to convince the trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused was not entrapped. Since entrapment is no
defense unless the trap is set by an agent of the government, 0 the
North Carolina courts have required the defendant -to produce substan-
tial credible evidence that the person who set the trap was an agent
if the state denies that the entrapper was in fact its agent. If a
43. For North Carolina's definition of entrapment see text accompanying note 21
supra. See also 288 N.C. at 28-29, 215 S.E.2d at 595.
44. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602, 61 S.E.2d 626 (1950); State v.
Hughes, 208 N.C. 542, 181 S.E. 737 (1935); State v. Goffney, 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E.
162 (1911).
45. See State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955). The defendant
in Burnette was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. The accused actually
raised two defenses-consent of the victim and entrapment. The judge instructed the
jury on both defenses. Id. at 174-75, 87 S.E.2d at 197-99. Since the victim's consent
and participation were crucial elements of both defenses, it has been noted that trial
courts may experience considerable difficulty in separating the two defenses. Note,
Criminal Law-Entrapment in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. RIv. 536, 544 (1956).
46. 288 N.C. at 32, 215 S.E.2d at 597, quoting State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238,
241, 265 A.2d 11, 14 (1970). It has been suggested that the issue be tried by the court
in the absence of the jury. Jurisdictions that have followed the minority rule have been
amenable to this latter view. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962). See also text accompanying note 40 supra.
47. State v. Cook, 263 N.C. 730, 733, 140 S.E2d 305, 308 (1965); State v. Bland,
19 N.C. App. 560, 199 S.E.2d 497 (1973). The Model Penal Code provides that the
accused has the burden of proof and must prove the existence of entrapment "by a pre.
ponderance of the evidence." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
48. E.g., Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).
49. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 281 N.E.2d 803 (1972).
50. State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E.2d 507 (1955).
ENTRAPMENT
defendant fails to supply such evidence, the issue of entrapment will
not be submitted to the jury."
It is necessary in North Carolina for the defendant to show that
he "entertained no prior criminal intent."5 2  This requirement is the
part of the defense that has been criticized most often, both on policy
grounds53 and on the grounds that it is often unfair in its application.
To convince the jury that he is a victim of entrapment, a criminal
defendant must ordinarily admit while on the stand that he is indeed
guilty of doing those criminal acts of which he is charged."4 The fact
that the defendant admits that he has committed the act puts an infer-
ence of guilt in the minds of the jury that would appear difficult to
rebut with even the best evidence showing a lack of predisposition.55
The defendant with a prior criminal record is placed in an
especially precarious position. Depending on local rules of evidence,
once the defendant takes the stand to try to prove lack of predisposi-
tion, the prosecution may be able to introduce the defendant's prior
criminal record along with other testimony that could provide the jury
with rumors and suspicions of other conduct of the defendant. Besides
the fact that it is often difficult or impossible to ascertain the truth or
falsity of much of this evidence, the substantial prejudicial effects of
such evidence create substantial danger that the jury will convict, not
because of the acts in issue, but because of prior convictions. These
considerations mean that as a practical matter the government can go
to greater lengths in trapping a person with a criminal record of related
crimes than they can go in trapping a person with no criminal record.5 7
Although convictions may come easier when the accused has a prior
criminal record, the police conduct that entrapment seeks to prevent
is as reprehensible when directed to a multiple offender as it is when
51. State v. Yost, 9 N.C. App. 671, 177 S.E.2d 320 (1970), cert. denied, Yost v.
Ross, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971).
52. 288 N.C. at 28, 215 S.E.2d at 595 (emphasis omitted); see text accompanying
notes 36-38 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
54. The North Carolina courts have held that the accused must admit to the crim-
inal act in order to raise the entrapment issue, thus rejecting the possibility of inconsist-
ent defenses. State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957).
55. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissent-ing). 56. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
57. Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv.
871, 898 (1963).
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directed toward an ordinary law-abiding citizen.,
Although it is unlikely that Stanley reflects any substantial changes
in the North Carolina law of entrapment, there are some significant
points in the case that deserve noting. Stanley is the first case in which
the North Carolina appellate courts have found entrapment as a matter
of law. Additionally, entrapment was not an issue in the petition for
certiorari; however, the supreme court raised the entrapment issue on
its own volition. 59 These facts suggest the possibility that the North
Carolina court is developing a more receptive attitude toward entrap-
ment.
Though the North Carolina Supreme Court may be increasingly
open to a broader view of entrapment, the extreme facts of Stanley
make it difficult to perceive any real change in the North Carolina law.
The court's reasoning focused on the total lack of evidence of any pre-
disposition to commit the crime. The state's undercover officer estab-
lished a "big brother" relationship with the defendant, and as the offi-
cer testified, the defendant had been unable to tell if certain substances
he purchased were real drugs. e0  Beyond these facts, the court
described the defendant as an "agent" of the law enforcement officer;
therefore, the court ruled that the defendant should receive some sort
of indirect benefit from the statute granting immunity to officers enforc-
ing the drug laws."'
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the holding in Stanley
relates to the value of prior convictions. The court held that "a convic-
tion of possession of marijuana would not indicate a predisposition to
commit the crime of [possession of LSD with intent to distribute]. 0 2
Within this context, the holding seems to go beyond an assessment of
the probative weight of the marijuana conviction. The implication is
that the marijuana conviction is irrelevant to the LSD conviction. 3
Therefore, the North Carolina court is apparently attempting to miti-
58. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). "No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to crim-
inality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society."
Id. at 382-83.
59. 288 N.C. at 25-27, 215 S.E.2d at 593-94.
60. Id. at 22, 215 S.E.2d at 591.
61. Id. at 33, 215 S.E.2d at 598. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.1(c) (1975).
62. 288 N.C. at 33, 215 S.E.2d at 598.
63. Cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1958), in which it was
held that a nine year old conviction for sale of narcotics and a five year old conviction
for possession of narcotics were "insufficient" to prove a present intent to sell narcotics.
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gate the prejudicial effects of introducing evidence of a prior criminal
record by strictly limiting such evidence to those crimes that bear the
highest degree of relevance to the present charges.
With the exception of the points discussed above, Stanley is essen-
tially a reaffirmation of prior North Carolina law with greater reliance
on the federal definition of entrapment. 4 Except for extreme cases,
the issue remains one for the jury to resolve. The court also
announced in Stanley that it will continue to focus on the particular
defendant's predisposition to participate in the criminal act. However,
the North Carolina court has recognized that abuses inevitably occur
when overzealous law enforcement officers set traps, particularly in
search of violations of drug laws. In correcting these abuses, it is hoped
that the court, recognizing the need for judicial intervention, will con-
tinue to search for the appropriate responses.
JOSEPH D. JOHNSON
Criminal Law-Diminished Responsibility, Long Ignored in
North Carolina, Is Given a Hearing But Not Yet Adopted
North Carolina has never recognized the doctrine of "diminished
responsibility," by which a mentally disordered defendant may be
deemed incapable of the degree of mens rea required for conviction of
the crime for which he is charged, even though his mental illness does
not reach the level of insanity.' In three recent cases2 the North
Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that it remains unwilling to adopt
64. See 288 N.C. at 29-32, 215 S.E.2d at 595-97.
1. The doctrine herein referred to as "diminished responsibility" goes by several
different names, including "diminished capacity," "partial insanity" and "partial responsi-
bility." F. LinmAN & D. McIN'nRE, Tim MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 355
(1961); People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 364, 406 P.2d 43, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763,
772 (1965). In addition, the term "diminished reponsibility" is used to describe a quite
different doctrine derived from civil and Scottish law whereby the defendant's punish-
ment is reduced if he could not resist the criminal impulse. Id. Despite this confusion
and the fact that the doctrine "contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for
the crime actually committed," State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314
(1959), "diminished responsibility" is probably the most common term and is the one
used by the North Carolina Supreme Court. E.g., State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 699,
174 S.E.2d 526, 532 (1970).
2. State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975); State v. Wetmore,
287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975); State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305
(1975).
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the theory, at least under the label "diminished responsibility." Never-
theless, the courts statement in State v. Cooper that one who lacks the
mental capacity to premeditate and deliberate cannot lawfully be con-
victed of first degree murder' appears to acknowledge the basic theory
underlying diminished responsibility, perhaps opening the way for
that doctrine in North Carolina.
In Cooper the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife
and four of his children.' The trial court properly instructed the jury
on insanity as a complete defense5 and on the elements of first and
second degree murder.' The jury was not instructed to consider the
evidence of the defendant's mental disorder as it affected the elements of
premeditation and deliberation, but the defendant did not request such
an instruction.7 The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder despite considerable evidence that he was a paranoid schizo-
phrenic. 8
The supreme court, over a strong dissent by Chief Justice Sharp,
held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury to consider the
evidence of defendant's mental disorder on the question of premedita-
tion and deliberation did not amount to reversible error.0 The court
said that "a defendant who does not have the mental capacity to form an
intent to kill, or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, cannot
be lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental
deficiency be due to a disease of the mind. . . or some other cause."'1
However, since the jury's verdict established that the defendant had the
menial capacity to know right from wrong at the time of the killings, the
court reasoned that it "necessarily follows that he had the lesser, includ-
ed capacity" to intend to kill." The court also noted that the jury, after
"proper instructions as to what constitutes premeditation and delibera-
tion," determined that the defendant "did, in fact, premeditate and
deliberate upon the intended killings.' Accordingly, the court found
no error of omission in the trial court's charge. 1"
3. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
4. Id. at 552, 213 S.E.2d at 308.
5. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
6. 286 N.C. at 570-71, 213 S.E.2d at 319-20.
7. Id. at 595, 213 S.E.2d at 334 (dissenting opinion).
8. Id. at 552-64, 213 S.E.2d at 308-15.
9. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 573, 213 S.E.2d at 321.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
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Chief Justice Sharp agreed with the majority that a person with a
mental disorder that prevents his acting with premeditation and deliber-
ation cannot be guilty of murder in the first degree. However, she said
the defendant was entitled to the instruction the majority found unneces-
sary.' 4 She would require such an instruction in many such homicide
cases even when defense counsel failed to request it:
,[An instruction would be required in any case] in which proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent to kill, formed after
premeditation and deliberation, is prerequisite to a conviction for
murder in the first degree, and . ..in which there is substantial
evidence that at the time of the homicide defendant had been and
was suffering from a recognized serious mental disease and en-
gaged in abnormal behavior characteristic of such disease. 15
Accordingly, a first degree murder defendant who could not be convict-
ed by use of the felony-murder rule would be entitled to a diminished
responsibility instruction if his acts were characteristic of a serious
mental disorder.
In State v. Wetmore'6 the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that several states had adopted the theory of diminished responsibility,
but the court did not consider the matter further because the defendant
admitted in his brief that North Carolina had not adopted the doctrine.' 7
Despite the lack of discussion in Wetmore the court said in State v.
Shepherd,8 "In Wetmore our Court discussed, but clearly did not adopt
. . .the theory of diminished responsibility."' 9
Prior to 1975 the court specifically referred to diminished responsi-
bility only once.20 Although a number of jurisdictions have adopted the
theory,' the only test of criminal responsibility utilized by North Caroli-
na courts to measure a state of mind has been the M'Naghten insanity
14. Id. at 595, 213 S.E.2d at 334-35.
15. Id. at 592, 213 S.E.2d at 332.
16. 287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975).
17. Id. at 356, 215 S.E.2d at 58. The court also cited Cooper, both for its
restatement of the M'Naghten rule and for its discussion of diminished responsibility, but
it only implied that Cooper rejected the doctrine. Id. at 357, 215 S.E.2d at 58. In
Wetmore the defendant took the stand and in effect admitted premeditation. Thus,
despite her dissent in Cooper, Chief Justice Sharp agreed that the defendant was not
entitled to a diminished responsibility instruction. Id. at 358-59, 215 S.E.2d at 59-60.
18. 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975).
19. Id. at 349, 218 S.E.2d at 176.
20. In State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970), the court noted in
dictum that several states had adopted a diminished responsibility theory. Id. at 699,
174 S.E.2d at 532.
21. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
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rule.2" Under the M'Naghten rule a mentally disordered defendant is
exempt from criminal responsibility "only if, at the time he commits the
act which would otherwise be illegal, he was incapable of knowing the
nature and quality of his act or of distinguishing between right and
wrong with relation thereto."28  A defendant who does not meet the
insanity test is considered wholly sane and fully responsible for the
consequences of his acts, for "there is no halfway house on the road to
insanity.' '24
It is a common law principle "that the state of mind with which a
person commits a criminal act is material in determining not only
whether he should be punished therefor, but also, if he is to be punished,
how severly."25 From this principle, which is manifest in any classifi-
cation of offenses according to degree of mens rea, some jurisdictions
have derived the doctrine of diminished responsibility. 20 These jurisdic-
tions have said, in effect, that a defendant who was incapable of
entertaining the state of mind required for the commission of a crime
cannot logically be found guilty of that crime.27 If this reasoning were
carried to its logical conclusion, a defendant totally incapable of even a
general intent should be absolved of all guilt. In practice, however,
diminished responsibility is used only -to negate specific intent, "allowing
conviction for any lesser-included offense which dogs not have the
requirement of a particular mental element."28
Many states, including North Carolina, have allowed intoxication
to negate the elements of premeditation and deliberation necessary for
conviction of first degree murder.29 Those jurisdictions that have
adopted diminished responsibility have often been persuaded to do so
because of the anomalous result of allowing the alcohol or drug user
more lenient treatment than is afforded a defendant with a mental
22. See State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 513-14, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1974). In
1915 the supreme court suggested that lack of capacity to form a criminal intent would
be a complete defense to crime. State v. Cooper, 170 N.C. 719, 723, 87 S.E. 50, 52
(1915). Nevertheless, the M'Naghten rule was set out immediately following this
suggestion, so it is doubtful that the court intended to propose an alternate or supplemen-
tal test for criminal capacity.
23. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 652, 174 S.E.2d 793, 800 (1970).
24. State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 514, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1974).
25. H. W oOFEN, MEmAL DisoRDas ASA CRimiNAL DEFENSE 177 (1954).
26. See id.
27. Comment, Mental Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: The Recommenda-
tions of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 482, 492
(1955).
28. Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Nol, 8 HOUSTON L. Rav. 629, 634
(1971).
29. E.g., State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 71-72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968).
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disorder he cannot control.3 0 The statement in Cooper that a defendant
cannot be convicted of first degree murder if he lacked the requisite
capacity "due to a disease of the mind, intoxication. . . or some other
cause"31 indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court was aware of
this anomaly.
Diminished responsibility has been used most commonly in murder
cases, to reduce the defendant's crime from first to second degree
murder.32 Thus, under California's "rule of diminished responsibility"
a defendant who was "suffering from a mental illness that prevented his
acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation!
cannot be convicted of first degree murder.33 A similar rule has been
adopted in the District of Columbia 4 and in about one third of the
states.3 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court specifically stated in Cooper:
"[A] defendant who does not have the mental capacity to form an
intent to kill, or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, cannot
be lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental
deficiency be due to a disease of the mind.. . or some other cause."36
Although the court did not use the term "diminished responsibility," this
language in Cooper is similar to that used by courts in California and
other states.37 Consequently, it appears that North Carolina may be on
its way toward adopting diminished responsibility, notwithstanding the
admission in defendant's brief in Wetmore and the reliance thereon in
Shepherd.
The defining language in Cooper is only dictum, because the
evidentiary question was not before the court, and a diminished respon-
sibility instruction was found unnecessary. Nevertheless, the statement
that a defendant who is unable to premeditate "cannot be lawfully
convicted" of first degree murder apparently means, at a minimum, that
evidence of mental disorder is relevant to the premeditation issue in first
degree murder cases. If this is true, a defendant whose mental disorder
30. E.g., State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 294, 347 P.2d 312, 315 (1959).
31. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
32. F. LXNDMAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 1, at 355.
33. People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 423 P.2d 777, 781, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625,
629 (1967).
34. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1000-02 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane).
35. E.g., State v. Santiago, 55 Hawaii 152, 516 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (1973); see
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1246-52 (1968).
36. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
37. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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does not reach the level of insanity should be free to introduce evidence
to prove his lack of capacity to premeditate.
Of the states that have adopted diminished responsibility only
California3 8 requires a diminished responsibility instruction on the trial
court's motion whenever it appears the defendant is relying on the
doctrine.30 Although it acknowledged in Cooper the relevance of men-
tal illness to the premeditation issue, the court indicated that North
Carolina is not ready to join California in requiring a diminished
responsibility instruction. New York has refused to require such an
instruction on the ground that it is self-evident to a jury "that a defend-
ant who cannot deliberate does not deliberate. '40 The majority in
Cooper arrived at the same result as the New York court by taking "ju-
dicial notice of the well known fact that a dog. . . may have the mental
capacity to intend to kill." Accordingly, the Cooper court observed that
"[it requires less mental ability to form a purpose to do an act than to
determine its moral quality."41  Employing these postulates the court
determined that the jury's verdict of guilty established that the defendant
had the lesser capacity to intend to kill.42
Although the court may be correct in finding that diminished re-
sponsibility instructions are not required, the manner in which the re-
sult was reached presents two problems. The first is that the court's
reference to a dog's intent to kill obviously refers only to the general
intent found in all criminal acts, since a dog surely does not have the
capacity to premeditate and deliberate or to possess malice afore-
thought. The reference to a dog's general intent has no place in a dis-
cussion of diminished responsibility, for that doctrine has been applied
to specific intent crimes only. The second problem is that the court,
in its statement that less mental ability is required to form a purpose
to do an act than to determine its moral quality, seems to be recogniz-
ing a theory that should not be judicially noticed, since it is not well
1
38. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 492, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,
82 (1963) (en bane).
39. New Mexico says that such an instruction is required, but it is not clear' that
the trial court must act on its own motion. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 293-96, 347
P.2d 312, 315-16 (1959). Several other states seem to be close to the position that a
diminished responsibility instruction is required. See, e.g., State v. Donahue, 141 Conn.
656, 663-65, 109 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1954); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 138-40, 126
N.W.2d 285, 291 (1964); State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J. 44, 62-66, 202 A.2d 657, 666-68
(1964).
40. People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E.553 (1928) (per curiam).
41. 286 N.C. at 573, 213 S.E.2d at 321.
42. Id.
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established or authoritatively settled.43
As Chief Justice Sharp's dissent makes clear, Cooper was a first
degree murder case in which the defendant had a history of mental
disorder and engaged in abnormal behavior characteristic of that disor-
der at the time of the killing." Unfortunately the majority did not
discuss diminished responsibility in this context. Instead, by its refer-
ence to general intent crimes, the court indicated that it was unaware
that diminished responsibility has ordinarily been applied to specific
intent crimes only.
Under the North Carolina homicide statute a murder without
deliberation is a lesser crime than murder with deliberation. 45 The state
of the criminal law under this statute provides the prime opportunity to
ameliorate the all-or-nothing nature of North Carolina's insanity defense
without disrupting the purposes of the criminal law. At a first degree
murder trial, when evidence of mental disorder is introduced to show
insanity, a jury that finds that a defendant was sane will then determine
whether he premeditated and deliberated upon the act. In such a case
(of which Cooper is an example) it is arguable that, even in the absence
of a diminished responsibility instruction, the jury will consider the
defendant's mental disorder on the issue of deliberation. A finding that
a defendant did deliberate presupposes a finding that he could deliber-
ate.
On the other hand, if there is no doubt that at the time of his act a
43. "A matter is the proper subject of judicial notice only if is 'known,' well
established, and authoritatively settled." Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 506, 142
S.E.2d 361, 366 (1965). The court in Hughes recognized, however, that when the
information is not "the controlling or even a significant basis for decision" but is merely
"rhetorical and illustrative," appellate courts are not bound by the restrictive judicial
notice rule that governs adjudicative facts. See id. at 507, 142 S:E.2d at 366. Neverthe-
less, it appears that if the court in Cooper had not beleived that it requires less mental
ability to form a purpose than to tell right from wrong, it would have required a
diminished responsibility instruction. Because the court's statement controlled its deci-
sion, the court should have been surer of its factual basis before invoking judicial notice.
If we define morality to include "the idea of predicting the consequences of our
actions and being responsible for them," a certain mental level is, of course, necessary
for moral behavior. N. WILmAMs & S. WmILiAs, TAE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CHLDREN 106 (1970). If this is what the court meant to say, judicial notice might have
been appropriate. However, if determining the moral quality of one's acts implies that
one will stop those acts if they injure someone else, it is not 'established" that
determining moral quality requires less mental ability than forming a purpose. Certain
scientific experiments have demonstrated that rats and monkeys will forego pleasure to
themselves if their actions cause discomfort to other animals. S. DimorD, THE SocrAL
BEHAvioR OF ANImALs 119-23 (1970).
44. 286 N.C. at 595-96, 213 S.E.2d at 334-35.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendant knew right from wrong with respect to it, he cannot claim
insanity. Accordingly, in a jurisdiction in which the only means of
testing criminal capacity is the M'Naughten insanity test, such a defend-
ant has no opportunity to introduce evidence of mental disorder. If a
defendant who is insane nevertheless lacks the capacity to premeditate
and deliberate, he ought to be allowed to introduce evidence to show
his lack of capacity. If he is not allowed to introduce such evidence, he
could be convicted of first degree murder though he lacked the capacity
to premeditate at the time of the act. A refusal to admit evidence of
lack of capacity is justifiable only if it is true that one who is sane
necessarily.possesses the mental capacity to premeditate; however, it is
questionable that knowledge of right and wrong presupposes that capac-
ity. Since the insanity test is inapplicable to those defendants who are
not insane but who do not possess the requisite capacity, North Carolina
would do well to supplement its insanity test with diminished responsi-
bility, at least in first degree murder cases. 46
The only diminished responsibility issue in Cooper was whether the
trial court must on its own motion instruct the jury to consider evidence
of the defendant's mental disorder on the question of premeditation and
deliberation. The answer given in Cooper was that the trial court need
not give this instruction on its own motion.47
Cooper also indicates that North Carolina acknowledges the under-
lying premise of diminished responsibility: a defendant so mentally
disordered that he does not have the capacity to premeditate cannot be
lawfully convicted of first degree murder. Conversely, Cooper, Wet-
more and Shepherd show that North Carolina is willing to dismiss
diminished responsibility without fully considering it. To date the
North Carolina Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss the doctrine
46. One argument against diminished responsibility is that the defendant who is
convicted of a lesser degree of crime because of mental disorder will be released from
prison sooner than the supposedly less dangerous criminal who is mentally normal. The
statute that provides for the involuntary commitment of dangerous defendants acquitted
on grounds of mental illness could not be used against one found guilty, but of a lesser
crime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). However, because diminished
responsibility is being considered in North Carolina only to reduce the defendant's crime
from first to second degree murder, he may still receive a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Of course, the benefits of
diminished responsibility in murder cases would be negligible if capital punishment were
abolished. See F. LINMAN & D. MciNbRmE, supra note 1, at 355-57, for a survey of the
arguments for and against recognizing the defense of diminished responsibility.
47. See text accompanying notes 9 & 13 supra. The court did not have to consider
the case that would arise if the trial court, after counsel had tried to persuade the jury
that there was evidence of insanity, exercised its right to instruct that there was no such
evidence. State v. Melvin, 219 N.C. 538, 540, 14 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1941).
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only with reference to instructions in cases in which the defendant,
having pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, has already introduced
evidence of mental disorder. Hopefully, when the issue presented to
the court is the admissibility of such evidence to show lack of capacity
to premeditate, the court will give diminished responsibility more serious
consideration.
JOHN H. BODDIE
Criminal Law-Sua Sponte Instructions on Defendant's Failure
to Testify
Section 8-54 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that a
defendant in a criminal action is a competent witness but that the
defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf "shall not create any
presumption against him."' In several decisions,' the most recent of
which is State v. Caron,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court has dealt
with the issue of whether it is error under section 8-54 for the judge, on
his own initiative, to instruct the jury that the defendant has a right not to
testify and that no adverse inference is to be drawn from the defendant's
silence. Other state and federal courts, dealing with similar statutes,
have divided4 as to whether such an instruction, given without a defend-
ant's request, so sensitizes the jury to the defendant's silence that an
inference of guilt may arise or an existing adverse inference may be
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969) provides:
Defendant in criminal action competent but not compellable to testify.
-In the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings against per-
sons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses or misdemeanors, the
person so charged is, at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent
witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him. But every such person examined as a witness shall be subject
to cross-examination as other witnesses. Except as above provided, nothing in
this section shall render any person, who in any criminal proceeding is charged
with the commission of a criminal offense, competent or compellable to give
evidence against himself, nor render any person compellable to answer any
question tending to criminate himself.
2. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974); State v. Bryant, 283
N.C. 227, 195 S.E.2d 509 (1973); State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 180 S.E.2d 115
(1971); State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d 522 (1968); State v. Rainey, 236 N.C.
738, 74 S.E.2d 39 (1953); State v. Wood, 230 N.C. 740, 55 S.E.2d 491 (1949); State v.
McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E.2d 733 (1948); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 5 S.E.2d
156 (1939); State v. Home, 209 N.C. 725, 184 S.E. 470 (1936).
3. 288 N.C. 467, 219 S.E.2d 68 (1975).
4. See Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968) for a compilation of these cases.
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strengthened. In State v. Caron the court repeated its frequently stated
assertion that the better practice is to "give no instruction concerning a
defendant's failure to testify unless such an instruction is requested by
defendant,"5 but declined to hold a sua sponte instruction to be reversi-
ble error.
Defendant Caron was tried and convicted in Wake County Superi-
or Court for feloniously setting fire to a building that housed his body
and paint shop. The defense called witnesses to testify, but the accused
himself did not take the stand.' Although the defendant did not
request an instruction on his right to have no adverse inference drawn
from his failure to testify, the court charged the jury as follows:
"I recall that the defendant, even though he offered evidence,
he did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf. Now,
I make mention of that fact for this purpose. I have told you
that he had no responsibility to offer any evidence, had a right
to but no responsibility to; that he owed you no duty to offer any
evidence; that the State had the whole burden and has the whole
burden of proof throughout this case. Now that being so, he had
an absolute right under the law to try his lawsuit in the fashion
that he decided that it ought to be tried. He had a right to offer
no evidence. If he offered any, he had a right to remain off the
stand. You can't punish any man for exercising a lawful right.
So I give emphasis to this fact: The fact that the defendant did
not testify does not permit you to speculate about why he did not.
He has exercised a lawful right. You may not take the position
during your deliberations did he have something he didn't want
us to know. He has exercised the lawful right and you may not
hold it against him to any extent the fact that he did not testify.
You must deal with what you have before you in this evidence
and you may not hold against the defendant a'tall the fact that
he did not testify."'7
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
5. 288 N.C. at 472-73, 219 S.E.2d at 72, quoting State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449,
457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972).
6. The evidence against defendant showed that he increased the first insurance
coverage on his business several days before the fire; defendant had purchased a fifty-five
gallon drum of lacquer thinner the day before the fire; lacquer thinner had apparently
been poured in a trail throughout the shop and then ignited; defendant admitted being in
the building shortly before the fire; and when notified of the blaze by the fire
department, defendant arrived on the scene in a less-than-pristine state-that is, his
hands, clothes, and face were coated with soot-a phenomenon that the defendant was
unable to explain at the time. Defendant presented evidence that his accountant
recommended the increased insurance coverage and that he was "habitually dirty" from
his work in the body shop. 288 N.C. at 470-71, 219 S.E.2d at 70-71.
7. 288 N.C. at 471-72, 219 S.E.2d at 71.
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Moore upholding the court of appeals, 8 found the instruction "unduly
repetitious" but "not prejudicial."9 Although noting that some jurisdic-
tions hold such instructions erroneous when not requested by defendant
and that the North Carolina Supreme Court itself had suggested that
such a charge not be given unless requested by defendant, the majority
concluded that the "spirit of G.S. 8-54 [had] been complied with.""'
In dissent, Chief Justice Sharp, joined by Justice Exum, chided the
majority for "disregard[ing] this Court's repeated admonition that 'it is
better to give no instruction concerning failure of defendant to testify
unless he requests it.""' To the majority's holding that the undue
repetitions in the charge were not prejudicial, the Chief Justice replied,
"This conclusion ignores the fact that certain medicines taken in small
doses may effect a cure while a large dose of the same medicine, or a
small one indiscriminately repeated, can be fatal."12 Finally, of the trial
judge's admonition not to speculate on the reasons for defendant's
absence from the stand, the dissent concluded, "[tio prohibit this
thought was to suggest it."' 3
At common law parties to legal actions were not allowed to testify.
In the mid-nineteenth century, however, North Carolina and many other
states enacted statutes making parties competent witnesses. The ques-
tion remained whether the removal of a defendant's inability to testify
should produce an inference of guilt when defendant failed to use his
opportunity to attest to his innocence. In 1881 North Carolina enacted
the predecessor of section 8-54,1r which allowed criminal defendants to
remain silent without a presumption of guilt being created.' 6 Like its
predecessor, the current statute is an attempt to give meaning to a
defendant's constitutionally mandated protection from compulsory self-
incrimination.17 If silence were permitted to raise an inference of guilt,
the defendant's choice of whether or not to testify would be a meaning-
less one, for his decision to testify would subject him to questioning that
8. State v. Caron, 26 N.C. App. 456, 215 S.E.2d 878 (1975).
9. 288 N.C. at 473, 219 S.E.2d at 72.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 72, quoting State v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 232, 195
S.E.2d 509, 512 (1973).
12. 288 N.C. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 73.
13. Id.
14. State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 479, 112 S.E.2d 61, 71 (1960); 8 J. WrGmoRE,
EvIDENC E § 2272, at 427 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
15. N.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 89 (1881), as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969).
16. State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 479, 112 S.E.2d 61, 71 (1960).
17. See Note, Comments to the Jury on Defendant's Failure to Testify, 64 DicK. L.
REv. 164 (1960).
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could produce evidence of his guilt, while his decision not to testify
would be treated as evidence of guilt.
In Bruno v. United States8 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted a federal statute 9 worded almost identically to section 8-54
of the North Carolina General Statutes.2 0  The Court held the statute to
mean that when the defendant requests a federal judge to so charge, the
judge is required to instruct the jury of defendant's right to silence and
of the absence of any presumption of guilt resulting from his silence.2 1
Although dealing with the problem in a different context, the Court in
Bruno raised the same issue that underlies cases in which the defendant
objects to or fails to request the instruction: how does the jury react to
an instruction to ignore the defendant's silence. It was argued in Bruno
that the defendant was not harmed by the judge's refusal to comply with
the requested instruction since, had it been given, the charge would only
have directed the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify and
thus heightened the natural inference of guilt that arises when the jurors
learn that the defendant will not testify. The Court found that, "[by
legislating against the creation of any 'presumption' from a failure to
testify, Congress could not have meant to legislate against the psychol-
ogical operation of the jury's mind. 22 Congress's intent, rather, was to
allow the accused "to make his own choice" of whether the jury should
be instructed, by balancing the risk of highlighting his failure to testify
against the advantage of informing the jury of the "no presumption"
principle. 23
Some legal scholars and jurists have also doubted the efficacy of
such instructions regarding defendant's failure to testify.2 4  Professor
Wigmore, for example, thought that a natural inference of guilt arises
18. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
19. The statute provided that in federal criminal trials "the person so charged shall,
at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to make
such request shall not create any presumption against him." Act of March 16, 1878, ch.
37, 20 Stat. 30, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1969).
20. Compare statute quoted at note 19 supra, with statute quoted at note I supra.
21. 308 U.S. at 293.
22. Id. at 293.
23. Id. at 294.
24. An interesting study which lends support to this point of view is cited at Note,
The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264, 266
(1966). The University of Chicago Jury Project found that experimental juries reacted
to an instruction to disregard evidence by becoming even more aware of the evidence.
When defendants in negligence suits disclosed they had insurance and no objection was
made, the average verdict was $33,000. When defendants disclosed that they were in-
sured, the plaintiff objected and the judge instructed the jury to disregard the evidence,
the average verdict was $46,000.
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when jurors observe the defendant's failure to take the stand and that
instructing a jury to ignore this inference is useless. "It is well enough
to contrive artificial fictions for use by lawyers, but to attempt to enlist
the layman in the process of nullifying his own reasoning powers is
merely futile, and tends toward confusion and a disrespect for the law's
reasonableness."25  One judge, arguing for eliminating the required
instruction, stated that doing so "'would cure . . a species of legal
hypocrisy whereby courts and jurors are compelled to assume an ap-
pearance of disregarding and forgetting something which is practically
impossible for either of them to disregard or forget.' "26
While a natural inference probably does arise from the accused's
failure to take the stand, courts have generally rejected the arguments
for entirely eliminating the instruction. Some have stressed that the law
presumes the innocence of defendants and that therefore the accused
should be allowed to attempt to minimize any existing adverse inference
either by choosing to instruct the jury of the presumption or by choosing
not to further emphasize his silence.
Not all courts, however, recognize the right to a choice in cases in
which the defendant does not desire the instruction. The Bruno
Court,28 in upholding the defendant's right to the instruction when
requested, noted that knowledge of the human mind was not so certain
as to "justify us in disregarding the will of Congress by a dogmatic
assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor would
heed the instructions of the trial court that the failure of an accused to
be a witness in his own cause 'shall not create any presumnption against
him.' "29 In United States v. Garguilo3  Judge Friendly for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the above quotation from
Bruno to find that there was no error when the same instruction was
given in the absence of a request by the accused. Noting the natural
adverse inference that arises from defendant's failure to testify, Judge
Friendly thus found it quite possible that the instruclion would be
helpful rather than prejudicial since it is not known that the jury could
not or would not heed the instruction.3 1 The Second Circuit thereby
25. J. WiGMOm!, supra note 14, at 436.
26. Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York, 26 COLUM. L Rnv. 253,
259 (1926), quoted in L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AmEN TmE FIFT= AMENDMENT 22
(1959).
27. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 73 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
28. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
29. 308 U.S. at 294.
30. 310 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. Id. at 252.
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interpreted Bruno in such a way as to allow removal of the very choice
that the Bruno decision had provided.
Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v.
California32 has furnished the rationale for some courts' decisions that
the unrequested instruction is erroneous, it has been seen by other courts
as not preventing a contrary conclusion.33 Griffin held that the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution forbid
comment by the court on the accused's silence.34 The Griffin case dealt
with an instruction that defendant's silence could be considered by the
jury as evidence of his guilt. The debate about Griffin's meaning has
centered around whether Griffin forbids only those instructions that
allow adverse inferences or whether Griffin's sanction against "com-
ment" extends to an unrequested charge that no adverse inference is
allowed.35
In State v. Bryant"6 the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
Griffin as barring only an instruction that defendant's silence was
evidence of guilt.3 7 While the North Carolina court has held that, in the
absence of a request by the accused, section 8-54 does not create a duty
for the judge to instruct that silence creates no inference of guilt, 8 the
court has frequently suggested that the instruction not be given unless
requested by the defendant.3 9 Despite these repeated admonitions, the
court has found prejudicial error in the sua sponte instruction in only
two cases, and in both cases the judge informed the jury of the defend-
ant's right not to testify but failed to mention that no adverse inference
could arise from the exercise of that right.40  These two instructions
32. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
33. Many of these cases are collected at 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968).
34. 380 U.S. at 613.
35. 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968).
36. 283 N.C. 227, 195 S.E.2d 509 (1973).
37. Id. at 233, 195 S.E.2d at 513.
38. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974); State v.
Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 231, 195 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1973); State v. Rainey, 236 N.C. 738,
741, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 365, 5 S.E.2d 156, 161
(1939).
39. State v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 233-34, 195 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1973); State v.
Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023
1972); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 366, 5 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1939).
40. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974) (instruction
that defendants "'did not offer any evidence as they have a right to do' was prejudicial
error since it failed to instruct the jury "correctly and completely"). State v. Rainey,
236 N.C. 738, 740-41, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953) (error in mentioning defendant's right to
silence without noting presumption of innocence, but held harmless error since presump-
tion was mentioned three times elsewhere in the charge).
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were erroneous because they were incomplete statements of the law, not
because any right of the defendant would be violated if the judge gave
the full instruction without a request by the defendant.41
Even accepting the notion that the unsolicited instruction is not
error per se, the phrasing of instructions such as the one given in
Caron,42 which repeatedly emphasizes defendant's silence, could certain-
ly prejudice the defendant. It is the wording of instructions rather than
the fact that an instruction was given that the court has criticized most
often.48  The North Carolina courts have frequently urged that the
language of the statute itself be used in giving the instruction,44 and
since 1973, a pattern instruction has been available.45 Yet instructions
such as that in Caron continue to be given, and only two supreme court
justices have been willing to go beyong a suggestion that more "com-
mendable" language could be used.46
Adoption of the view that the sua sponte charge of "no presump-
tion of guilf' is reversible error would raise the question of the proper
procedure to use at trial. The rule of Bruno v. United States47 and the
similar North Carolina case, State v. Rainey,48 should be retained: when
defendant requests the instruction that no inference arises from his
failure to testify, the trial judge is required to so charge the jury. This
41. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738-39, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974):
While it was not error for the court, in the absence of a request by the defend-
ant, to instruct the jury correctly and completely on this point, any instruction
thereon is incomplete and prejudicially erroneous unless it makes clear to thejury that the defendant has the right to offer or to refrain from offering evi-
dence as he sees fit and that his failure to testify should not be considered by
the jury as basis for any inference adverse to him.
42. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
43. E.g., State v. Caron, 288 N.C. 467, 473, 219 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1975) ("we do not
commend the instruction given . . . as it was unduly repetitious"); State v. Baxter, 285
N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974) (charge was "incomplete statement"); State
v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 233-34, 195 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1973) ("we do not approve the
language chosen"); State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972) ("the instruction is meager and is not commended");
State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 423, 158 S.E.2d 522, 527 (1968) ("infelicitous choice of
words").
44. E.g., State v. McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 379, 49 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1948); State v.
Caron, 26 N.C. App. 456, 460, 215 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1975); State v. Powell, 11 N.C.
App. 465, 474, 181 S.E.2d 745, 760 (1971).
45. NoRTH CAROLINA PATrENM INSTRffCrONS--CIM. 101.30 (1973). It reads:
"The defendant in this case has not testified. The law of North Carolina gives him this
privilege. This same law also assures him that his decision not to testify creates no pre-
sumption against him. Therefore, his silence is not to influence your decision in any
way.$,
46. See State v. Caron, 288 N.C. 467, 474, 219 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1975) (Sharp &
Exum, JJ., dissenting).
47. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
48. 236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E.2d 39 (1953).
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rule protects the defendant who fears that the jury may attach undue
significance to his silence and who yet believes that the judge's instruc-
tion has the potential of diminishing the adverse inference that naturally
arises from his silence.4"
Currently in North Carolina, attorneys are not required to request
instructions on "substantive" features of a case, while they must request
an instruction on a "subordinate" feature.5 0 Failure to request the
"subordinate" feature instruction leaves the judge with discretion wheth-
er to charge the jury on the issue.5 The instruction about defendant's
failure to testify has been classified as relating to a subordinate feature
of a case,5" 2 and thus the question arises whether the judge's discretion to
instruct in the absence of a request should be retained. Several jurisdic-
tions allow the judge to use his discretion but subject it to the defend-
ant's right to object."3 If the accused offers an objection to the judge's
proposed instruction, it is error for the judge to give the instruction.
In North Carolina, however, attorneys are not required to object to
errors in an instruction in order to preserve the error for appeal; 5' and
even if they do object, it is not necessarily erroneous for the judge to
instruct over their objections. The alternatives for implementing the
rule that the sua sponte charge is error are thus either to remove the
judge's discretion to charge when the defendant does not request the
instruction or to retain the discretion and to require the defendant to
object if he thinks the instruction will call undue attention to his silence.
Since a judge-made rule currently excuses the defendant from objecting
in criminal actions,55 the court itself could change the rule and require
the accused to object at trial if he wishes to bar comment on his right to
silence. If the judge then instructed over the defendant's objection, the
charge would be erroneous. Either of these alternatives would allow
"defendant's counsel [to] observe the entire proceedings and make his
49. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). See Note, Comments to the Jury
on Defendant's Failure to Testify, 64 DICK. L. REv. 164.
50. Broun, North Carolina Jury Instruction Practice-Is It Time to Get the Judge
Off the Tightrope?, 52 N.C.L. REv. 719, 720 (1974).
51. State v. Powell, 11 N.C. App. 465, 474, 181 S.E.2d 754, 760 (1971).
52. State v. Rainey, 236 N.C. 738, 741, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953).
53. E.g., United States v. Smith, 392 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Russell v.
State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966); Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N.E.2d
371 (1974).
54. Broun, supra note 50, at 720.
55. Id. Professor Broun points out that N.C.R. Civ. P. 46(c) excuses attorneys
from objecting to the charge in civil cases. Id. at 720 n.6. Broun argues for requiring
objections to preserve error for appeal in civil and criminal cases, with an exception for
"plain error." Id. at 733-34.
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choice after he has determined whether an instruction is needed to
protect the defendant's rights in the particular case." 56 In addition, the
choice would be given "to the one whose rights are at stake; hence, if
defendant [were] ultimately prejudiced by his selection, he [would]
have no cause to complain."57
Regardless of whether the rule is changed to allow the defendant
an absolute choice about giving the instruction, North Carolina's appel-
late courts should enforce their frequently repeated suggestion that the
words of the statute or the available pattern instruction be used in
charging the jury.5" The instruction in Caron is a flagrant example of
the ineffectiveness of these mere warnings to the trial courts. It is
difficult to believe that such an instruction could not prejudice the
defendant's right to remain silent, and when the means to assure that the
instruction is properly given are so readily available, failure to do so is
inexcusable.
The "natural inference" that a defendant who does not testify in his
own behalf must be guilty runs counter to the law's presumption of
innocence and to the accused's privilege of silence. Innocent defend-
ants who decline to testify do exist; their silence may be prompted by
fear of impeachment through the introduction of evidence of bad char-
acter or prior conviction, by fear that under the pressure of cross-
examination their demeanor may adversely affect the jury, or by fear of
exposing matters remotely related to the charges.59 If the defendant,
innocent or guilty, "is to have the unfettered right to testify or not to
testify he should have a correlative right to say whether or not his silence
should be singled out for the jury's attention."6  State v. Caron is the
latest example of the North Carolina Supreme Court's willingness to pay
lip service to this right of the defendant while refusing to enforce the
right.
BARBARA C. RUBY
56. Note, 64 DicK. L. REv. supra note 17, at 171.
57. Id.
58. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
59. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893); C. McCoemnce, HAND3ooK
oP THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 118 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at
§ 2272.
60. Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 100, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1966).
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Criminal Law and Procedure-The Automaton Court: North
Carolina Places Burden on Defendant to Prove Unconsciousness
The criminal defense of unconsciousness has been recognized in
many states' and in England2 as a means by which a defendant, al-
though he has committed the act with which he is charged, can escape
criminal responsibility. Unconsciousness, often referred to as automa-
tism, occurs when one who engages in what would otherwise be criminal
conduct is at that time in a state of unconsciousness or semi-conscious-
ness.3 This defense, however, is not a simple one, and its use presents
several difficulties. The principal problems center on whether the
defense is in actuality only an offshoot of an insanity defense and"
therefore should require no separate treatment with respect to the appli-
cable criminal law and procedure and whether, assuming that uncon-
sciousness is a separate and distinct defense, the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant did the act while in a state of
unconsciousness should be on the defendant.
In State v. Caddell' the North Carolina Supreme Court was
presented both problems and in a nearly unanimous decision held that
the defenses of insanity and unconsciousness are not the same in nature
and that the burden rests on the defendant to establish his defense of
unconsciousness to the satisfaction of the jury. The court's decision is
unusual in that it not only refuses to follow its own precedent, as well as
strong California precedent and some English case law to the contrary,
but also bases its decision on the rationale that unconsciousness, al-
l. Initially Kentucky, California and Wisconsin recognized the defense in the late
1800's and early 1900's in court decisions. See People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 P.
481 (1901); Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879); Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249,
126 N.W. 737 (1910). Other states soon followed with court decisions that approved
the unconsciousness defense and often the defense was incorporated into the state
statutory framework. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
2. The English acceptance of the defense received full court support in Rex v.
Harrison-Owen, [1951] 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.) and numerous cases thereafter. See
text accompanying notes 38-49 infra.
3. For further definition and discussion of the defense see 1 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON
CRIMINAL Lw §§ 388, 395 (9th ed. 1923); 1 H. BRILL, CYCLOPEDrA. OF CRIMINAL IAW§§ 124, 128 (1922); 1 W. BTURDICK, THE LAw OF CRIME §§ 216, 217 (1946); W. LAFAvE
& A. Scotr, HANDBOOKs ON CRUMINAL LAw § 44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LiFAvn]; J.
MILLER, MILLER ON CRIMmAL LAW § 39 (1934); H. WEIHOFEN, MEmAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEmNSE (1954); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PaocEDURE
§ 50 (R. Anderson ed. 1957). See also 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 55 (1965); 22
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 55 (1961).
4. 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
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though "distinct" from insanity, is "akin" to it and hence the burden of
proof placed on the defendant with respect to insanity should likewise be
applicable to unconsciousness. 6 This result is a confusing mixture of
the true policy grounds and case law that properly justify the court's
conclusion.
Willis Tony Caddell was charged with kidnapping and was tried
before a jury in Guilford County. He entered pleas of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial the State's evidence tended to
show that defendant kidnapped a fourteen-year-old girl, that he attempt-
ed intercourse with her, and that he choked and beat the victim over a
period of thirty minutes. Defendant testified in his own behalf and
stated that he "remembered nothing"' of the events of that day. He also
introduced medical testimony, contrary to the advice of his counsel, that
tended to show that defendant was not insane. Upon this evidence, the
superior court judge charged the jury with respect to the issue of
unconsciousness 8 and insanity, and the jury convicted defendant.
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, defendant asserted
that the jury instruction that the defendant does not have the burden of
proving unconsciousness and the instruction that the july should find
him not guilty if they found he was "completely unconscious' were
inconsistent. " Although acknowledging the truth of this contention, the
majority concluded that defendant did have the burden and that there-
fore the alleged error was harmless and in favor of defendant.' 0 Rely-
ing upon an analogy to the insanity defense and quoting some of the
5. Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Copeland dissented. See text accompanying
notes 57-60 infra.
6. 287 N.C. at 281-90, 215 S.E.2d at 358-63.
7. Id. at 272, 215 S.E.2d at 352.
8. The instruction read:
Now, members of the jury, a person cannot be held criminally responsible
for acts committed while he is unconscious. Unconsciousness is never an af-
firmative defense. Where a person commits an act without being conscious
thereof, such act is not criminal even though if committed by a person who was
conscious it would be a crime. The defendant has no burden to prove that he
was unconscious. If you find that the defendant was completely unconscious
of what transpired ... then he would not be guilty ....
Id. at 283-84, 215 S.E.2d at 359 (emphasis added).
9. The proper instruction when a defendant does not have the burden of proving
unconsciousness is that the jury should find the defendant not guilty unless they find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was conscious of what transpired. In other words,
when the defendant does not have the burden, he only has to show "reasonable doubt"
and the state has the ultimate burden of persuading the jury that the defendant was
conscious of his acts. See generally State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 116, 165 S.E.2d 328,
336 (1969); LAFAvE, supra note 3, at § 44.
10. 287 N.C. at 284, 290, 215 S.E.2d at 359-60, 363.
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rationale in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland,11 the court
concluded:
"The necessity of laying [the] proper foundation is on the defence:
and if it is not so laid, the defence of automatism need not be
left to the jury."
. . . We are unable to perceive a reasonable basis for distinction
. between insanity . . . and unconsciousness. . . . In [both)
defenses the contention is the same-the defendant did the act,
but should not be convicted because the requisite mental element
was not present. The same presumption, which casts upon the de-
fendant, claiming insanity, the burden of proving it to the satisfac-
tion of the jury, and thus to negative the presence of mens rea,
applies also to the defendant who asserts a temporary mental lapse
duo to [unconsciousness].12
The supreme court, therefore, placed the burden of proving uncon-
sciousness, to the satisfaction of the jury, on the defendant.
Unlike the situation in North Carolina, where contacts with the
automatism defense have been few, other American courts have dealt
extensively with the situation.'3 In fact, in some states the defense of
unconsciousness has been codified into state law.' 4  Where the defense
is recognized, various sources of automatism have been accepted by
court decision. These sources include somnambulism and somnolen-
ture,15 hypnotism,' 6 diabetic shock,'I epileptic black-outs,' 8 kleptoman-
11. [19613 3 All E.R. 523.
12. 287 N.C. at 288-89, 215 S.E.2d at 362-63 (emphasis added and deleted). Note
the court's reference to mens rea. See text accompanying notes 25, 50-55 infra.
13. For a broad treatment of the defense see Fox, Physical Disorder, Conscious-
ness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1963). See also Edwards,
Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MoDERN.L. REv. 375 (1958).
14. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-134(2) (1973 Supp.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5)
(1970); IIAHo CODE ANN. § 18-201(2) (1975 CuM. Supp.); MONT. Ry. CODES ANN. §
94-201(5) (1969); N-v. Rnv. SrAT. § 194.010(6) (1967); OnrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
152(6) (1958). The typical statute reads: "All persons are capable of committing
crimes except those belonging to the following classes: . . . Persons who committed the
act charged without being conscious thereof. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5) (1970).
15. Somnambulism is commonly referred to as "sleep-walking," while somnolenture
has been defined as "the lapping over of a profound sleep into the domain of apparent
wakefulness." Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 187 (1879), quoting F. WHARTON &
M. STILLE, A TREATISE ON MEDIcAL JURIsPRUDENcE § 151 (1855). See also H. BRILL,
supra note 3, at § 127.
16. People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1894).
17. Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1955).
18. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1960); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 268 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1954); People v. Magnus, 155 N.Y.S. 1013 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1915).
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ia,'0 delirium from fever or drugs,2" drunkenness, 21 and cerebral concus-
sion.22 However, the decisions with respect to these sources have not
been uniform 23 and, compounded by the variance among the states
concerning where the burden of the defense lies, the result has been
inconsistent case law that provides ample support even within a single
jurisdiction for different findings.24
The primary reason for this variance is the confusion over the
constituent element of crime-actus reus or mens rea2 5-- to which the
automatism defense relates. If the unconsciousness defense is catego-
rized as precluding "voluntariness," then the defense relates to the lack
of an actus reus. Such is the view in California.26 However, some stat-
utes and courts characterize the defense as relating to the presence or
absence of mens rea.2 7 This divergence over whether the defense is
connected with the "voluntary act" or the "guilty mind" produces two
19. H. BnRLL, supra note 3, at § 126.
20. See People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Sup. Ct.
1973); Note, Drug Induced Insanity and Unconscousness-A Clarification of California
Law, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 442 (1974).
21. See Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 27 S.E.2d 659 (1943). Although drunkenness
that results in a "black-out" condition may sometimes be considered a source of
unconsciousness or an affirmative defense in and of itself, it has been held that
"voluntary" drunkenness is an exception and provides no defense (for instance, when the
defendant has formed an intent to commit a crime and drinks to give himself courage to
commit it). State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 141 S.E.2d 473 (1965).
22. Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okl. Crim. App. 1962).
23. Compare People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623
(Ct. App. 1959) (where the court did not differentiate between epilepsy and insanity)
with People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943)
(where the court held that insanity is not the same as epilepsy).
24. Compare Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879) with Tibbs v. Common-
wealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910) for an example of this variance within
Kentucky.
25. See, e.g., 1 W. BuRtixcE, supra note 3, at § 96 where the elements of crime
are defined:
Every crime necessarily requires two elements. . . one biing physical the
other mental. The physical element is the prohibited thing done or the com-
manded thing left undone, or what is called "the act" [or the actus reus or the
voluntary act]. The mental element is the state or condition of -the doer's
mind which accompanies the act, the human will, otherwise known as "the
intent" [or the mens rea or the guilty mind].
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5) (1970), quoted supra note 14. The actus reus
category is also the one chosen by the Model Penal Code:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of
which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this
Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-116 (1964).
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important consequences: the categorization of unconsciousness as de-
pendent upon mens rea instead of actus reus can result in (1) a confu-
sion with the insanity defense,28 and (2) a different burden of proof
upon the defendant (i.e., if. the focus is on actus reus, the burden is
on the State; if on mens rea, the burden will fall on the defendant).20
With respect to the first consequence, the equating of automatism
with insanity may in some instances seem somewhat purposeful due to
the results occasioned by pleading one defense as opposed to the other.
While, for example, a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" carries
with it in most jurisdictions a commitment for some definite term to a
mental hospital or institution for the criminally insane, the plea of "not
guilty by reason of unconsciousness" typically results in outright acquit-
tal of the defendant.30 Therefore, some courts utilize the association of
insanity with unconsciousness"' to preclude use of automatism as a
separate defense, instead recognizing the unconsciousness defense "as a
species of insanity."3 2 In this way, a focus on automatism as relating to
mens rea enables the court to confuse automatism with insanity and
serves as a device whereby the courts can dictate the result of pleas (and
strike a plea of automatism by the defendant) due to the courts' dislike
for the outright release afforded by the assertion of the unconsciousness
defense.
Concerning the burden-of-proof33 consequence in jurisdictions that
28. See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra. In fact, several authors list the
sources of unconsciousness under the general heading of "insanity" without a separate
discussion of automatism. See, e.g., 1 J. BisHop, supra note 3, at § 388.
29. See text accompanying notes 34-49 infra.
30. LAFAVE, supra note 3, 1 44, at 338.
31. Of course, the insanity defense always relates to the mens rea element of a
crime. The general test for insanity is "that at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722
(H.L. 1843) (emphasis added). It is the meaning of "disease of the mind" that
frequently creates problems with respect to unconsciousness sources. Although, techni-
cally, unconscious acts caused by epilepsy, somnambulism, etc. are "diseases," most
courts that recognize automatism consider that such sources are not the "diseases" of
insanity. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969).
32. Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 567, 128 S.W. 871, 874 (1910). The
court says in its opinion that it fails to see how evidence of somnambulism "would
constitute any defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity." Id.
33. It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court has also wrestled
with the problem of the burden of proof when a mens rea type defense is asserted. See
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, (1895). In that case the Court was torn between
placing a burden of proof to the satisfaction of the jury on the defendant or maintaining
the reasonable doubt burden on the prosecution. Justice Harlan decided that the
prosecution should have the burden because, otherwise, a burden on the defendant "is in
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recognize the distinction between insanity and unconsciousness, the
cases in two such jurisdictions provide an interesting comparison. In
California, where courts focus upon the actus reus, the burden of proof
is on the defendant merely to go forward with the evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt as to his consciousness,34 and the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains on the prosecution. Although the California courts
recognize that the law creates a presumption that when a person commits
an act, he is presumed conscious, it emphasizes that the "cardinal rule in
criminal cases [is] that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt."35 Thus, one California court has
stated that "'[mien are presumed to be conscious when they act as if
they were conscious, and if they would have the jury know that things
are not what they seem, they must impart that knowledge by affirmative
proof [,] . .. [which] is merely another way of saying that defendant
has the burden of going forward."36  Thus, under this analysis, any
evidence produced by the defendant would be sufficient to raise such a
defense and to require the trial judge to instruct upon unconscious-
ness-even if the evidence is merely the defendant's statement that he
"remembers nothing' or that "it was hazy."3"
In contrast to California, the English courts have not been unified
in their allocation of the burden of proving consciousness and of per-
suading the jury. In Rex v. Harrison-Owen38 the defendant, who was
arrested in a home that was obviously being burglarized, testified that he
had "no recollection" of entering the house and that he must have done
so in a state of automatism. Lord Goddard stated that the defendant
was entitled to an automatism instruction because 'w]hen a prisoner
sets up such defences it is as well to leave the matter to the jury."39
effect to require him to establish his innocence, by proving that he is not guilty of the
crime charged." Id. at 487. The issue of unconsciousness itself has not been specifical-
ly dealt with by the Court. The tendency of the Court, however, has been to leave the
burden of proof on the prosecution and the Court may eventually extend this analysis to
the unconsciousness defense. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-03 (1975).
34. See People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948).
35. Id. at 63-64, 198 P.2d at 871.
36. Id. at 64-65, 198 P.2d at 872, quoting in part People v. Nihell, 144 Cal. 200,
202, 77 P. 916, 917 (1904).
37. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (where the court stated that the fact that evidence may not be of a
character to inspire belief does not authorize the refusal of an instruction based thereon).
But cf. Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358 (1957) (where the court held
that a failure to remember what happened is alone not sufficient to present such an issue
to the jury).
38. [1951] 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.).
39. Id. at 727.
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Accordingly, this analysis was similar to that of the California courts
and focused upon the actus reus element of the crime.40 In a later case,
Regina v. Charlson,41 the defendant produced medical evidence of a
cerebral tumor and a history of ill health in the family; the court
instructed the jury as to unconsciousness, and the jury acquitted the
defendant despite the brutal nature of the crime.42 In response to this
"defect of the law" (i.e. the outright release for dangerous defend-
ants),43 the court the following year in Regina v. Kemp 14 muddled the
distinction between the insanity and unconsciousness defenses and ac-
cordingly refused to instruct the jury on unconsciousness.
After Kemp, Hill v. Baxter45 marked the initial policy change of
the English courts toward a shifting of the burden of proving automa-
tism to ffe defendant. In Hill no evidence of the defendants automa-
tous action other than his own testimony of "remembering nothing" was
presented. The same Lord Goddard of Harrison-Owen responded to
these facts: "[The onus of proving that [the defendant] was in a state
of automation must be on him. '[Automatism] is not only akin to a
defence of insanity but it is a rule of the law of evidence that the onus of
proving a fact which must be exclusively within the knowledge of a
party lies on him who asserts it."46 Thus, the British court had clearly
shifted to a mens rea analysis of the defense and had imposed some sort
of burden on the defendant.
The court in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland47
attempted to answer the question whether the burden was that of going
40. Id. at 728 (where the court held that "[wihether [it is] a voluntary act or not
was a question for the jury") (emphasis added).
41. [1955] 1 All E.R. 859 (Chester Ass.).
42. The facts of the case show that the defendant-father called his ten-year-old son
to a window and then brutally assaulted him with a mallet. Id.
43. See Edwards, Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MODERN L. REV.
375 (1958) for a discussion of the dissatisfaction of the courts with automatism and
outright release afforded by the unconsciousness defense.
44. [1956] 3 All E.R. 249 (Bristol Ass.). In this case evidence of arteriosclerosis
was introduced as a cause of defendant's unconsciousness. The trial judge broadened the
"disease of the mind" focus of insanity to include these facts and thus preclude use of
automatism. The court was obviously focusing on the mens rea element of the crime.
45. [1958] 1 Q.B. 277.
46. Id. at 282. Lord Devlin in the same case also related that a defendant cannot
rely on the automatism defense without providing some evidence of it. Other language
in the opinion is that the nature of the burden is one of "going forward" but that there
must at least be some "prima facie" evidence before the defense can be relied on. He
hedged, however, by stating that he reserved "for future consideration. . . the question
of where the burden ultimately lies." Id. at 285.
47. [1961] 3 All E.R. 523 The facts of the case involved a murder of a young
girl and the defendant stated that he had a "feeling of blackness." Medical evidence
indicating a disease of the mind was also introduced.
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forward or whether the burden was one of at least a degree of persua-
sion on the defendant. The court concluded that a "proper foundation"
must be laid by the defendant before the evidence and charge of
unconsciousness will be submitted to the jury. Lord Kilmuir suggested
that the defense was similar to insanity and, concentrating on the mens
rea element, concluded that some sort of persuasion burden should be
on the defendant. However, Lords Denning and Morris spoke of the
necessity of a "voluntary act" and categorized the burden as merely one
of going forward; nevertheless, both still recognized the need of first
laying a proper foundation.4 8  Therefore, the court split in its analysis
and left authority for at least two divergent viewpoints with respect to
defendant's burden of proof.49
Although the North Carolina experience with automatism has been
limited to two cases, the conclusions of the state's supreme court have
been just as varied as those of the English courts. In State v. Mercer5 °
the trial judge limited the evidence of defendant's "black-out" to the
issue of intent. A unanimous supreme court, however, held that this
ruling was erroneous and cited California law as authority for
the proposition that "[u]nconsciousness is never an affirmative
defense . ." 1 and that even though the only evidence of automatism
was the defendant's own testimony, he was entitled to an instruction to
the jury that he could be found not guilty because of his unconscious-
48. Therefore, the burden advocated by Denning and Morris is not that of going
forward which typically requires that the defendant merely come forward and present
any evidence but is a slightly stricter burden requiring at least a proper foundation more
than the mere statements by the accused (i.e., some medical testimony is needed). Id. at
535-36. In this light, the Denning and Kilmuir proposals are not far apart, although
Denning would still leave the ultimate burden of persuasion on the state. Id. at 536.
49. As an example of the complications that resulted from this divergence, see
Regina v. Quick, "1973] 3 All E.R. 347 (where defendant assaulted the victim while in
diabetic shock and the court confessed confusion not only as to where the burden of the
defense lay but also as to whether such shock was the result of an internal disorder and
thus a "disease of the mind" precluding assertion of the unconsciousness defense); Beck,
Voluntary Conduct: Automatism, Insanity and Drunkenness, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 315 (1967)
(in which the author relates that three types of automatism have developed since Bratty:
(1) Sane automatism (involving a blow to the head and the actus reus element; the
burden is always on the Crown), (2) Insane automatism (resulting from internal
malfunction; the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the balance of probabilities),
and (3) Alcoholic automatism (raising the question of lack of intent to a specific intent
crime; the burden is on the Crown)). See also Sullivan, Self induced and Recurring
Automatism, 123 NEW L.. 1093 (1973) (in which the author discusses the turmoil cre-
ated by the unconsciousness defense).
50. 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969). The case involved a murder by the
defendant who testified that he was "blank in mind." No medical evidence concerning
the cause of the black-out or symptoms of somnambulism or epilepsy was introduced.
51. Id. at 117, 165 S.E.2d at 335.
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ness. No mention was made of English precedent or the likeness of the
defense to insanity. Automatism, then, in accord with California law,
was held to be a defense of "no voluntary act," as to which the state and
not the defendant had the ultimate burden of proof."
Caddell, six years later, not only marks an overruling of Mercer
and a refusal to follow California precedents, but also is indicative of the
recognition of British law precedents on the issue and the dissatisfaction
of courts in general with the automatism defense. The majority recog-
nized that there is variance with respect to the burden of proof 0
but decided that the rationale underlying the Hill decision and underly-
ing the "proper foundation" analysis of Lord Kilmuir in Bratty was
controlling. The court deemed this rationale to be that the defense of
unconsciousness is "like unto insanity" and "it does not necessarily
follow that the two defenses are different in law with respect to the
burden of proof" 54-both relate to the mens rea element, both involve
facts that are within the realm of knowledge of the defendant alone, and
both involve conclusive presumptions (in the case of insanity, the doing
of the act presumes conscious volition). 55 Although the court incorrect-
ly stated that Mercer was the only decision in which a court had allowed
a defendant's uncorroborated testimony of a "black-out" to be sufficient
to present the jury with the question of unconsciousness, 0 it was correct
in its interpretation of English precedent as authority for placing an
affirmative burden of proof on the defendant not only to produce
evidence constituting a "proper foundation" but also to persuade the
jury to their satisfaction that he was unconscious at the time of the
crime.
Chief Justice Sharp, joined by Justice Copeland, dissented from the
majority's conclusion that automatism is an affirmative defense and that
the burden of proving it is on the defendant. Her focus, in contrast to
52. Id. at 115, 165 S.E.2d at 334.
53. 287 N.C. at 286, 215 S.E.2d at 361.
54. Id. at 288, 215 S.E.2d at 362. The burden of proving insanity to the
satisfaction of the jury rests on the defendant. See State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213
S.E.2d 305 (1975); State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949); State v. Swink,
229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E.2d 852 (1948); State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E.2d 232
(1943).
55. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1966) ("... the general criminal intent
necessary to conviction is deduced from the doing of the criminal act.") (emphasis
added).
56. 287 N.C. at 290, 215 S.E.2d at 363. Several California cases and at least one
early English case permitted automatism to be raised when the only evidence of it was
defendant's own testimony. See People v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (cited supra note 37); Regina v. Harrison-Owen, [1951] 2
All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.) (cited supra note 39).
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that of the majority, was on the actus reus, 57 and, instead of analogizing
to the defense of insanity, she stated that "[It]he plea of unconsciousness
is analogous to a plea of accident or of alibi, neither of which is an
affirmative defense. Each plea merely negates an essential element of
the crime charged."5 She concluded that if defendant has a burden, it
is only that of going forward.59 The Chief Justice's analysis then
depended upon the actus reus and upon one of the "long-established
principles of our criminal jurisprudence--that the defendant has no
burden to prove his innocence." 60
Although the majority was at odds with the Chief Justice
and ostensibly violated "long-established" criminal jurisprudence with
its holding in Caddell, the decision appears to be a wise one and
compatible with current policy formulations. First, the decision comes
on the wings of the law-and-order movement of the seventies that
advocates a toughened judicial stance against crime. Such a position
then is consistent with the deterrence of criminal conduct, not by
depriving the innocent of his rights, but by simply forcing the defendant,
when the unusual automatism circumstances are involved, to provide a
proper foundation for the jury to believe that such circumstances were
actually present. The fear that the defendant will be deprived of an
unconsciousness plea because of lack of corroboration of his testimony is
in any event no different from the fear that an insanity plea will be
denied because not supported by medical evidence. Secondly, the focus
on mens rea seems justified because of the nature of the defense and its
close relationship with the mental element. Also, since evidence of
black-out or causes thereof lies entirely within the knowledge of the
57. 287 N.C. at 291, 215 S.E.2d at 364 (defendant "voluntarily committed the...
act charged"). Id. at 293, 215 S.E.2d at 366 ("possibility of a voluntary act"; "voluntary
act is an absolute requirement for criminal liability"), quoting IAFAvE, supra note 3, at
181.
58. Id. at 296, 215 S.E.2d at 367.
59. For support of her position, see Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.
1960); People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948); Lord
Morris's opinion in Bratty v. Attorney Gen. for N. Ireland, 11961] 3 All E.R. 523,
535-36. Justice Sharp has also espoused the same opinion concerning the burden of
proof with respect to the insanity defense. See State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213
S.E.2d 305 (1975) (where she argued that the evidence introduced by defendant short of
the foundation necessary to take the issue of insanity to the jury should still be
considered in determining whether the accused formed the necessary intent; therefore,
she argued that the ultimate burden should always remain on the state).
60. 287 N.C. at 301, 215 S.E.2d at 370. See also N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 23; N.C.
GN. STAT. § 8-54 (1970). This long-established principle is the "cardinal rule" in
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948) (see note 34 supra) and
the "golden rule" of Lord Morris in Bratty v. Attorney Gen. for N. Ireland, [1961] 3 All
E.R. 523, 535-36 (see note 48 supra).
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defendant, the burden should be on him to bring out those facts that
tend to negate the presence of the guilty mind which is necessary to
convict. The presumption of consciousness deduced from the doing of
the proscribed act is controlling, and the defendant should show and
prove that at the time the act was committed, he was not conscious and
thus did not possess the intent requisite to the crime. Finally, in view of
the consequences of a plea of unconsciousness-acquittal and outright
release-the decision rightly embodies the judicial dislike for the de-
fense that has been categorized as "the refuge of guilty minds." Thus,
by making automatism an affirmative defense with burden of satisfac-
tion on the defendant, the court is simply hoping to close off an avenue
of outright release for the guilty defendant. In the long run, however,
the problems raised by this defense cannot be solved in one case; there-
fore it remains the job of the General Assembly to awaken from its own
automatous state and to clear the confusion surrounding the defense of
unconsciousness."'
JAMES M. ISEMAN, JR.
Criminal Procedure-North Carolina Rejects a Retroactive
Application of Mullaney
Homicide defendants in North Carolina who asserted that they had
acted in self-defense or in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation
were long required to "satisfy the jury" of the truth of their assertions.'
61. Several variances on the theme and solutions to the problems have been
proposed. See State v. Sikora, 44 NJ. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965) (in which an expert
witness psychiatrist proposed that the mens rea element be abolished because, in his
opinion, the "conscious is always the unwitting and unsuspecting puppet of the uncon-
scious." Id. at 458, 210 A.2d at 198); Beck, supra note 49 (in which Beck proposes that
the fault lies in a criminal code giving outright acquittal and that the legislature should
require some sort of compulsory treatment after the trial if an automatism defense is
asserted); Fingarette, Diminished Mental Capacity as a Criminal Law Defense, 37 Mou-
ERN L. REv. 264 (1974) (in which the author says that the defense of automatism is not
unconsciousness but is an "altered state" of conscious action where defendant has lost
"rational control of his conduct" and that the confusion can be alleviated by treating the
defense as such.); and Sullivan, supra note 49 (in which he suggests that a solution lies in
making the unconscious defendant criminally negligent if he had a previous history of
black-outs and the jury found that a reasonable man would have anticipated the
unconscious state which occurred).
1. State v. Barnett, 132 N.C. 1005, 43 S.E. 832 (1903). See also State v.
Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E.2d 461 (1969); State v. Miller, 112 N.C. 878, 17 S.E.
167 (1893); State v. Ellick, 60 N.C. 450 (1864).
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But in Mullaney v. Wilbur the United States Supreme Court held that
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defend-
ant did not act in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation when
that issue is presented.2 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State
v. Hankerson, concluded that the Mullaney standard of proof also
applied to homicide defendants who raised the issue of self-defense, 3 but
the court declined to give retroactive effect to the new Mullaney rule.4
In Hankerson the court used a balancing test that the United States
Supreme Court has sometimes employed in deciding the retroactivity of
a new constitutional doctrine.5 This test involves balancing three fac-
tors: the purpose to be served by the new rule, reliance by enforcement
officials on previous decisions inconsistent with the new doctrine, and
the potential impact of retroactive application of the new doctrine on the
administration of justice. In applying the balancing formula, the North
Carolina court found that the purpose of the Mullaney rule was to
provide for a more "reliable" determination of innocence or of the
degree of guilt.8 Against this concededly important purpose the
court balanced the two other factors. It found that North Carolina and
other states had justifiably relied on an earlier Supreme Court pro-
nouncement in Leland v. Oregon that states could constitlutionally place
the burden of persuasion on defendants, at least for the affirmative
defense of insanity.7 Giving Mullaney retroactive application also
raised the specter of a tremendous burden on the administration of
justice in North Carolina.8 After balancing these interests, the court
concluded that the burden on judicial administration and prior justified
reliance were sufficient to outweigh the possibility that the fact-finding
process had been tainted by the pre-Mullaney standaqd and, thus, that
Mullaney should not apply retroactively.9
During the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has
The burden also rested, and may still rest, on defendants to prove such matters as
intoxication, State v. Marsh, 234 N.C. 101, 66 S.E.2d 684 (1951), and insamty, State v.
Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949). The North Carolina Supreme Court has
indicated that Mullaney does not affect the burden for the insanity issue. State v.
Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 351, 218 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1975).
2. 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
3. 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975).
4. Id. at 652, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
5. See text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
6. 288 N.C. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591-92.
7. 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that a state could require a defendant to prove
himself sane beyond a reasonable doubt).
8. 288 N.C. at 654-55, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
9. Id. at 652, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
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used the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to revolution-
ize criminal procedure in state courts.10 Because some of the Court's
decisions during this period were unforeseeable and also because some
decisions required procedures fundamentally different from those pre-
viously used, the Court has on occasion held that a new rule is to be ap-
plied prospectively only.'" Thus, the Court has sometimes avoided un-
fairness to states, which had relied on previous constitutional doctrine,
by refusing to require them to choose between "emptying the jails" and
investing enormous amounts of time and resources in retrials.
The Court has established two lines of analysis in holding new
constitutional doctrine either fully retroactive or merely prospective. One
line'2 states that new rules intended primarily to insure an accurate
determination of facts are automatically to be enforced retroactively:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been
given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by
state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has suf-
ficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.' 3
Conversely, if the major purpose of the new doctrine is perceived not to
be to enhance the judicial truth-finding function, retroactivity is typical-
ly denied.' 4
In a second line of analysis, the Court does not consider the
purpose of the new rule dispositive. Rather, a balancing test is used to
examine the probability that past trials have resulted in inaccurate guilty
verdicts.' 5 Using this balancing approach "[t]he question whether a
constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the
reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of
10. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. See, e.g., cases cited notes 16-18 infra. It may be that the Court would have
been less willing to extend notions of due process had all of its rulings been automatical-
ly retroactive.
12. Hereinafter referred to as the "automatically retroactive" cases.
13. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (dictum) (plurality
opinion) (footnote omitted). See also Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203
(1972) (per curiam); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam).
14. See, e.g., Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (per curiam); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
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degree."1 6 The Court reasons that the old rule may not have been the
cause of a guilty verdict: it rejects "the premise that every criminal trial,
or any particular trial, was necessarily unfair because it was not conduct-
ed in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of [the
Constitution]."" In this line of cases the Court considers the question
whether the old rule infected the fact-finding process as a "question of
probabilities ' 18 and thus avoids the "automatically retroactive" line of
analysis. Once this analysis is chosen the Court uses a "balancing
approach,"' 9 weighing three factors: "(a) the purpose to be served by
the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administra-
tion of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. 20
The Court has been inconsistent in deciding which test to apply.
For rules intended primarily and perhaps solely to insure a more just
determination of facts, the Court has sometimes invoked the "matter of
degree" formula rather than the ostensibly more appropriate "automati-
cally retroactive" analysis. Such was the case in DeStefano v. Woods2 '
in which the Court held nonretroactive the Duncan v. Louisiana&2 rule,
which incorporated the right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses.
DeStefano also made Bloom v. Illinois,23 which required a right to jury
trial for serious criminal contempts, valid prospectively only. The
rationale for holding a new rule which changes the trier of fact retroac-
tive must be that a different fact-finder might arrive at a more just
result.24  In denying retroactivity, the Court assumed that many trials
by judges were as fair as if tried by juries, and concluded that since the
results might have been identical, an analysis of the other factors affect-
ing retroactivity was in order.2 5 On the other hand, the Court has
ignored the "matter of degree" formula in other cases where the trier of
16. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966) (holding Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), non-retroactive).
17. Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 3.1, 32 (1975) (per curiam) (holding Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), barring the exclusion of females from petit juries, non-
retroactive).
18. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973).
20. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). In this line of cases, "the purpose
to be served by the new constitutional rule" will not automatically decide retroactivity,
but is merely "[floremost among these factors." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
249 (1969).
21. 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
22. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
24. 391 U.S. at 158.
25. 392 U.S. at 633-34.
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fact might or might not have reached a different result had the new
standard been in force. In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 20 for example,
the Court noted an obvious fact-finding purpose for the substitution of
the reasonable doubt standard for a preponderance of the evidence test.
Consequently, the Court disposed of the matter with a recital of the
"automatically retroactive" line of cases. Such inconsistencies provoked
one commentator to conclude that the Court may be "basing its deci-
sions on a pragmatic political assessment of the consequences. 27
When the Court uses the balancing approach, it finds that the
factors of reliance and burden on judicial administration work together
against retroactivity. The reliance factor often seems merely a make-
weight argument. In Daniel v. Louisiana,28 for instance, the Court's
refusal to hold its ban on sexually exclusive juries29 retroactive was
probably based almost exclusively on the potentially staggering impact
on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule (at
least in Louisiana). The Court emphasized, however, that Louisiana
had been entitled to rely on a fourteen-year-old decision finding such
procedure constitutional." Similarly, when the potential burden on
judicial administration seems minor, the Court may claim that reliance
on prior inconsistent rules was unjustified because a recent case "clearly
foreshadowed . . . [or] preordained" the overruling of prior law and
thus the advent of the new constitutional doctrine.3' The relative
insignificance of this reliance factor is illustrated by the fact that retroac-
tivity has never been limited by the Court to the time when the new rule
was "foreshadowed. 32
26. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam) (holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), retroactive).
27. Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional
Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289, 307 (1973).
An additional factor that the Court weighs is the availability of post-conviction
remedies for unfairness if the new doctrine is made prospective only. See, e.g., Stovall V.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
28. 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam).
29. Articulated in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 512 (1975).
30. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
31. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (per curiam). The Court held
the rule in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), that a state must make a good faith
effort to bring in a missing witness, retroactive. The Court reasoned that Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which incorporated the sixth amendment's right of
confrontation into the fourteenth, made the Barber rule follow. But Pointer overruled a
series of cases from West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904), to Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953), on which states were no doubt relying.
32. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), made Barber retroactive not just to
the time at which Pointer was decided, but for all time. See Ostrager, supra note 27, at
294-95.
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The Court is also hesitant to put great burdens on any state's
judicial administration. The prospect of numerous retrials in any state
weighs against retroactivity, even if such retrials would be necessary in
only a small minority of states. 3 Retroactivity under these circum-
stances would impose an enormous burden on those states, since wit-
nesses and evidence that a state had presented at the first trial might no
longer be available."4 The Court's analysis of this potential impact of
retroactivity on the judicial system has usually been non-quantitative,
because in few instances will a state's records indicate in how many
cases a formerly constitutional procedure was followed.35 In rare in-
stances, however, the Court is able to use statistics to evaluate the havoc
that retroactivity might wreak. For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell the
Court refused to require the expunction of facts in prison. records that
had been determined without such minimum standards of due process as
the rights to see written notice of charges and to be furnished a written
statement of the evidence relied on.3 6 The Court in Wolff identified the
burden on prison administration quantitatively: misconduct hearings in
the federal system alone were proceeding at the rate of 19,000 per year
in 1973. 3 Reasoning that it had earlier held other due process stan-
dards non-retroactive for parole revocation proceedings for which the
federal government had held only 1,173 hearings in 1973,38 the Court
concluded that non-retroactivity should obtain in Wolff "a fortiori."3 9
In other cases the Court's quantitative analysis of the impact of
retroactivity on the administration of justice has been less sophisticated.
For instance, in Halliday v. United States, the Court refused to make
retroactive the rule that a guilty plea is invalid if the judge who accepted
it failed to comply with the applicable Federal Rule.4 0  The Court noted
that "over 85% of all convictions in the federal courts are obtained
However, limitation of retroactivity to the point where the new rule became
preordained would seem a good result where the other two factors are hi close balance.
33. See, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam); Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418 (1966).
34. 382 U.S. at 418-19.
35. See, e.g., DIVISION OF CRIMINAL LAw AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
JuscE, STATE OF CALIFoRNIA, CRIME IN CALiFoRNrA (1962); NORTH CAROLINA DE.
PARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE CORRECTIONs STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr (1974).
36. 418 U.S. 539, 563-65, 573-74 (1974).
37. Id. at 574. There was no estimate of the burden on state prisons.
38. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972).
39. 418 U.S. at 574. The Court used the balancing approach although it admitted
that the new doctrine "related to the integrity of the fact-finding process." Id. at 573-74.
40. 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (per curiam). The doctrine held non-retroactive arose in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and referred to FED. R. CrM. P. 11.
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pursuant to guilty pleas."'" It failed, however, to explore how many of
those convictions would have been voided by giving retroactive effect to
the ruling. The percentage actually voided would have been far less
than the Court's figure because the new rule was "substantially a
restatement of existing law and practice."'42
At first glance the North Carolina decision in Hankerson, holding
Mullaney non-retroactive, seems to be a likely candidate for reversal in
the federal courts. Mullaney, which held that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in the heat of
passion upon sudden provocation, relied heavily on In re Winship,
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceed-
ings.4  Winship was held retroactive in Ivan V. v. City of New York,44
a fact that the Court noted in a footnote to Mullaney.46 On its face,
that footnote suggests that Mullaney might also require retroactive
application.46  The footnote's position, however, is a clue to its import-
ance: it appears in the middle of a sentence in which the Court re-
jected the lower court's refusal to extend the Winship requirement that
the State shoulder the burden of proof for all essential elements of a
crime to the defense of heat of passion upon sudden provocation. There-
fore, taken in context, the footnote seems designed to buttress the
Court's conclusion that the lower court in Mullaney had misinterpreted
Winship. Despite its decision that this footnote was not controlling on
the issue of retroactivity, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized
41. 394U.S. at 833.
42. Id. at 834 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Wolff, the Court may have assumed that practically none of the nation's prison
disciplinary proceedings comported with its requirements of due process before its ruling.
Given the affirmative nature of its requirements, such an assumption, although not
articulated, should be warranted.
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam).
45. 421 U.S. at 688 n.8.
46. The per curiam decision in Ivan V. used the "automatically retroactive" test,
finding that the "major purpose" of the Winship rule "was to overcome an aspect of a
criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function." 407 U.S. at 205.
Thus, the Court failed to examine the other two factors which would have been weighed
in the balancing approach. However, its failure to invoke the balancing line of cases in
Ivan V. is not dispositive of the Hankerson situation. Two earlier cases that seem to
belong in one category were treated oppositely: the Court's use of the absolutist
approach in 1968 to hold the right to counsel at the imposition of a deferred sentence
retroactive, McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam), did not preclude use of
the balancing approach in 1972 to hold the requirement of counsel at preliminary
hearing non-retroactive. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972). A shift in the make-
up of the Court may explain to some extent the recent rise of the balancing approach. At
any rate, the way that the Supreme Court decides to treat the purpose factor "seems
sometimes to depend on analysis of the other two factors." 288 N.C. at 653; 220 S.E.2d
at 590.
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the importance of distinguishing Ivan V. from Hankerson throughout its
analysis of retroactivity.47
In its analysis of whether to give retroactive effect to Mullaney, the
North Carolina Supreme Court employed the United States Supreme
Court's balancing approach. The North Carolina court was as unclear as
the United States Supreme Court in articulating why it chose to use the
balancing approach rather than the "automatically retroactive" line of
cases, since it conceded that "the purpose of the Mullaney rule [is] to
insure a reliable determination of the question of guilt. '48  The court
invoked the balancing test by calling the possibility of an inaccurate
verdict of guilty a "'question of probabilities."',4  However, the court
failed to examine what the probabilities of an incorrect determination
were, and, incidentally, lost an opportunity to distinguish Hankerson
from Ivan V.50  Prejudice by the finder of fact was less inherent in
Hankerson than. in Ivan V. Presumably all of the juvenile defendants
made eligibile for retrial in Ivan V. were tried before judges.51 Many if
not all homicide trials are before juries, as was the case in Hankerson.52
The complicated pre-Mullaney set of instructions in North Carolina 3
might well, as Justice Lake suggested in a concurring opinion in Hanker-
son, have resulted in harmless error.54 Unable to follow th, shifting bur-
den in the homicide instructions, the jury might well have heeded the
apparently overriding instruction to convict only if convinced of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.5 5 Unwilling to convict without proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the jury might have refused to do so, thus nullifying
the instruction.55 An exhaustive study has shown that juries often
47. See, e.g., 288 N.C. at 654; 220 S.E.2d at 590. The court couches its distinction
of Hankerson from Ivan V. in terms of the differences between Mullaney and Winship.
48. Id. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
49. Id. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591-92.
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 64 infra.
52. See note 72 infra.
53. See 288 N.C. at 642-43, 220 S.E.2d at 583-84.
54. Id. at 659-60, 220 S.E.2d at 594. However, for a constitutional error to be
harmless "the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
55. Even in a simple case, "the average juror usually does not understand the rules
of law applicable to the case, or often is not able to apply them appropriately if he does
understand them." Gordon & Temerlin, Forensic Psychology: The Judge and the Jury,
52 JuIucATtRu 328, 332 (1969). In a sampling of over 300 jurors conducted by federal
judges, "[olver one-third reported not having understood the judge's'instructions; and an
unknown number. . . did not understand but did not say so." Id.
56. H. KALvBN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMEPCAN JuRy, 182-90 (1966) (juries have a
higher standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than do judges and are less likely to
convict).
It would be extremely interesting to compare conviction rates (when self-defense or
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disregard the harshness of rules of law especially in judging self-defense
claims.57 The probability of misunderstanding or of nullification of the
pre-Mullaney instruction 'by a jury seems much higher than that of a
judge confusing the standards in pre-Winship cases. Thus, there seems
to be a lower probability that a defendant was wrongfully convicted in
the Mullaney situation than in the Winship situation.
Justice Exum's analysis of the reliance element of the Supreme
Court's balancing test is the strongest part of the court's opinion. He
distinguishes Hankerson from Ivan V. by noting that the reasonable
doubt standard required in Winship has long been an essential part of
criminal proceedings, with no exception ever made for juveniles. 58 Yet
an exception to the reasonable doubt standard for affirmative defenses
had been clearly carved out by the Supreme Court itself. In Leland v.
Oregon59 the Court held that placing the burden on defendant for an
insanity defense comported with due process. Before Mullaney, it was
"believed that there [was] no general federal constitutional barrier" to
shifting the burden on "affirmative defenses." 60 Consequently, the
reliance factor clearly militates in favor of non-retroactivity.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis of the potential
burden of holding Mullaney retroactive on the administration of justice
in North Carolina and elsewhere is incomplete. The court failed to
explain why the impact of Winship's retroactivity on the administration
of justice in one state (New York) "would obviously be less than the
Mullaney rule which applies to all homicide cases."6 1 But explanation
heat of passion instructions were given) in states that formerly shifted those burdens to
defendants with conviction rates of states that always retained the burden.
57. In their classic work, THE AMERICAN JuRy, supra note 56, Kalven and Zeisel
conducted a study of cases in which judges disagreed with jury verdicts when self-defense
or provocation were issues. In each of the fifty-five disagreements studied, the judge
thought the law and the evidence required more severity (conviction rather than acquittal
or conviction of a more serious offense) than the verdict allowed. Id. at 239, 221-41
(Chapter 16, the Boundaries of Self-Defense). In their study of 1063 disagreements of
all kinds between judge and jury, in 143 of the cases, or thirteen percent, the judge
thought the law and the evidence required less severity than the verdict reflected. Id. at
110. The authors concluded that "[Wn the end the jury protest reflected in this long
sequence of cases speaks for itself: an impatience with the nicety of the law's boundaries
hedging the privilege of self-defense." Id. at 240-41. Nine years before Mullaney, the
authors found that "[iln many ways the jury is the law's most interesting critic." Id. at
219.
58. 288 N.C. at 654,220 S.E.2d at 590-91.
59. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
60. E. CLFARY & J. STRONG, EVIDENCE-CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 118 (2d ed.
1975).
However, Mullaney did not overrule Leland directly. Cf. Tehan v. Shott 382 U.S.
406, 417-18 (1966).
61. 288 N.C. at 654; 220 S.E.2d at 591.
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is possible. First, many of the juveniles who suffered from improper
trials before Winship must have been released before Ivan V. was
decided two yeais later because the typical length of stay in New York's
juvenile correctional facilities in fiscal 1971 was under one year.6 There
is obviously much less turnover among those convicted of murder and
manslaughter. 63 Secondly, since there is no right to jury trial in juvenile
proceedings,6 4 the burden on New York in Ivan V. was further reduced;
expensive and time-consuming jury trials were not required of the state.
In considering the potential burden on the administration of justice
in North Carolina, the court could have used a more complete quantita-
tive analysis. The court identified 997 persons then incarcerated for
first and second degree murder as potential beneficiaries of Mutlaney
retroactivity in North Carolina.65 That figure is both underinclusive
and overinclusive. Only those convicted murderers who did not plead
guilty and who satisfied the burden of coming forward with a self-
defense or a heat of passion defense should be eligibile for retrial.66
Perhaps only fifteen percent of the 997 convicted murderers would meet
this test of eligibility for retrial.6 On the other hand, the court failed to
62. There were 3489 admissions to and 3483 discharges from juvenile facilities in
New York in fiscal 1971. The total juvenile population in New York's juvenile facilities
was 2682 as of June 30, 1971. M. HiNDELANG, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
AND STATISTICS SERVICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIStrcs-1974, Tables
6.4 (at 418), 6.7 (at 421), 6.10 (at 423).
63. The typical length of incarceration for assault (see text accompanying notes
71-72 infra) must also be substantial. For example, the penalty for assault in Pennsyl-
vania can reach ten years, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1103(2), 2702 (1973), and
occasionally twenty years, id. tit. 18, §§ 1103(1), 2502, 2704 (1973, Spec. Pamphlet
1975).
64. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
65. 288 N.C. at 654, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
66. Those who pleaded guilty should not be allowed to raise such a defense now.
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
WVhere evidence and witnesses have disappeared and memories have faded, the State
would have no record upon which to base its case. Many convicted murderers would
win their freedom by now putting the State to its proof.
If a defendant did not meet the burden of going forward with a self-defense or heat
of passion defense at trial, he either did not have one to present then or was wrongfully
determined not to have met the initial burden. In the former case, justice and good
sense should preclude his raising the defense at a later date. In the latter case, if he has
failed to use available appellate remedies for the wrongful determination, holding
Mullaney retroactive should not change his situation.
67. With the cooperation of the North Carolina Department of Corrections, I
sampled, at random, the records of 207 murderers convicted before Mullaney. Each file
contained a "Crime Story-Inmate's Version" as well as an indication of whether the
inmate pled guilty or was tried. My purpose was to determine in how many cases a self-
defense or heat of passion upon sudden provocation instruction would have been required
under North Carolina law. In the self-defense category are those-inmates who indicated
that they thought it necessary to kill in order to save themselves from death or great
1976] 1029
1030 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
note that untold numbers of the 695 prisoners convicted of man-
slaughter who pleaded self-defense would also be potential benefi-
ciaries. 8 In addition, many parolees might willingly seize upon an
opportunity to have their cases retried and to establish their innocence."9
But the burden on the North Carolina courts would be less than
that on those of some other jurisdictions. Justice Exum lists fourteen
jurisdictions that required homicide defendants to carry the burden of
persuasion for self-defense or heat of passion. 0 Two of those fourteen,
Olri- and Pennsylvania, and three others not included in the fourteen,
bodily harm, and who claimed that they were without fault in bringing about the
altercation. See State v. Smith, 268 N.C. 659, 151 S.E.2d 596 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1032 (1967). 4 J. STRONG, N.C. INDEx Homicide, § 9 (1968). In the heat of
passion upon sudden provocation category are defendants who claimed that they were
struck or assaulted by the victims immediately prior to the killing, but who did not claim
fear of death or great bodily harm. See State v. McLawhorn, 270 N.C. 622, 155 S.E.2d
198 (1967). Other legal provocations such as sexual act with a female relative and
defense of one's habitation or place of business are recognized in North Carolina, id. at
628-29, 155 S.E.2d at 203, but no inmate claimed that he killed because of them. It
should be noted that the "Crime Story-Inmate's Version" may not necessarily corre-
spond to what defendant claimed at trial.
The primary explanations I found were:
First degree Second degree
murder murder
Number of files examined 100 107
Number that pled guilty or
nolo contendere 37 83
Explanations of inmates pleading not guilty
Self-defense 9 11
Heat of passion upon sudden provocation 7 4
Did not commit crime 17 4
Intoxicated (alcohol or drugs) 12 0
Accident during felony 8 0
Don't remember 2 2
Insane 1 0
Guilty-law prevented guilty plea 4 0
Fifth Amendment 3 1
Child beating 0 2
68. These prisoners should be eligible for retrial only if they received a self-defense
instruction at trial. See note 66 supra. A substantial number of those imprisoned for
manslaughter (695 at the end of 1974, N.C. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 35, at
29) may well be eligible for retrial. To be convicted of voluntary manslaughter in
North Carolina, one must prevail upon a heat of passion defense, or be adjudged to have
used excessive force in defending one's self. 4 J. STRONG, supra note 67, at § 6; see State
v. Watson, 222 N.C. 672, 24 S.E.2d 540 (1943); State v. Mosely, 213 N.C. 304, 195 S.E.
830 (1938). In the latter, the relevant situation, the burden was on defendant to show
that his use of force was reasonable. State v. McDonald, 249 N.C. 419, 106 S.E.2d 477
(1959). Were Mullaney retroactive, those inmates who claimed reasonable force would
be entitled to retrials. See State v. Calloway, 1 N.C. App. 150, 160 S.E.2d 501 (1968)
(erroneous instruction about intensity of proof on justification not cured by manslaughter
verdict, because defendant's self-defense plea could have resulted in acquittal).
69. The number of murderers and manslayers on parole is unknown.
70. 288 N.C. at 654-55; 220 S.E.2d at 591.
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Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri, put the burden on defendants for one
or both issues in assault cases.7 1  The number of persons who would
benefit from retroactive application of Mullaney in Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania might be significantly higher than in North Carolina, which has
never shifted the burden in assault cases. 72 Furthermore, if the Mulla-
ney principle is to be extended to other affirmative defenses, other states
might face retrial of substantial numbers of convicted felons.7"
If Mullaney were made retroactive, however, and if only prisoners
who had not pleaded guilty and who had sustained their burden of
producing evidence on issues of self-defense or heat of passion were
permitted retrials, the position of the states affected would not be
impossible. Retrials for that limited class of prisoners would not impose
on the states some of the burdens normally associated with retrials.71
The disappearance of evidence and witnesses and the fading of witness-
es' memories should not unduly prejudice the State. Normally, in order
to meet his burden of production in the original trial, the defendant
71. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 121, 206 S.W.2d 485 (1947); Davis v.
State, 237 Md. 97, 205 A.2d 254 (1964); State v. Davis, 342 Mo. 594, 116 S.W.2d 110
(1938); State v. Powers, 98 Ohio App. 365, 129 N.E.2d 653, appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio
St. 431, 123 N.E.2d 406 (1954); Commonwealth v. Yancer, 125 Pa. Super. 352, 189 A.
684 (1937), cited with approval, Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 762
(1952). See generally 6A CJ.S. Assault & Battery § 115 (1975).
72. The North Carolina rule of placing the burden on defendants in homicide cases
but not in assault cases was a rational one. When defense lawyers seek to "tiry the
victim wherever possible," Katz, Defense of a Homicide Case, 1 NXt'L J. OF CRIM.
DEFENSE, 235, 248 (1975), and when defendant is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to
have eliminated any possible rebuttal by the victim, there is a reason for making
defendant explain which does not exist in the assault situation. See note 66 supra.
However, fewer persons were in North Carolina prisons for non-sexual assault
(728) than for homicide (1661) at the end of 1974. N.C. DEPT. OF COnancrIONS,
supra note 35, at 29. On the other hand, if the incorrect placement of the burden of
proof had a significant effect, the ratio of convicted assaulters might well be higher in
the jurisdictions using the improper standard.
Furthermore, there would be administrative difficulty in states that allow felony
trials without a jury. North Carolina does not permit waiver of jury trial except for
petty misdemeanors. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; State v. Hill, 209 N.C. 53, 182 S.E. 716
(1935); State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749 (1884). In other states, if there were no instruction
on heat of passion or self-defense, the courts would have to determine from perhaps
sketchy records whether such a defense was properly raised from all the evidence.
73. Mullaney could conceivably be extended to reach numerous affirmative de-
fenses on which some defendants have borne the burden of persuasion, including
insanity, duress, intoxication, and entrapment. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRMINAL
LAw 46-51 (1972). But cf. State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 351, 218 S.E.2d 176, 179
(1975) (Mullaney does not apply to insanity).
74. There appears to be little precedent for a criminal retrial limited to only certain
questions. Cf. Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973) (remand to review
record to determine whether invalid prior convictions affected prisoner's sentence).
Arguably, however, such a procedure would seem ideal were Mullaney to be held
retroactive. No relitigation of the fact that defendant committed the homicide or assault
should be permitted. That fact has been properly proved, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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himself testified about the act. That testimony, when introduced at
retrial,7 5 should serve practically to preclude assertion of a defense that
the defendant did not commit the act. Thus, the issue will normally be
only the existence of a self-defense or heat of passion defense.76 Those
are questions about the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness
of that state of mind at the time of the alleged crime. The re-creation
of the circumstances by other witnesses will be secondary; the credibility
of the defendant will be central to determination of the issue.77 That
practical limitation on the issues to be resolved will normally make the
burden on the states one of time and expense only. Because the State is
not likely to dismiss cases of convicted murderers, grossly incorrect
results should be exceptional.7
The considerations in Hankerson are fairly evenly balanced. The
burden on the administration of justice would be substantial, but at least
in North Carolina, not catastrophic unless Mullaney is extended. Reli-
ance on Leland, which allowed the State to shift the burden of persua-
sion on the affirmative defense of insanity,70 seemed to justify the
75. It would be admissible. 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 357 (1965); 22A
C.LS. Criminal Law § 733 (1961).
76. There remains the rare situation when defendant's burden was met by evidence
other than his own testimony. In that situation, the State may well be harmed by retrial.
But normally, the record of the State's evidence, combined with that of the evidence that
defendant produced, should be sufficient to convince the jury that defendant committed
the act, so that practically the only questions raised will be those on which the defendant
wrongly bore the burden of persuasion.
77. In an assault retrial, the State's case is more likely to be severely prejudiced if
the victim has disappeared or died than in a homicide retrial. In the typical assault trial,
there is a contest of credibility between the accused and the victim. In the homicide
situation, there may or may not be witnesses who actually saw the event.
78. Paradoxically, since the State will presumably fail to retry few defendants, the
burden in terms of time and expense will be even more extensive.
79. This Notes analysis makes the decision in State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346,
218 S.E.2d 176 (1975), which held that Mullaney does not apply to the affirmative
defense of insanity, seem unwise. Hankerson seems correct only if (1) the shift in the
burden of proof mandated by Mullaney is merely of minor importance, and (2) the
retrials of prisoners create serious problems for the State. Shepherd's insistence that the
burden remain with the defendant for an insanity defense seems to belie the first
contention. Furthermore, the Shepherd result creates a serious risk of many retrials. It
seems far from clear that Shepherd will survive Supreme Court scrutiny. See The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. I.. REv. 1, 53 (1975). If the Court reverses
Shepherd, it will have to decide whether to make that extension of Mullaney retroactive.
Like the Hankerson question, the question of the retroactivity of future extensions of
Mullaney seems to admit of no easy answer. Therefore, prisoners who raise insanity
defenses at post-Mullaney trials may well gain new trials because of a future Supreme
Court decision.
The decision in Shepherd is understandable, however, given that once courts extend
the concept of due process, they rarely renege on the extension. See text accompanying
note 10 supra. As a stop-gap procedure, until the appeals in Shepherd are exhausted,
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court's decision to hold Mullaney non-retroactive. Although the Mul-
laney rule does relate to truth-finding, the probability in most cases that
facts were wrongfully found at trial may be quite low.
Although it is a close question, the decision in Hankerson seems
correct. The benefits of the more equitable rule of Mullaney for future
defendants should not be outweighed by the costs of its retroactive
application. For the last two decades the United States Supreme Court
has been seeking to refine American criminal procedure. Mullaney
represents a technical readjustment, a proper refinement. Frequent
relitigation does not serve the Supreme Court's goal. Retrials cost
money and take time; they result in incorrect verdicts because evidence
and witnesses are missing; they make prosecutors spread themselves too
thinly. Most importantly, they tend to diminish the confidence of the
public in the judicial process. The citizenry can quickly grasp the fact
that a trial without a lawyer may have been unfair, but it will have more
trouble finding that a person who has been fairly proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to have killed another was unfairly tried because he
had to show that he was provoked and angered or that his life was
threatened.80
HENRY PATRICK OGLESBY
North Carolina prosecutors might voluntarily request a misstatement of the law in jury
instructions on the affirmative defense of insanity: they could request a charge making
the State prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. If conviction resulted, that instruction
would seem harmless to defendant. Then, the verdict would be unassailable in future
years. This procedure, if not uniform, might be subject to equal protection challenge.
80. In other jurisdictions, the question of Mullaney's retroactivity is closer than in
North Carolina. Had the North Carolina court held Mullaney retroactive, the most
important interest, life itself, would be protected, since some convicted murderers in
North Carolina face the death penalty. State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803,
cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). Ivan V. protected liberty only. Although the due
process clause does not establish a hierarchy among the protected interests of "life,
liberty, [and] property," the United States Supreme Court seems unanxious to affirm
death sentences even for persons properly convicted. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). It is important to consider that some North Carolina prisoners face execution
after trials that would not presently pass constitutional scrutiny. Yet the United States
Supreme Court has always given special consideration to those states whose procedures
most grievously offended due process in deciding retroactivity. See text accompanying
note 33 supra. Although the burden on the administration of justice might vary
substantially among states, a retroactivity decision would apply equally to all. Al-
though the burden may not be great in North Carolina, other states face a more
substantial burden. Therefore, the Hankerson result should ultimately prevail in the
United States Supreme Court.
Perhaps a better procedure would be to let each state arrive at its own balance,
articulating the factors, balanced, with an empirical determination of the potential
burden on the administration of justice. Results that the federal courts found offensive
to due process could be reversed.
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Employment Discrimination -New Limitations on Appellate
Review of Teacher Employment Discrimination Suits
Discrimination in the hiring and dismissal of teachers has been a
perplexing aspect of school desegregation. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has taken an active role in confronting this problem; how-
ever, in Jones v. Pitt County Board of Education' the court departed
from this pattern of intervention. Because of the restrictions it imposed
upon itself in reviewing the district court's findings, it appears that the
court intends to place the teacher employment discrimination issue
primarily within the discretion of the district courts.
The plaintiff in Jones, a black school teacher, alleged that the
county board of education was racially motivated in its refusal to renew
her contract. Mrs. Jones had been a seventh and eighth grade teacher
in an all-black school for ten years. In the implementation of a judi-
cially mandated school desegregation plan she was shifted to a fifth
grade classroom in a previously all-white school. Pursuant to the
recommendation of her principal, and requests of both the local
advisory council and the county superintendent that she not be reem-
ployed, the county board decided not to renew her contract. Mrs.
Jones sued for damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. section
19832 alleging a denial of equal protection.3
The district court concluded that the board of education had
proved by clear and convincing evidence4 that Mrs. Jones's professional
incompetence and not racial discrimination was the reason for her non-
retention. Plaintiff appealed claiming that the evidence did not
support this finding of fact." She argued that the principal's written
1. 528 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1975).
2. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States.. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. The plaintiff also raised a due process issue in the trial but did not raise it
on appeal. Though not in issue, the court indicated that hearings before the advisory
council and before the board of education with counsel present at both were sufficient
under the due process clause. 528 F.2d at 415-16.
4. See text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
5. If the court had been so inclined it could have focused upon the conclusion
of no racial discrimination and treated it as a finding of mixed fact and law. The find-
ing of no racial discrimination is a conclusory finding much like a finding of no negli-
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evaluations did not support his recommendation that her -contract not
be renewed.
In affirming, the court of appeals displayed great deference to
the lower court's finding. First, the court refused to consider plaintiff's
crucial evidence. Terming the principal's written evaluations and the
county's hiring practices6 "minutia of the evidence," the court reasoned
that they could not be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard
of appellate review7 since this test prohibits the appellate court from
conducting a trial de novo. Next, the court stated that the "clearly
erroneous" standard must be applied without considering defendant's
burden of proving its case by "clear and convincing" evidence.8 In a
vigorous dissent Judge Craven contended that the whole record must
be examined in applying the "clearly erroneous" rule and that the rule
must always be applied in light of the standard of proof. He concluded
that, in view of the whole record, the board of education had failed to
sustain its burden of proving the plaintiff's incompetence by "clear and
convincing" evidence.9
Jones resulted from the confluence of two streams of judicial
decisions. One of these was the litigation over school desegregation
that followed Brown v. Board of Education.10 As judicially mandated
school desegregation was implemented, it became apparent that black
teachers might become casualties of the process." Because of the fre-
quent recurrence of this problem, the Fourth Circuit in Chambers v.
gence. If the finding of no discrimination is determined to be a finding of mixed fact
and law, First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 552 (1927), seems to make the
finding freely reviewable without regard to the clearly erroneous rule. See also 5A J.
MoORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 52.05[l] (2d ed. 1975); 9 C. WRiGHT & A. MILLER, FED,-
ERAL PRAICE AND PRoCEDURE: CIviL § 2589 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT AND
MiLLER]. But cf. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 241-42 (1891); Famous Knitwear
Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 253 (4th Cir. 1974) (where the court said some
questions of fact and law were freely reviewable while others were not).
6. The county's new hire ratio was 6 to 1 in favor of whites. Thus, the ultimate
result of the 50-50 non-renewal rate was discriminatory. 528 F.2d 416, 420 (dissenting
opinion).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides in part that: "In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury . . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon .... Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." For the history of Rule 52(a), see Clark
& Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Cm L. REv. 190 (1937).
8. 528 F.2d at 418.
9. Id. at 420.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 346 F.2d 768, 773 (4th Cir.
1965).
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Board of Education12 fashioned a remedial mechanism for exposing this
form of racial discrimination. Relying on Supreme Court cases's deal-
ig with jury discrimination in criminal trials, Chambers held that when
a history of segregation in the school system was ended only by judi-
cial decree and there was a sudden disproportionate reduction in the
number of black teachers, the school board had the burden of proving
the absence of racial discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.
14
This "clear and convincing' standard of proof has remained
nebulous in teacher employment discrimination cases. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has defined the standard as an intermediate position between "a
preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 5
Chambers indicates that the county school superintendent's assertions
of personal preference are insufficient to sustain the burden.' On the
other hand, Williams v. Board of Education' held that being late for
the start of the school year, being late with reports, and having a dispute
over corporal punishment was sufficient to sustain the board's burden
of persuasion. Other cases indicate that the court is inclined to accept
the general observations of the teacher's superiors.' 8 Although school
systems are supposed to prove their cases by clear and convincing evi-
dence, the court of appeals has generally accepted much weaker proof
in teacher employment discrimination cases than it has in other employ-
ment discrimination cases.'"
The second stream of judicial decisions influencing Jones involves
the interpretation of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
12. 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
13. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85 (1955); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
14. 364 F.2d at 192. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973),
the Supreme Court cited Chambers approvingly and held that racial discrimination must
not play any part in the board's actions. To determine when to apply Chambers, see, e.g.,
North Carolina Teachers Ass'n v. Asheboro City Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1968); Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967). One line
of teacher employment discrimination cases deals with the National Teachers Examina-
tion. See, e.g., Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968), quoting Cross v. Led-
ford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118. Hobson also distinguished between the "clear
and convincing" standard and the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard.
16. 364 F.2d at 191.
17. 490 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
18. See, e.g., Vance v. Chester County Bd. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820 (4th
Cir. 1974).
19. Compare cases cited in notes 16-18 supra with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). See also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405 (1975);
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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dure. The classic statement20 of the "clearly erroneous" test of rule
52(a) is in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.:21 "A finding
is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. ' '22  A simple disagree-
ment with the result or a preference for a different interpretation of the
facts does not justify reversing the lower court.23
When reviewing cases that vary the standard of proof, such as
cases that apply the Chambers rationale, the appellate court must deter-
mine how the standard of proof applied by the trial court will influence
its review under the clearly erroneous test.24  In Baumgartner v. United
States25 the Supreme Court held that in denaturalization cases, in
which the government must prove its case by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence, it would review the findings in light of that stand-
ard of proof.20  Also, in Mortensen v. United States= the Court held
that in appeals of criminal convictions, in which the burden is "beyond
a reasonable doubt," the appellate court must consider this standard in
its review of the conviction. Since the appellate court must take into
account the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard and the "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing' standard, it logically should also consider
the "clear and convincing' standard in its review. Indeed, in the past
the Fourth Circuit had claimed to do so.
28
20. Some courts have contended that if there is substantial evidence to support the
judge's findings the findings cannot be "clearly erroneous," but that position has been
generally abandoned. See WsuosT AND MLLER, supra note 5, § 2585, at 735.
21. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
22. Id. at 395.
23. See Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1868).
See also Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1962);
Jersey Ins. Co. v. Heffron, 242 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1957).
24. For a general discussion of the topic see Note, Appellate Review in the Fed-
eral Courts of Findings Requiring More Than a Preponderance of the Evidence, 60
HAv. L. REv. 111 (1946).
25. 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944). Accord, Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660
(1958),
26. In Jones the majority used Hobson (see text accompanying note 15 supra) in
an apparent attempt to distinguish the "clear and convincing" burden from the "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" burden.
27. 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944). But cf. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966).
28. Darden v. Darden, 152 F.2d 208, 209 (4th Cir. 1945), and Holt v. Quaker
State Oil Ref. Co., 67 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1933), though not the only cases, provide
the most straightforward statements that the "clearly erroneous" review must take into
account the burden of proving by "clear and convincing" evidence.
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Jones is unusual29 in that the court of appeals expressly refused
to consider the clear and convincing standard of proof when re-
viewing the case, even though it displayed no inclination to abandon
the Chambers principle of increasing the standard of proof when there
has been a history of segregation in the school district that persisted
after Brown. Furthermore, the court applied Chambers without ques-
tioning whether there had been a rapid and disproportionate reduction
in the number of black teachers.30 It is therefore perplexing that the.
court in Jones would refuse to consider the standard of proof imposed
at the trial stage when applying the clearly erroneous test while con-
tinuing to display such strong support for Chambers.
The majority3' relied on Oburn v. Shapp,32 which held that the
court would not consider the "compelling state interest" test in review-
ing a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. 3 Oburn, how-
ever, provides only weak support for the majority's position. First,
there is a difference between the "compelling state interest" criterion
at issue in Oburn and the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
in Jones. Secondly, Oburn was an appeal from the denial of a pre-
liminary injunction, not an appeal from a final judgment; therefore, the
question before the court was whether the trial court had abused its
discretion, not whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in its find-
ings of fact.34
29. See notes 24, 26 & 28 supra.
30. One criterion for the application of Chambers had been a large and rapid re-
duction in the proportion of black teachers. Williams is another example, though not
the only one, of the court's application of Chambers without any question as to the pro-
portion of black teachers not retained. Perhaps the court has been influenced by Keyes
which made no comparable requirement (however, Keyes did not deal directly with
teacher employment discrimination). Jones clarifies the court's stance in applying
Chambers. In Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1975),
the court had refused to apply the Chambers approach where the school system, though
segregated at the time of the Brown decision, had moved immediately to desegregate.
31. The dissent in Jones relied on two cases, Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co.,
229 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973 (1956), and Soccodato v.
Dulles, 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955), that held that the clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing standard of proof must be considered in applying the clearly erroneous test. The
dissent reasoned that since the court was obliged to consider the clear, unequivocal, and
convincing standard in applying the clearly erroneous test, it should also consider the
clear and convincing standard in applying the same test. 528 F.2d at 419. The ma-
jority distinguished both the dissent's cases and the denaturalization cases (see notes 24,
25, and 27 supra) by differentiating the clear and convincing standard used in Jones
from the clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard used in the other cases. See note
15 supra.
32. 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 149 n.19.
34. Id. at 147.
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In Chambers the court justified its original reallocation of the bur-
den of proof" by the fact that the school board had the power to pro-
duce the facts.38 This reasoning obviously supports the court's shifting
to the school board the burden of coming forward with he evidence.
The logical connection between determining who has access to the facts
and imposing the "clear and convincing!' standard of proof is less clear.
Since only one party has access to most of the relevant facts, the adver-
sary process by itself will not insure adequate fact production. There-
fore, the court can assure itself of adequate fact production by imposing
the burden of producing the evidence on the party having access to the
facts and increasing the standard of proof. While the court has not
abandoned the Chambers approach, Jones implies that, ii the future,
district courts will have exclusive authority in applying the "clear and
convincing" standard. So far as appellate review is concerned, how-
ever, the court has settled for half a loaf. By tacitly retaining oversight
of the shifting of the burden of coming forward with the evidence, it
can be assured of some fact production, but by abandoning further
examination of the use of the clear and convincing standard of proof,
the court can no longer assure itself of adequate fact production.
The second significant aspect of Jones is the court's refusal to
examine the evidence fully. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
"[i]n applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district
court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in
mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. '37 The
Court, however, has also stated that in its review the appellate court
must consider the whole of the evidence.38 In American Football
League v. National Football League the Fourth Circuit focused upon
the latter requirement when it stated that it had been obliged to review
all the evidence.39
The refusal of the Jones court to consider the "minutia of the
evidence" in its review is the court's most radical departure from
accepted authority. The majority based its refusal on the Supreme
35. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-41 (2d ed.
1972), for a discussion of burden of proof.
36. 364 F.2d at 192.
37. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
38. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948); Garsed v. Beall, 92 U.S. 684, 695 (1875). WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 5,.
§ 2585, at 731, suggests that the prohibition against a trial de novo does not prevent
examining all the evidence.
39. 323 F.2d 124, 134 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Court's prohibition against conducting a de novo trial.40 The dissent,
on the other hand, emphasized that the Supreme Court required appel-
late courts to consider the record as a whole4" even when reviewing
decisions of administrative agencies, which had traditionally been shown
more deference than those of trial courts. Judge Craven contended
that the court must therefore consider the minutia of the evidence in
order to review the record as a whole. 2 Such an examination in Jones
reveals that the objective evaluation forms filled out by the principal
tended to dispute his recommendation not to retain plaintiff. Thus, the
majority's manipulation of the trial de novo concept not only forbids
consideration of critical evidence but also violates the policy adopted
by the court in American Football League of reviewing all the
evidence.43
Although the court's approach has not been expressly prohibited44
by the Supreme Court, it does seem to violate the policy for a review
of the whole record. If the court can use the "minutia of the evidence!'
phrase to close off its consideration of proof that conflicts with the trial
judge's findings of fact, then appellate review will be nothing more than
a formal expression of the whims of the appellate court. The clearly
erroneous rule, while it does limit appellate review of a trial court's
findings of fact, should not be used to make the right to review mean-
ingless. The Supreme Court once stated: "The right of appeal
is a substantial right, and not a shadow. . . . [W]e may not
abdicate the performance of the duty which the law imposes upon us
by declining to give our own judicial effect."'45  The Jones court's re-
fusal to review the whole record is that kind of abdication of duty.
Perhaps Jones is merely the court's response to a questionable
lower court decision that it desired to affirm. On the other hand, the
case suggests a more basic decision by the court to restrict its review
under the clearly erroneous test. If Jones is followed, appeals by
40. 528 F.2d at 418, quoting Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123 (1969).
41. 528 F.2d at 419-20. The dissent relied on Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
42. 528 F.2d at 419-20.
43. See authorities cited notes 38 & 39 supra.
44. If the court were inclined to review these cases more closely, it could use the
"constitutional fact" doctrine to free its review from the "clearly erroneous" rule.
See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954); Guzick v. Drebus, 431
F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitu-
tional Fact," 47 N.C.L. Rlv. 311 (1969); Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitu-
tional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
45. The Ariadne, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 475, 479 (1871).
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teachers from adverse district court decisions will be virtually meaning-
less. The teacher's primary weapon has been the "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof imposed on the local school boards. On
review, that standard will be ignored. Furthermore, the court can
manipulate the "minutia of the evidence" phrase to avoid meaningful
review of the lower court's findings. The potential effect of Jones,
however, extends beyond the teacher employment discrimination issue.
In the past, appellate courts have delved into intricate evidence in other
kinds of employment discrimination cases to expose underlying dis-
crimination. The "minutia of the evidence" phrase can be easily
manipulated by a busy appellate court to avoid such time-consuming
analysis. If Jones represents the beginning of a trend in the extent
of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit, the right of appellate review
may become no more than a shadow of what it once was.
NIGLE B. BARRow, JR.
Evidence-A New Approach to Character Evidence in North
Carolina
In 1904 Professor Wigmore stated that although the Anglo-Ameri-
can rules of evidence had "taken some curious twistings in the course of
their development," none was more curious than the rule limiting the
admissibility of character evidence only to that of the general communi-
ty-reputation of 'the person in question.' This rule has generated con-
tinuous debate by legal theoreticians and scholars, but the case law has
remained unchanged for almost seventy-five years. State v. Stegmann
is another curious twist in this area of the law; the North Carolina
Supreme Court departed from precedent and the traditional rule and
held admissible testimony about the character and reputation of the
1. 11I J. WIGMORn, EVIDENCE § 1986 (1st ed. 1904). An analysis of this issue
must first differentiate between the terms "character" and "reputation." "Character"
refers to the actual qualities and characteristics of an individual, while "reputation" is
the esteem in which a person is held by others. I D. STANSHURY, NoRT- CARoLrNA
EVIENCE § 102 (Brandis rev. 1973). As the court stated in State v. Ussery, 118 N.C.
1177, 1180, 24 S.E. 414, 415 (1896), "Some critic has said that character lives in a
man-reputation outside of him." Unfortunately, judicial decisions have tended to use
the terms interchangeably and thus obscure the distinction. V J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE §
1608 (3d ed. 1940).
2. 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
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prosecutrix in a rape case based upon personal opinion and observation,
as well as upon her reputation within the community.' This decision thus
represents a major change in the permissible forms of proving an
individual's character in North Carolina.
John Richard Stegmann was charged with the abduction and rape
of Ruth O'Leta Kendall on September 4, 19734 and was convicted on
both counts.5 At trial, the defendant alleged that the prosecutrix had
consented to the sexual intercourse with him,6 and thereby placed the
question of her character in issue.7 !n response, the district attorney
introduced the testimony of fourteen witnesses to show the good charac-
ter and reputation of the complainant.8 The first two witnesses testified
"properly" as to her good general reputation in the community in which
she lived,9 and no exception was taken to their testimony. 10 However,
when examining the other twelve witnesses, after receiving an answer to
his question about the general reputation of Mrs. Kendall, the district
attorney went on to ask each witness, "On what do you base your
opinion?"'1 Eleven answered that their opinions were based upon her
general reputation as well as upon their personal opinions about and
observations of her."2 One witness stated that her opinion was based
solely upon her personal contact with the prosecutrix.'3  The defend-
ant's second and third assignments of error were based on the trial
judge's admission of this testimony.'"
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ver-
dict and judgments,' 5 abandoning the traditional North Carolina rule
3. Id. at 649, Z13 S.E.2d at 271.
4. Id. at 640, 213 S.E.2d at 265.
5. Id. at 643, 213 S.E.2d at 267. Stegmann received a life sentence for the
kidnapping charge and a death sentence for the rape charge.
6. Id. at 642-43, 213 S.E.2d at 267.
7. Cf. State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 917 (1960); State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897); State v. Daniel,
87 N.C. 507 (1882); State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846); 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § '105 (Brandis rev. 1973). See text accompanying notes 19-20
infra.
8. 286 N.C. at 644-46, 213 S.E.2d at 267-69.
9. Le., in keeping with the traditional rule, they testified only to her general
community reputation and did not speak of their personal opinions of her character or of
specific acts or conduct of the prosecutrix.
10. 286 N.C. at 644, 213 S.E.2d at 267 (witnesses Frazee and Smith).
11. Id. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
12. Id. at 644-45, 213 S.E.2d at 268-6 (witnesses Hopkins, Judson, Godwin,
Ledbetter, Porter, Parker, M. Reinburger, C. Reinburger, Riggin, Cimaglia and Peases).
13. Id. at 645-46, 213 S.E.2d at 269 (witness Harris).
14. Id. at 643, 213 S.E.2d at 267.
15. 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975). The majority opinion was written by
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that character may not be evidenced by the opinion of the character
witness or by specific acts of the person in question.16 The court held
that the district attorney's question "and the answers thereto tended to
show the foundation for the character evidence given by the witnesses. A
strong or weak foundation for the testimony of a witness aids the jury in
determining the weight it will give that testimony. Thus, the question
was properly permitted. .... ,,17 The court did, however, find the trial
judge in error in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Harnis, which was
based solely on personal opinion.'8 In effect, the court held admissible
testimony based in part on personal observation and in part on general
community reputation.
The general rule in the United States is that when seeking to prove
a person's character as a collateral matter,' 9 the witness may testify only
about the general reputation of the person in question in the community
in which he lives. The witness is not permitted to teslify about the
person's specific acts or about the witness's personal knowledge or
beliefs.20  This general preference in favor of the indirect method of
evidencing character by reputation, as opposed to the direct method of
proof by personal opinion, has arisen despite serious questions raised by
Professor Wigmore concerning the historical foundations of the rule.2 '
Justice Huskins. Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Copeland both dissented as to the death
sentence for the rape conviction. Justice Exum filed a long dissenting opinion based
upon his belief that "the only method of proof previously sanctioned by this Court and
most other jurisdictions is by showing the general reputation of the witness in the
community where she lived," excluding testimony based on personal opinion. Id. at 659,
213 S.E.2d at 277.
16. Id. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 649, 213 S.E.2d at 271.
19. Character is a collateral issue in a case when it is offered as evidence of the
person's conduct on a particular occasion or of his truthfulness and veracity in general.
For purposes of this note, no attempt will be made to differentiate between the various
situations in which character evidence may come into issue, e.g., the character of the
accused in a criminal proceeding, the character of a witness who has given testimony, the
character of a complainant in a rape case, the character of a party to a civil suit, the
character of the deceased in a homicide case, etc. Both the majority and minority rules
with regard to personal opinion evidence apply equally in all situations.
20. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948); 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 110 (Brandis rev. 1973); VII J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1980 (3d
ed. 1940).
21. VII J. WIaMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1981-82 (3d ed. 1940). In tracing the history
of the rule, Wigmore demonstrates that prior to 1865, the universal practice was to
permit character witnesses to state their personal opinions of the individual in question.
E.g., Trial of Cowper, 13 How. St. Tr. 1106, 1180 (1699); Trial of Hardy, 24 How. St.
Tr. 199, 999 (1794); Case of Davison, 31 How. St. Tr. 99, 190 (1808); Trial of Jones,
31 How. St. Tr. 251, 310 (1809). This orthodox practice was altered by the decision in
R. v. Rowton, Leigh & C. 520, 10 Cox Cr. Rep. 25 (Eng. 1865), where the court
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Prior to the decision in State v. Stegmann, North Carolina followed
the majority rule.22 As stated in Johnson v. Massengill:23 "The gen-
eral rule is that a witness, offered to prove the character of another
person, may not testify as to his personal opinion concerning the repu-
tation of such other person but is limited to testimony concerning the
character of such person in the community. 24
The vast majority of other jurisdictions in the United States follow
the limited rule.2 5 The United States Supreme Court has spoken to this
issue only once, in Michelson v. United States,6 which was heavily
relied upon in the dissent in Stegmann. Although the Michelson Court
approved the general rule, it did so in less than unqualified terms. The
Court first discounted the importance of its conclusion by speaking of its
ignored a long line of precedents and held that testimony based on personal opinion
alone was inadmissible and that the question to the witness must be framed in terms of
the reputation of the individual in question. Wigmore believes this decision to be based
in part upon a misunderstanding of a statement made by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in
Jones' Trial, 31 How. St. Tr. 310 (1809), that 'It is reputation; it is not what a person
knows" that may be used to prove character. Wigmore contends that this remark refers
to the exclusion of particular facts attempting to demonstrate a specific trait, and not to
the witness's speaking from personal knowledge. VII J. WIGMoRE, EVIDECB § 1982, at
146-47 (3d ed. 1940).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. Massengill, 280 N.C. 376, 186 S.E. 2d 168 (1972); State
v. McKissick, 271 N.C. 500, 157 S.E.2d 112 (1967); State v. Steen, 185 N.C. 768, 117
S.E. 793 (1923); Edwards v. Price, 162 N.C. 243, 78 S.E. 145 (1913); Bottoms v. Kent,
48 N.C. 154 (1855); State v. Parks, 25 N.C. 296 (1843). See also 1 D. STANSOURY,
NQRTH CAROLINA EVm CE § 110 (Brandis rev. 1973).
23. 280 N.C. 376, 186 S.E.2d 168 (1972).
24. Id. at 383, 186 S.E.2d at 173. There is one North Carolina decision that
possibly cuts the other way. In State v. Nance, 195 N.C. 47, 141 S.E. 468 (1928), the
court held that a witness, after stating the general character of the individual inquired
about, may of his own accord say in what respect the person's character is good or bad.
One writer has viewed this case as upholding the use of personal opinion. Ladd,
Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REv. 498, 512 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Ladd]. Presumably, a witness could amplify his conclusion as to a
person's character by stating that it was based on personal observation. However, the
later case of State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 157 S.E. 851 (1931) seems to indicate that
Nance was meant to allow the witness to qualify his conclusion "by adding that [the
person's character] is good for certain virtues and bad for certain vices," thus limiting
any elaborations to references to specific traits of character. Id. at 541, 157 S.E. at 852.
25. See, e.g., Deschenes v. United States, 224 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Neff, 343 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 475 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1973);
People v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 P. 372 (1901); People v. Gordon, 103 Cal. 568, 37 P.
534 (1894); Gifford v. People, 148 Ill. 173, 35 N.E. 754 (1893); Hischman v. People,
101 Ill. 568 (1882); Borders v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 577, 67 S.W. 2d 960 (1934);
State v. Harrison, 168 La. 1115, 123 So. 800 (1929); State v. King, 78 Mo. 555 (1883);
State v. Pearce, 15 Nev. 188 (1880); State v. Todd, 28 N.M. 518, 214 P. 899 (1923);
People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907); State v. Magill, 19 N.D.
131, 122 N.W. 330 (1909); Commonwealth v. Gaines, 167 Pa. Super. 485, 75 A.2d 617
(1950); Prater v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 669, 284 S.W. 965 (1926); State v. Williams, 38
Wyo. 340, 266 P. 1056 (1928).
26. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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lack of expertise in the field of evidence in general. 27  The Court then
endorsed the majority rule, primarily because it was loath to make
sweeping changes in the established law, and because the Court saw
itself as an improper forum in which to fashion rules of procedure and
evidence for state courts.28 Significantly, Michelson did not deal with
the issue in constitutional terms,29 thus leaving it to the states to decide
the matter for themselves. For all these reasons, Michelson should not
be viewed as a preemptive or controlling decision in the area of charac-
ter evidence.
In spite of the number of jurisdictions that adhere to the majority
position, a few states, most notably Iowa ° and Minnesota,"' have stated
that charcter evidence based upon a witness's personal observations of
the person in question is as competent and worthy of consideration as
evidence of that person's general reputation. 32
Underlying the debate over the proper form of proof in this area
are conflicting policy considerations. Two major propositions are often
stated in support of the majority rule. First, there are the "overwhelm-
ing considerations of practical convenience." 3 As stated in People v.
Van Gaasbeck:34
If a witness is to be permitted to testify to the character of an ac-
cused party, basing his testimony solely on his own knowledge and
observation, he cannot logically be prohibited from stating the par-
ticular incidents affecting the defendant and the particular actions
of the defendant which have led him to his favorable conclusion.
In most instances, it would be utterly impossible for the prosecution
27. This is because the law of evidence is normally developed by state courts of the
last resort and due to the paucity of occasions that the Supreme Court has to rule on
such matters. Id. at 486.
28. Id.
29. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563 (1967).
30. See State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76, 25 N.W. 936 (1S85); accord, State v.
Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 270 N.W. 874 (1937); State v. Richards, 126 Iowa 497, 102
N.W. 439 (1905).
31. See State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407 (1876). See also Richmond v. Norwich, 96
Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907);
Mathewson v. Mathewson, 81 Vt. 173, 69 A. 646 (1908); State v. Hosey, 54 Wash. 309,
103 P. lZ (1909).
32. It is important to note that the minority rule does not seek to exclude evidence
of general reputation. It merely holds evidence based on personal opinion to be on an
equal footing in terms of relevance and credibility and hence admissibility.
The MODEL CoDE OF EviDENcE rule 306 (1942) would allow opinion evidence, as
well as evidence of general reputation, as proof of the character of the accused in a
criminal action. The Uriuoi.m RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 608(a) (1974) would permit
opinion evidence concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness.
33. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 418, 82 N.E. 718, 721 (1907).
34. 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907).
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to ascertain whether occurrences narrated by the witness as consti-
tuting the foundation of his conclusions were or were not true.
They might be utterly false, and yet incapable of disproof at the
time of trial. Furthermore, even if evidence were accessible to
controvert the specific statements of the witness in this respect, its
admissibility would lead to the introduction into the case of in-
numerable collateral issues which could not be tried out without
introducing the utmost complication and confusion into the trial,
tending to distract the minds of the jurymen and befog the chief
issue in litigation.3 5
This fear of opening up "a history of the person's whole life" at trial and
thus diverting the focus of the proceeding and the attention of the jury
has been expressed in a number of North Carolina cases.30
The second argument supporting the majority rule is based upon
the fear that the personal opinion given by the witness may be based
upon personal prejudice towards the individual in question or upon a
misinterpreted or unrepresentative experience with that person.37  Not
only would testimony founded on such inadequate bases not be proba-
tive, but it could also lead into a discussion of specific acts of the person
in question, which is universally condemned.33 For these reasons,
among others," most courts have believed that reliability and credibility
are gained by the use of the opinion of the community as a whole as
opposed to that of a single individual.
Professor Wigmore was one of the earliest and most ardent sup-
porters of the liberal minority position, and one of the most vociferous
critics of the majority rule. 0 He argued that personal observations and
opinion were simply a more credible and reliable form of proof and that
35. Id. at 418, 82 N.E. at 721.
36. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 193 N.C. 581, 137 S.E. 657 (1927); Edwards v.
Price, 162 N.C. 243, 78 S.E. 145 (1913); Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N.C. 154 (1855). See
also 1 D. STAsiwRy, NoRTu CAROLINA EvmENcE § 110, at 336-37 n.91 (Brandis rev.
1973); Sizemore, Character Evidence in Criminal Cases in North Carolina, 7 WAxE
FoREST L. REv. 17, 19 (1970).
37. Ladd, supra note 24, at 511, citing Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Me. 375 (1841);
State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 P. 237 (1929); Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336, 8
Am. Dec. 655 (Pa. 1817).
38. 1 D. STANsBuRY, NORTH CAROLiNA EVDENCE § 110, at 336-37 & n.91 (Brandis
rev. 1973). See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
39. A number of other less important and less persuasive policies have been
advanced in favor of the majority rule, including: the fear that testimony based on
personal observations would violate the opinion rule, Sizemore, Character Evidence in
Criminal Cases in North Carolina, 7 WAKE Forsr L. Rnv. 17, 19 (1970); that such
evidence would invade the province of the jury, as it is their job to infer character from
the facts, Ladd, supra note 24, at 510; and that reputation is a fact which may be
presented to the jury and utilized by them as a basis to evaluate character, id.
40. See note 21 supra.
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it would be preferred both by the parties and by jurors.41 Professor
Stansbury contends that although attorneys and judges may know that
the witness should limit his testimony only to that of general reputation,
the layman is not so schooled in the ways of the law. The practical
result is that often the witness will state what is in fact his personal
opinion of the person in question, although couching it in. terms of the
person's general reputation in the community. Stansbury, therefore,
argues that a more realistic approach would be to admit testimony based
clearly and solely on the witness's personal opinion.42
Court decisions upholding the minority rule have relied on yet
another theory to support their position. In both State v. Sterrett3 and
State v. Lee,44 the two leading minority view cases, the courts reasoned
that since the purpose of the introduction of character evidence is to
present a foundation for a presumption by the jury that the person in
question acted in a certain way, the crucial question becomes whether
the person in fact possesses a certain disposition and not whether he is
reputed to be of such disposition. Therefore, the personal opinion of
the witness as to the person's character is evidence of that fact and is of
equal competence to testimony of the reputation of the person's charac-
ter. Although other equally persuasive arguments have been made,45
these policies are the most popular justifications cited for the minority
rule.
With this long standing theoretical controversy and the prior devel-
41. VII J. WIGMORE, EviDENcB § 1986 (3d ed. 1940). "So far as practical policy
and utility is concerned, there ought to be no hesitation between reputation and personal
knowledge and belief." Id. at 166.
42. 1 D. STANSBuRY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 110, at 336-37 n.99 (Brandis
rev. 1973); cf. Ladd, supra note 24, at 517, wherein the author states: "When reputation
for character is offered . . . , the jury undoubtedly regard [sic] the statement of the
accused's reputation as corresponding to the opinion of the witness."
43. 68 Iowa 76, 78-79, 25 N.W. 936, 937-38 (1885).
44. 22 Minn. 407, 409-10 (1876).
45. See Ladd, supra note 24. Reliance upon reputation as evidence is a throwback
to the days of small, rural communities. In view of toaay's complex, urban society
however, witnesses have little contact with the person in question other than personal
observation. As a result, their testimony concerning the person's community reputation
is, in reality, personal opinion evidence in the guise of reputation. Id. at 515, citing
Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937); accord, State v. McEachern, 283
N.C. 57, 194 S.E.2d 787 (1973) (evidence of good character is no longer confined to
reputation in the community in which a person lives), overruling sub silentio State v.
Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 195 S.EB 72 (1938).
The fear expressed in the majority rule jurisdictions that personal opinion testimony
will be based on prejudice or isolated or trivial experiences (see text accompanying notes
37-38 supra) can be overcome by the device of cross-examination and requirements
relating to the laying of a proper foundation for the character witness's testimony. Ladd,
supra note 24, at 518.
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opment of North Carolina case law in mind, the holding and the
implications of the decision in Stegmann can properly be analyzed.
First, the North Carolina Supreme Court did not completely embrace
the minority rule. By excluding the personal opinion testimony of Mrs.
Harris, but admitting that of the other witnesses, 40 the court espoused a
middle ground. Clearly, testimony based solely on general reputation
will continue to be admissible, while that based solely on personal
opinion will be excluded. However, the holding of the case now makes
it permissible to introduce evidence consisting of both personal opinion
and observation and general reputation testimony. The district attor-
ney's question, "On what do you base your opinion?", although criti-
cized by the court as being "unnecessary and ineptly phrased"47 will not
constitute reversible error, and thus is allowable.
One problem in attempting to define the scope of Stegmann is that
the court, in adopting this new rule, did not give a detailed discussion of
the possible policy justifications for its decision. The reason given by
the court for the decision 48 seems to fall within the policy adopted by the
other minority state courts:49 since the issue before the court is the fact
of the person's disposition, personal opinion testimony is competent
proof of such fact. The court did not cite those opinions, however, and
it was silent as to the other popular policies in favor of the minority
rule. 50
The court's partial adoption of the minority rule can be criticized
for taking a "half a loaf' approach. The personal observations of a
witness, now allowed by the court, will assist the jury in evaluating the
character evidence introduced. However, one can argue that jurors will
likely not differentiate between the community-reputation evidence and
the personal opinion evidence and so will not use the latter only to
reinforce the former, as the court apparently intends. Professors Stans-
bury and Ladd believe that jurors already tend to interpret reputation
testimony as consisting of the personal opinion of the witness.51 The
new rule increases this likelihood of jury confusion, so the court should
drop its charade, recognize the practicalities of the situation and admit
personal opinion evidence per se.
46. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
47. 286 N.C. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
48. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra. Nor did the court refer to the
decisions or policies which support the majority position.
51. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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Furthermore, by recognizing the probative value of personal opin-
ion testimony under limited circumstances, the court should go on to
realize that the same value is present when the personal opinion testimo-
ny comes in by itself and that safeguards are available to prevent any
adverse effects of such an offer of proof.52 Having acknowledged the
value of the evidence, there is no justification for the court's not differ-
entiating between evidence of reputation and of personal knowledge and
belief as suggested by Professor Wigmore. 53 In short, there would seem
to be no reason why the court, if it is disposed to move away from the
majority rule, should not completely embrace the minority position. As
stated by Professor Ladd, "[t]he emphasis upon the means of proving
character should be directed to the probative quality of the -testimony to
be obtained rather than to the formalistic procedure of satisfying the de-
mands of legal ritual."' 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Stegmann
raises almost as many questions as it answers and will obviously need
clarification in later cases. However, it seems to represent the first
tentative steps on the part of the court to adopt a new approach to the
controversial area of character evidence. At least for the time being, it
is clear that character testimony may consist of both the general reputa-
tion of the individual in question and personal observations and opin-
ions of the witness concerning the person in question. This is a new
rule, and practicing attorneys in North Carolina should take careful note
of it.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS
Federal Courts-Bradford v. Weinstein: The Federal Courts
Reopen the Door to Prisoners' Civil Rights Claims
Since the mid-1960's the federal courts have witnessed a tremen-
dous influx of state prisoner petitions. 1 Claimants have sought civil
52. Proper requirements for laying a foundation for a witness's testimony and for
cross-examination will serve to exclude testimony with an inadequate basis or founded
on personal prejudice. Likewise, control of the proceedings by the presiding judge will
avert a degeneration of the testimony into a listing of specific acts of the person in
question or a recounting of his life's history, which are both still condemned.
53. VII I. WIGMOM, EVIDENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940).
54. Ladd, supra note 24, at 517-18.
1. Petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal courts totaled 13,423 in 1974, an
increase of 1,439.3% over the total in 1960. The 1974 total is more than double the
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relief under 42 U.S.C. section 19832 and release from incarceration
through writs of habeas corpus.3 The impetus for this influx of claims
arose from the lack of effective grievance procedures within the prison
system,4 as well as from the concern expressed by some federal judges
over the acute conditions in many state prisons.5 As a result of the in-
creasing number of state prisoner petitions and the judicial activism of
some judges, federal courts began to engage actively in prison reform."
In Preiser v. Rodriguez,7 however, the United States Supreme Court
greatly inhibited the consideration of the merits of prisoners' claims by
the federal courts.8 Apparently motivated by concern over jammed
dockets' and fears of federal judicial activism destroying federal-state
6,248 petitions filed in 1966. Habeas corpus petitions increased from 5,339 in 1966 to
7,626 in 1974, a 42.8% increase. Civil rights petitions increased from 218 in 1966 to
5,236 in 1974, a 2,301.8% increase. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMiNiSTRATrvE OFmcn op mHu
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 220-21 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Habeas corpus was originally a writ at common law. It is now codified in 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
4. See Singer & Keating, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms, 19 CruMn m
DELNQUENcY 367 (1973). Singer and Keating conclude that the lack of effective
grievance procedures is one of the major reasons for prison violence.
5. An example of the judicial concern over the outrageous conditions in many
state prisons can be seen in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). In
Jordan, Chief Judge George Harris, registering a sense of outrage over the conditions he
saw at California's Soledad prison complex, took steps "to restore the primal rules of a
civilized community in accord with the mandate of the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 680.
6. The impetus for federal judicial action in the area of prison reform can be
traced to the decision in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See,
e.g., Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574(8th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Hahn v.
Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1969); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
8. The Washington Post described Preiser as a "setback for civil rights and civil
liberties groups and the American Bar Association. . . . The Court effectively closed
off access to federal courts which have shown the most sympathy for prisoner's
grievances." Washington Post, May 8, 1973, § 5A, at 3, col. 3.
9. Although the Court in Preiser never referred to the large number of prisoner
petitions, it is safe to assume that it was aware of the situation since briefs filed in the
case dealt at length with this issue. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Brief for Respondent at
27, Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae at 28, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
The Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court has suggested an imposition of
unique exhaustion requirements on prisoners' section 1983 actions. See Doyle, The
Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JunxcruRE 406, 409 n.8 (1973).
PRISONER'S CIVIL RIGHTS
relations,10 the Court placed serious restraints on the prisoner's use of
section 1983.11 The Court found that many categories of prisoners'
section 1983 claims fall within the "core of habeas corpus" and thus
require exhaustion of available state remedies before the federal courts
can consider the claims. 2 A year after the Preiser decision, in Bradford
v. Weinstein' 3 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals extended jurisdiction
to a prisoner's section 1983 challenge to a parole proceeding, 14 a
situation in which the Preiser test arguably required habeas corpus
proceedings. 5 Bradford's rejection of the Preiser test in this situation
illustrates the lower courts' desire to limit the applicability of Preiser and
to establish the federal courts as a forum for prison reform.
The Bradford appeal was a consolidation of two class action suits,
one brought in the name of Howard Bradford, an inmate in the North
Carolina prison system, and the other by Levi Jenkins, a prisoner in
South Carolina. Both prisoners brought section 1983 actions alleging
that the hearings in which they were denied parole did not comport with
due process of law."8 The federal district court in North Carolina
denied Bradford's claim, holding that the due process clause does not
apply to parole proceedings. The federal district court in South Caroli-
na dismissed Jenkins' petition on the ground that plaintiffs goal was
parole and that therefore the claim was "within the core" of habeas
corpus. The court concluded that under Preiser Jenkins would be
required first to exhaust his state remedies.' 7  On appeal the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower courts' decisions. 18 First, considering the due
process claim, the court found that the due process clause does apply to
parole eligibility proceedings. 9 However, the court postponed a deci-
sion on what procedure the due process clause requires in this situation
until after the district court conducted a full evidentiary investigation.20
The court then considered whether the prisoners' claims were proper
under section 1983. After a short examination of Preiser, the court
10. 411 U.S. at 490-92.
11. Id. at 489-90.
12. Id. at 487-94.
13. 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court heard the case and
delivered a per curiam opinion that declared the case moot since Bradford had been
released on parole prior to the date of hearing. 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975).
14. 519 F.2d at 734-35.
15. See id. at 735-38 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 729-30.
17. Id. at 730.
18. Id. at 735.
19. Id. at 732.
20. ld. at 733.
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concluded that the relief requested was not for immediate release from
confinement and thus was not "within the core of habeas corpus" as
defined by Preiser.2 1 The court therefore held that it had jurisdiction to
consider the prisoners' section 1983 claim.22 Judge Bryan filed a
vigorous dissent to the majority's granting of jurisdiction. Stating that
Preiser must be applied broadly in order to protect the state interest in
the area, Bryan viewed the plaintiffs' challenges to the parole hearings as
attacks on their detention and thus proper subjects for habeas corpus.2 s
Before analyzing the conflicting applications of the Preiser test by
the majority and dissent in Bradford, it will be helpful to examine the
development of the writ of habeas corpus and section 1983. An
understanding of the overlapping features of these two procedures will
facilitate an understanding of the problems in applying the Preiser test
to a situation such as the one in Bradford.
The principal means for prisoners to attack the legitimacy of their
confinement has traditionally been to seek a writ of habeas corpus.24
Originally the writ offered a prisoner a method to challenge the legiti-
macy of his confinement by attacking the validity of his sentence or
conviction. 25  Release from confinement was the available relief.20
However, the federal courts expanded the writ to remedy unconstitu-
tional conditions of confinement and to alleviate gross mistreatment of
prisoners.2 7 It was no longer necessary for the inmate to seek total
release from prison in order to obtain the writ.28 However, there is one
significant limitation on the use of habeas corpus. In the 1886 case Ex
parte Royal129 the Supreme Court strongly urged the federal courts, in
cases of a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief, to await the
exhaustion of available state judicial remedies before granting jurisdic-
tion over the prisoner's federal habeas corpus claim. The requirement
21. Id. at 733-34.
22. Id. at 734-35.
23. Id. at 736.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 484. See generally Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAiv. L. R y. 1038 (1970).
26. See generally Developments in the Law, 83 HA~v. L. REv., supra note 25, at
1079.
27. The federal courts expanded the writ in Coffin v. Riechard, 143 F.2d 443, 445
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) where habeas corpus was recognized
as a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The Supreme Court
affirmed this expansive role in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
28. In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Supreme Court approved the
use of habeas corpus to challenge a prisoner's solitary confinement. It was not necessary
for the inmate to seek total release from prison.
29. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
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of exhausting state remedies, born of a policy of preserving comity
between the federal and state judiciaries, is now codifiedY"
Although the reach of habeas corpus has been extended to allow
consideration of the conditions of confinement,"1 section 1983 has been
seen as a more appropriate vehicle to raise such challenges. The Civil
Rights Act, of which section 1983 is a part, was designed to combat the
injustices and discrimination that existed throughout the South during
Reconstruction. 32 In Monroe v. Pape33 the Supreme Court rejuvenated
the statute by holding that section 1983 provides a federal remedy for
violations of an individual's constitutional rights by officials acting
under "color of state law."34 The Act has since been applied to many
areas of state involvement,35 including prison problems."'
Although the coverage of the two acts clearly overlaps, there are
several reasons for prisoners' preference of section 1983. 3 7  The most
obvious reason is that section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state
remedies."' Exhaustion is time-consuming and expensive,39 and to
prisoners, who have very little concern for federal-state comity, it simply
appears to be another obstacle constructed by the judicial system to
prevent consideration of their grievances. Additionally, section 1983
offers a wide range of relief, including damages and broad equity
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-(c) (1970).
31. See note 27 supra.
32. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. Rv. 277 (1965). This article contains a good discussion of the history of
section 1983 and the Civil Rights Act. The article also includes excerpts from speeches
by Congressmen showing their concern over violence in the South after the Civil War
and demanding passage of the Act
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34. Id. at 184-85, 187.
35. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public education); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (police procedure); Holmes v. New York Housing Au-
thority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing).
36. The Supreme Court specifically approved the use of section 1983 for relief
from certain prison conditions. The cases approved in Preiser were Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per
curiam); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam); and Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
37. See generally Turner, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice in Prisoner Cases, in
PRISONERs' RiGHTs SOURCEnOOK 243 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds. 1973).
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). In finding that one did not have
to resort to a state remedy even if it would give the relief if enforced, Justice Douglas
stated: "[tihe federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." id.
39. To complete the gamut of state remedies before federal relief is available may
require months or even years. In cases where the challenge is to the parole procedure
the case might actually become moot by the time the case is heard by the federal courts.
See note 13 supra.
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powers.40 Class actions can also be maintained under section 1983. 41
Finally, section 1983 enables the petitioner to utilize the liberal discov-
ery procedures under the federal rules of procedure,4 2 as compared to
discovery pursuant to a federal habeas corpus claim, which is allowed
only upon obtaining a court order.4"
Although these two statutory remedies were at one time equally
available to state prisoners, the Supreme Court's attempt in Preiser v.
Rodriguez to define the relationship between the two resulted in serious
limitations on the use of section 1983. 44 The case involved a civil rights
action by three prisoners. Their complaint alleged that they had been
deprived of previously earned good time credits without being afforded
due process.45 The earned credits counted towards the reduction of
their sentences. The Supreme Court noted that the "essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person upon the legality of that custody, and
that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody."46  Since the remedy of restoration of the lost credits would
shorten the prisoners' time of confinement, the Supreme Court read the
prisoners' challenges as being to the "fact or duration" of their illegal
confinement and "as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on
the prisoner's conviction. . . .,4 The Court held, therefore, that the
prisoners' complaints should be treated as applications for writs of
habeas corpus and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.48
The majority announced the test that if the prisoner is challenging the
fact or duration of his confinement and seeking release or shortening of
his term of confinement, then habeas corpus is the sole remedy. 49 The
Court reasoned that this test would protect the policy behind the exhaus-
40. See note 2 supra.
41. The requisites of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be met.
F . R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2). See Zagaris, Recent Developments in Prison Litigation:
Procedural Issues and Remedies, 14 SANTA. CLARA LAw. 810, 831 (1974). Zagaris points
out that class actions are particularly well suited for prison plaintiffs. Zagaris notes
several reasons including that: (1) with a class of plaintiffs, the complete action cannot
be declared moot by the release of one prisoner, (2) the large number of plaintiffs allows
more extensive discovery, and (3) that attorneys' fees are often awarded in the class
action context. Id. at 831-34.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
43% See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
44. 411 U.S. at 489-90.
45. Id. at 476-77.
46. Id. at 484.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 481. In essence the Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling in the
companion case of United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir.
1971).
49. 411 U.S. at 500.
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tion requirement and allow the states to have the first opportunity to
correct state errors.50
Despite the apparent simplicity of the test announced in Preiser,
the decision left the lower courts confused as to how to apply the test.
Preiser clearly barred certain section 1983 suits: challenges to proce-
dures involving loss of good time credit, since relief in such a suit would
result in the prisoner's early release;5 and challenges to parole revoca-
tions, since a successful claim would reinstate parole.52  Equally as
clear, Preiser would not require exhaustion in certain situations: a
challenge to the conditions of confinement, such as a claim of inade-
quate physical facilities; and a challenge for which no adequate state
remedy existed.5 3  However, there remained many intermediate situa-
tions which did not clearly fall either within or outside the Court's
concept of the "core of habeas corpus. 54
Bradford confronted the court of appeals with just such a difficult
situation for application of the Preiser test. Since the prisoners were
challenging the constitutionality of the procedure employed at the parole
board hearings, 55 their allegations did not easily fall into the category of
"conditions of confinement";58 nor could their petitions be viewed as
requesting "release." Rather, their claims were directed at the proce-
dure of the parole board, which is an intricate part of the release system.
If the court interpreted Preiser to apply only in the narrow circum-
stances in which the prisoner's challenge is directed towards the fact or
50. Id. at 491-92. Justice Brennan authored a dissenting opinion that criticized the
majority's decision as "analytically unsound." The dissenters argued that the protection
of federal rights should not succumb to protection of federal-state relations and that
section 1983 should take precedence over habeas corpus and its exhaustion requirement.
Justice Brennan pointed out the difficulty in applying the majority's test as well as its
failure to prevent federal-state friction. Id. at 475, 500-25 (dissenting opinion).
51. Id. at 475.
52. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), a case prior to Preiser, the
Supreme Court found that exhaustion was required in an administratively imposed parole
revocation. See also Mason v. Askew, 484 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In
Mason the prisoner contended that parole revocation was inflicted with substantive and
procedural infirmities and sought relief under section 1983. The court denied the -claim
on the grounds of Preiser.
53. See, e.g., Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. Examples of situations not clearly within or outside the Court's concept of
"core of habeas corpus" are challenges to parole hearings, challenges to procedures
assigning an inmate to a special facility (such as a hospital for drug abusers) and
challenges to transfers of an inmate from one prison facility to another.
55. 519 F.2d at 734-35.
56. The most clear cut situations falling within "conditions of confinement" are
challenges to physical conditions or illegal actions of guards or other prison .personnel.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
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duration of his confinement and actual release is requested, then it
would have to conclude that the prisoners should be allowed to pursue
their section 1983 claims. However, if the court broadened the scope of
Preiser to include within the core of habeas corpus any challenge to the
release system, regardless of how remote the chance of actual release,
then their claims would necessarily fall because state remedies were not
first exhausted.
One member of the court, Senior Judge Bryan, chose the latter
alternative and read Preiser to require habeas corpus relief when a
prisoner is attacking the parole hearing process. 57 Reasoning that the
parole hearing is an event in the chain of ultimate detention and that a
change in the hearing procedure may eventually affect the duration of
incarceration, Bryan believed that the prisoners' complaints related to
their detention, not to the circumstances of imprisonment. 8 Therefore,
he concluded that plaintiffs' claims fell within the core of habeas corpus,
thus initially requiring exhaustion of state remedies.5 Bryan's view
raises the question whether the possibility of release, no matter how
remote, should be regarded as within the core. In Preiser the prisoners
were not actually seeking release but were challenging procedures that
denied them good time credits.60 However, if their claims had been
successful they would have been entitled to immediate release, with no
further proceedings necessary. Even so, release was actually collateral
to the claim. Bryan seemed to have seized on the collateral nature of
release in Preiser and extended it to support the proposition that any
potential release is within the core. Bryan justified such an extension
on the 'basis of protection of state-federal comity. 6
Judges Winter and Butzner took the opposite approach in narrowly
applying the Preiser test. They believed that Preiser does not apply
unless the purpose of the suit is to seek release or to shorten the duration
of confinement.6" In Bradford, however, the prisoners did not request
release; a favorable ruling would only entitle them to another parole
hearing. 63 By narrowly construing the language of Preiser, the majority
seemed to reason that the remote chance that the prisoners' claims
would actually expedite their release was not sufficient to bring their
57. 519 F.2d at 736.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 736-37.
60. 411 U.S. at 476-77.
61. 519 F.2d at 736-37.
62. See id. at 733.
63. Id. at 730-32.
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claims within the core of habeas corpus. Other lower federal courts
have shared the majority's view that the "possibility of release" should
not control in determining whether the claim is within the core of habeas
corpus."
The majority's restricted application of Preiser receives a great
deal of support from Gomez v. Miller, 5 a three-judge district court
opinion that was given summary affirmance by the Supreme Court.,6
As there was a detailed dissent by Judge Moore on the habeas corpus
issue, 7 the Supreme Court must have considered the jurisdic-
tional question and found the district court's opinion acceptable.6 8  In
Gomez three persons challenged their incarceration in hospitals for the
criminally insane.69 The plaintiffs, who were indicted for various felo-
nies but were untried, brought a section 1983 action contending that the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment
required the state to prove in a jury trial that they were "dangerous"
before they could be committed to a prison hospital.10 The case is
similar to Bradford, for in neither instance was there a challenge to the
state's right to place the plaintiffs in their particular situation, namely
placing them in a hospital or denying them parole, as long as it was
done constitutionally. The district court in Gomez rejected the state's
contention that habeas corpus relief was required.7 The court noted
that at best the relief sought would result in a transfer to a civilian
64. In Wingard v. North Carolina, 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973), a district
court allowed a section 1983 claim, stating that the relief prayed for, if granted, would
make the prisoner eligible for parole but would not constitute an actual grant of parole
and thus not actual release. As in Bradford, the court read Preiser to require the
prisoner to pursue habeas corpus when the only relief sought is an immediate or more
speedy release from prison.
In Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), state prisoners brought
section 1983 actions challenging the constitutionality of prison disciplinary procedures.
They did not seek immediate or earlier release from prison. Even though the challenged
disciplinary procedures had some effect on determining length of imprisonment, the
Ninth Circuit found that the effect of those procedures on the duration of the plaintiff's
sentence was too speculative and incidental to bring any part of the action within the
core of habeas corpus.
65. 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd mem., 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 333 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore felt that the petition should be
read as a writ of habeas corpus and thus the prisoner should be required to exhaust state
remedies. Judge Moore based his conclusion on the policy of protecting federal-state
comity.
68. At least one federal court has agreed that the Supreme Court could not have
overlooked the jurisdictional question in giving Gomez summary affirmance. Blouin v.
Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (1973).
69. 341 F. Supp. at 324.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 328.
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hospital and not outright release. 72 Such reasoning seems equally appli-
cable to Bradford, in which the relief would at best result in another
hearing, not in outright release. In both Gomez and Bradford the relief
being sought would bring the plaintiffs closer to release. But the
Supreme Court in affirming Gomez impliedly approved the reasoning
which found that simply improving the chances of release was not
sufficient to require the use of habeas corpus.
The question still remains why the federal courts have been unwill-
ing to extend Preiser to the limits suggested by Judge Bryan. There are
several answers, two of which can be found in the Bradford court's use
of Wolff v. McDonnell.7" In Wolff the Supreme Court allowed a
section 1983 challenge to the procedures used in revoking good time
credits.74 Judge Bryan took issue with the majority's citing of Wolff to
support their interpretation of the Preiser test. Bryan distinguished
Wolff on the ground that it involved a claim for damages, which made it
automatically a proper subject for section 1983 relief.75 Although
correct in his conclusion, Bryan's reasoning points out a flaw in the
Preiser test. Preiser recognized that since damages are not recoverable
in habeas corpus, "a damages action by a state prisoner could be
brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any require-
ment of prior exhaustion of state remedies." 78 The result is that, when
possible, prisoner petitions will request damage relief. In a situation in
which there is a claim for damages coupled with a complaint that might
otherwise be relegated to the habeas corpus procedure, the federal courts
could either retain the entire case on theories of pendent jurisdiction or
retain the damage claim only and send the remainder of the suit to the
state courts.77  The second alternative can result in waste of judicial
energy as well as increased friction between the federal and state courts
due to the possiblity of inconsistent results.78 To avoid having to make
72. Id.
73. 418 U.S. 539 (1974), discussed in 519 F.2d at 737-38.
74. 418 U.S. at 554-55.
75. 519 F.2d at 737.
76. 411 U.S. at 494.
77. See Zagaris, supra note 41, at 831. However, one court has found that it would
not consider a damage action if a ruling would imply that a state conviction is or would
be illegal. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974). In Edwards v. Illinois
Dep't of Corrections, 514 F.2d 477, 478 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975), the court noted that it
did not have to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for money damages for failure to exhaust
state remedies. Also, in Henderson v. Secretary of Correction, 518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir.
1975), the court recognized that as long as the plaintiff asserted damages his claim could
be heard.
78. Zagaris, supra note 41, at 831.
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this choice, many federal courts have attempted to limit Preiser in order
to have jurisdiction over most prisoners' section 1983 claims.
The majority in Bradford also had to deal with the broad language
employed by Preiser in announcing a policy of protecting the state's
interest in having the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the
internal administration of its prisons. The language was arguably
broad enough to include challenges to the parole system, as well as all
other attacks on prison administration.7" The question to be resolved
was whether the policy of protecting the state's interest in the prison
system demanded a consistently broad application of the Preiser test.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Preiser was clearly not intended to
preclude all section 1983 challenges by prisoners. It supported this
position by noting that the Court in Preiser had carefully reaffirmed its
holding in four earlier cases in which prisoners had brought section
1983 claims challenging some aspect of the penal system.80 Also, the
Bradford court demonstrated that the Supreme Court had further limit-
ed the broad policy language by its later holding in Wolff. In Wolff the
Supreme Court disallowed restoration of good time credits but did allow
a determination of the validity of the procedures for revoking the
credits.8 ' Impliedly, the Court found that the state interest does not
preclude such a challenge to prison administration systems as long as
release is not sought.8 2 Thus, the policy of protecting the state's interest
should not preclude the claim in Bradford, since the claimant, as in
Wolff, sought procedural protection without asking for release.
By limiting the application of the policy of protecting state interest
to the situation in which the prisoner seeks release, courts are acting
79. The Bradford court was quick to acknowledge the broad scope of the relevant
language. 519 F.2d at 734. The relevant discussion in Preiser can be found at 411 U.S.
491-92.
80. Preiser approved four state prisoner cases which did not require federal habeas
corpus remedy: Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (claim arising out
of an allegedly unconstitutional solitary confinement); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971) (per curiam) (challenge to living conditions and disciplinary measures
imposed while in maximum security of prison); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968) (per curiam) (legal materials confiscated by prison officials); Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (prisoner denied permission to purchase specific
religious publications). It seems clear that in each case the Supreme Court is approving
of the federal judiciary's interference with the state prison system.
81. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
82. See id. at 554-55.
Wolff can be distinguished from Bradford on the ground that the claimant is
seeking damages, but as mentioned previously, this argument seems to be placing form
over substance. There is no logic in an argument that state interests should be protected
when no damages are sought while disregarding those interests if the claimant seeks
damages. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
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consistently with the congressional intent in placing an exhaustion re-
quirement in the habeas corpus statute.88 Originally, the rule was based
on considerations of comity between federal and state judiciaries and did
not extend to challenges to state administrative action.8' Exhaustion
seems to have developed to allow states a chance to determine if the
prisoner was being legally detained before the federal courts could pass
judgment.8 5 Thus, it seems to be correct to require exhaustion for
challenges to state prison administrations only when a successful chal-
lenge would xesult in release. There is a valid distinction between the
federal courts ordering relief that will release a prisoner who had
violated state laws, as opposed to relief that will only require the states to
adjust their administrative procedures. Since the prisoner violated state
laws, the state courts should have the first opportunity to determine if the
prisoner should be released. However, there is no similar policy requir-
ing the state to have the first opportunity to consider allegedly unconsti-
tutional prison administrative procedures. By limiting the policy ex-
pressed in Preiser, the courts have paid tribute to this distinction and
have simplified the relevant inquiry to whether the claimant is seeking
release or whether release would result from the relief requested.
A final underlying reason for the hesitancy of the federal courts to
broaden Preiser is the changing view of the status of prisoners. In Cruz
v. Beto8" the Supreme Court, rejecting the notion that the prisoner
occupies a basically rightless status, stated that the federal courts are "to
enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prison-
ers. . . . [and that] persons in prison, like other individuals, have
the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. .... 87
This changed concept of the prisoner's status seems to have de-
veloped during the prison reform period of the past decade. During
this period the federal courts have offered prisoners the most sympathet-
ic forum available,"' and it seems that federal judges want the federal
83. Judge Parker, the author of the habeas corpus statute, explains the purpose of
the statute. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
84. Id.
85. See S. RPp. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
86. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
87. Id. at 321.
88. Judge James Doyle of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin commented on how he thought the courts should respond to prisoners' claims:
"I believe that the courts should be no less and no more painstaking, searching, and
respectful in their response to these litigants than they are in their response to any other
constitutional litigation." Doyle based his answer on the oath administered to federal
judges: "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons...
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courts to continue to be vehicles for prison reform. By limiting the
application of Preiser, federal judges can continue to insure prisoners a
forum in which to redress their grievances.
Bradford holds a place of importance among the numerous deci-
sions applying the Preiser test. The challenge to the parole hearing
presented the court with a situation in which it could have justified an
extension of the Preiser test and channeled the claim back into the state
courts. However, the court said in essence that simply improving the
chances of release is not sufficient to be within the "core." Bradford
interpreted Preiser to require prisoners to proceed under habeas corpus
only when the challenge is directly to the fact or duration of confine-
ment and the relief requested is immediate release from imprisonment.
Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, section 1983 will be useful not only to
challenge poor physical conditions but also to challenge the internal
administration of many prison proceedings. Besides allowing chal-
lenges to the parole hearing, the Fourth Circuit should grant jurisdiction
of section 1983 claims that challenge the procedures used in deciding to
transfer an inmate from one prison facility to another, assuming there
was a deprivation of liberty or property, and challenges to the proce-
dures that place an inmate in special facilities (such as special facilities
for drug offenders).89 In the above contexts, the prisoners should be
able to seek a restraint of enforcement of present procedural rules and
adoption of new ones.90 Hopefully, these claims will force lower courts
as well as the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of many
prison procedures. Favorable rulings in the federal courts will force the
prisons to adopt procedures that reflect the fact that prisoners do have
rights and will eventually lead to uniform procedures among the state
prisons. Inmates have sought a forum in which they can play an active
role in changing the penal system from one that views the prisoner as
being constitutionally naked to one that recognizes that prisoners do
have rights that must be protected.91 Bradford's extension of jurisdic-
do equal right to the poor and to the rich. . . support and defend the Constitution."
Doyle, supra note 9, at 406-07.
89. Even if a transfer from one facility is considered "release" within the Preiser
rationale, the challenge to the procedures employed in deciding on the transfer should,
under Bradford, be too remote to be considered a request for "release" and thus not
within the "core."
90. Under section 1983 the prisoner can seek both declaratory and injunctive relief
which would accomplish these results.
91. Singer and Keating have pointed out that the lack of effective grievance
procedures is one of the major reasons for prison violence. Singer & Keating, supra note
4, at 367. It is difficult for the average citizen to appreciate the frustration that
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tion over prisoners' section 1983 claims demonstrates that the federal
courts will offer the prisoners this sympathetic forum and enable them to
take an active role in correcting unconstitutional conditions and proce-
dures in the state prisons.
WILLIAM SIDNEY ALDRIDGE
Federal Jurisdiction-The Status of Public Officials as "Per-
sons" Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the right of
a tenured public school teacher to continued employment is a protected
property interest1 that cannot be taken away without due process.2
The employee facing removal is generally entitled to a hearing on the
charges. brought against him in which he can confront and cross-
examine witnesses.3 Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edge!ield County School District4 and
Thomas v. Ward greatly enhanced the opportunity for the victim of
prisoners experience within the prison grievance system and parole system. James
Hoffa, former president of the Teamsters' Union, commented on his observations of the
parole board while he was in prison: "I know of an individual who served 27 years in
prison and was allowed exactly three minutes to appear in front of the parole board and
then they said, Well, we want to study you two more years. What they found out in 29
years that they couldn't find out in 27 I'll never find out." Hoffa, Criminal Justice from
the Inside, 56 JuticATo'i 422, 425 (1973). Hopefully prisoners' section 1983 suits will
be effective in eliminating this type of process.
One lawyer seemed to sum up the situation best: "It is often difficult for attorneys,
or courts, whose entire universe revolves around rational decision-making, to fully
comprehend the total and arbitrary power which has characterized prison authorities'
control over the lives of prisoners. Administrative decisions which drastically affect the
lives and liberty of thousands of prisoners have often been made on the flimsiest of
information, without review." Brief for the National Council on Crime and Delinquen-
cy as Amicus Curiae at 3, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (dictum). In Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court expanded Roth to include not only those
teachers who were formally tenured, but also those who had an implied or "de facto"
tenure. Such tenure is to be ascertained by an examination of the historical policies
and practices of the institution. 408 U.S. at 602-03. For a similar statutory doctrine
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142 (1975) (establishing formal dismissal procedures for
teachers with more than three consecutive years of service in one school district).
2. Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Fraley, 470
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
3. McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1973).
4. 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
5. Civil No. 74-1541 (4th Cir., Nov. 24, 1975).
42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
a defective proceeding to secure restitutionary and injunctive relief
against school authorities. The court held that individual members of
a school board can be sued in their official capacity as "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act6 in an
original federal district court proceeding. 7 The practical effect of these
decisions may be far-reaching, in that they seemingly open the
treasuries of local governmental units to equitable reimbursement judg-
ments in section 1983 actions. Furthermore, Burt and Thomas mani-
fest the Fourth Circuit's continued resistance to Supreme Court deci-
sions narrowing the scope of remedies against public bodies in civil
rights actions.8
In the spring of 1970, the Board of Trustees of the Edgefield
County, South Carolina, School District released teacher Helen Burt on
the ground of incompetence. In May, 1972, she brought suit under
section 1983 against the school board and each individual member of
the Board alleging that her discharge was racially motivated and that
she was denied adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing. She
sought 25,000 dollars for damages to her "character and person," plus
reinstatement9 with back pay and retirement benefits. Before trial, she
dropped her damage claim, as well as her claim for reinstatement, but
retained her demands for back pay and retirement contributions. 10
The district court supported the Board's finding of incompetence but
determined that Mrs. Burt had been denied a hearing with due process
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States; ....
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1343(3) as conferring jurisdiction only
when a proper cause of action is stated under section 1983. See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973). See generally Comment, The Civil Rights Act
and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 144, 147-51 (1961).
8. See Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Lank-
ford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. 521 F.2d at 1203-04 n.l. By the time of trial Mrs. Burt had reached the nor-
mal retirement age of 65.
10. Id. at 1203.
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safeguards. She was awarded back pay but not retirement fund
contributions.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found it impossible to determine
whether the lower court judgment ran against the trustees of the school
district as individuals or as representatives of the school board. It
vacated the judgment"' and remanded the case for a clarification of the
action as one for damages1 2 or equitable reimbursment. 18  The court
dismissed the action against the Board as an official body since it
did not constitute a "person" under section 1983; however, it ruled
that members of the Board acting in their official capacities were
proper "persons' under section 1983 and thus subject to claims for
equitable relief.' 4
The factual circumstances of Thomas v. Ward closely paralleled
those of Burt. Lyle Thomas was dismissed from his teaching position
by the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County, North Carolina, School Board
following a hearing in which he was deprived of the opportunity to con-
front witnesses testifying by affidavit against him.' 5 The district court
11. The court found that the judgment on its face ran directly against the board
members as individuals, and ordered the named defendants to pay over damages to the
plaintiff. 521 F.2d at 1204 n.2. Upon that determination, it further ruled that the trial
court committed error in not allowing the defendant's demand for a jury trial. Id. at
1206. This result apparently reflects a change in judicial attitude from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8
(4th Cir. 1966), in which the court ruled that an action for back pay did not constitute
an action for damages, but rather only an integral part of the equitable remedy of reim-
bursement, and thus afforded no constitutional right to a jury trial. See Comment, Jury
Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TXA L
R v. 483 (1975).
12. The judges were in disagreement as to the proper measure of damages if thejudgment ran against the board members as individuals. Judge Craven would allow
damages only for the value of the broken employment contract, which he found only
nominal in the case of an incompetent teacher. 521 F.2d at 1204-05. Judges Winter
and 'Russell would allow full recovery of back pay as damages. Id. at 1207-08, 1209.
13. The Fourth Circuit has long regarded suits for back pay as equitable in nature
since such awards serve only to restore claimants to their rightful economic status. In
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 3.60 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966), the court
ruled that in section 1983 litigation, back pay is simply an integral part of the equitable
remedy of reinstatement. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.
1971) (back pay award under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g), ruled simply part of statutory equitable remedy); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Horton v. Orange County Bd. of
Educ., 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972), in which discharged teacher was not entitled to
reinstatement but was allowed to recover as "damages" her new pecuniary loss for the
period she was disemployed to the date of trial. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDcBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REME DS § 12.25, at 928-31 (1973).
14. 521 F.2d at 1205.
15. Thomas received a hearing in which the only evidence against him was let-
tert of school officials, his personal file, and affidavits of several students who were later
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ruled the hearing improper and ordered that Thomas be given another
hearing. The second, constitutionally proper hearing confirmed his
incompetence. Thomas filed another complaint in federal district court
against the Board and each of its members, requesting reinstatement
and back pay. The district court dismissed the action, but on appeal
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the defective first hearing at least entitled
Thomas to back pay until the time of his second hearing.16 On the
basis of Burt, the court reiterated that school board members acting in
their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983.17
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
The Fourth Circuit's approach in Burt and Thomas represents
another attempt by one of the lower federal courts to confront the con-
fusion surrounding the meaning of "person" in section 1983. Origin-
ally enacted in 1871,18 section 1983 attempted to protect newly emanci-
pated blacks against violence from the Ku Klux Klan with the open
acquiescence of state and local authorities. 9 It provided a federal
forum for actions against municipal and state officers who failed actively
to enforce the law--especially the fourteenth amendment.2 0  Like
most of the early civil rights legislation, the statute lay practically
dormant until the 1950's.21 Its first modem interpretation came in the
landmark case of Monroe v. Pape,12 in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of six children and their parents to
assert a damage action against Chicago policemen for unlawful invasion
of their home. However, after careful scrutiny of the legislative
history,2 3 the Monroe Court concluded that Congress did not intend
shown to be disciplinary problems themselves. No witnesses were sworn and Thomas
thus had no opportunity for cross-examination. The trial court found on this record a
failure of due process. Civil No. 74-1541 at 4.
16. Id. at 9-10.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
19. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 662 passim (1871). See also Kates
and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972).
20. For accounts of the attrocities reported to the Congress during the debates on
the Act see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. (1871).
21. See generally E. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 Mic. L REv. 1323 (1952); Note, The Proper Scope of Civil Rights Acts, 66 HAv.
L. REv. 1285 (1953).
22. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
23. Justice Douglas based his majority opinion on the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment that would have made local governments liable for riots or violence occur-
ring within their jurisdiction. Id. at 188-92. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
704-05, 725, 800-01 (1871). See generally Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 131.
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municipalities to be subject to the Act and that consequently they were
not "persons"' as defined in the statute.24 Since the city could not be
sued under section 1983, the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 134325 and dismissed the action against the
city. The Monroe result, limiting actions against municipalities, has been
interpreted to include many local political subdivisions, including school
boards. 20  The decision received much criticism, 27 and almost imme-
diately lower federal courts sought methods to circumvent its meaning.
Twelve years later, the Court again confronted the Monroe
situation. In Moor v. County of Alameda28 petitioners brought damage
actions under section 1983 against several law enforcement officers and
against the County on the theory that the County was vicariously liable
under state law for the officers' unconstitutional acts. Since under their
construction of the California Tort Claims Act,29 the County in effect
consented to be sued in state court, petitioners asserted that it had also
waived its immunity in the federal forum and thus could be treated as
a "person" for section 1983 purposes. Furthermore, they argued that
the Court's policy of exclusion of governmental units from section 1983
liability effectively denied plaintiffs an adequate recovery. In com-
plainants' view, personal actions against individual officers did not pro-
vide a deterrent against official infringement of federal rights, since
often the officers proved judgment proof or were protected by some
type of official immunity.30 In spite of these policy considerations, the
24. 365 U.S. at 191-92.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. See Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974).
27. See Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 132-36; McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA.
L R V. 1 (1974); Comment, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 55 U. M-N. L REv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).
28. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
29. CAL. Gov'T CoDn § 815.2(a) (West 1966).
30. The concept of the immunity of government officials sprang out of the com-
mon law's recognition of the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official
functions free from personal liability. This was modified in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that government officials are not totally
exempt from liability under section 1983. They were granted only a qualified immunity
contingent upon such factors as the scope of discretion and responsibility of the officers
plus the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the unconstitutional event. 416
U.S. at 247.
The latest standard for immunity in the school board disciplinary context (which
closely parallels the teacher suspensions in Burt and Thomas) appeared in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975): "A compensatory award will be appropriate only if
the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Id. at 322. See also Note, Constil-
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Court adhered to the rationale of Monroe and declared that Alameda
County was not a "person" under section 1983.
Soon after Moor, the Supreme Courts decision in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno31 apparently closed the issue of local government liability
under section 1983. In Kenosha appellee liquor store operators
brought an action under section 1983 claiming deprivation of due
process in the City's refusal to renew their one-year liquor license.
They sought only declaratory and injunctive relief.3 2 Although the
jurisdictional issue did not surface at the trial stage, the Supreme Court
dismissed the action against the City on the ground that it was not a
"person' for section 1983 purposes. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
concluded:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe,
or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word "person" in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of
the relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held in Monroe,
'Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within
the ambit of' § 1983. . . they are outside of its ambit for purposes
of equitable relief as well as for damages.33
The mandate of Kenosha seems clear. The Court has specifically
excluded municipalities and other local governmental units from "per-
son!' status under section 1983 whether the suit be couched in legal
or equitable terms.
Although the Supreme Court has emphatically denied municipal
liability under section 1983, it has not yet discussed the situation
presented by Burt and Thomas, in which the individual members of
the public body are sued in their representative capacities. Clearly,
Monroe sanctions suits against public officials as individuals, but
damage actions against such persons are often thwarted by various
tutional Law-Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the Doctrine of Executive Immu-
nity Automatically Bar a Suit for Damages Brought against State Officials in their Indi-
vidual Capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Scheuer v. Rhodes, 24 CAmT. U. L REv. 164
(1974); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983
Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV. 439 (1974).
31. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
32. 412 U.S. at 508. The district court declared the statute in question unconsti-
tutional, relying on two Seventh Circuit decisions holding officials to be proper "per-
sons" in an action seeking equitable relief, namely, Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d
1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
412 U.S. at 511. See generally Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil
Rights Act: Monroe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. CoLo. L. REv. 105 (1971).
33. 412 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted).
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forms of official immunity.3" Likewise, an injunctive decree against an
individual may fall outside the scope of his authority as an individual
and thus block effective relief. 8 Suits against board members as offi-
cials would not encounter either of these obstacles. It would seem,
however, that a judgment requiring municipal officials to pay damages
or reinstate an employee is precisely equivalent to requiring the city
to do so. Many lower federal courts have adopted this.reasoning"8 in
the wake of Monroe and Kenosha. In Taliaferro v. State Council of
Higher Educaton,37 for example, one court reasoned:
The logic of Bruno seems inescapable. . . . Since this Court can
perceive no distinction in principle between a state or county and
the agencies or institutions into which it divides itself, or the agents
in their official capacities through which it acts, the Court can reach
no other conclusion than that the State Council of Higher Educa-
tion, and the named defendants in their official capacities, are not
'persons' for purposes of either monetary or injunctive relief under
§ 1983.38
The Supreme Court has adopted the same reasoning in the
analogous context of state immunity under the eleventh amendment
from prosecution in the federal courts. Plaintiffs bringing suits against
state officials in their representative capacities often are confronted by
jurisdictional barriers by which the officials seek to define the action
against them as one running against the state. 9 If the court character-
izes the suit as one in essence against the state, it is compelled to dis-
miss the action for lack of jurisdiction, unless the state waives its
immunity. In such suits against state officials, the Supreme Court has
generally held that the classification of a suit as one against the state
is to be determined by the nature and effect of the relief sought.40
Thus, when an action involves recovery of money from the state
treasury, the state is the real party in interest, and its officials are
entitled to invoke the eleventh amendment even though they are
34. See note 30 supra. See also Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 131-32; The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 252, 256-63 (1973).
35. Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963).
36. See Patton v. Conrad Area School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 410 (D. Del. 1975);
Needleman v. Bohlen, 386 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1974); Hines v. D'Artois, 383 F.
Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1974).
37. 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974).
38. Id. at 1381-82. See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
40. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945). See also Ken.
necott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Great Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
[Vol. 541068
42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
nominal defendants.4 ' Applying this rationale, the Court has granted
immunity to individual state officials in actions for tax :refunds4 2 and
retroactive welfare benefits.4"
While interpretations of the eleventh amendment have no binding
effect on the definition of a "person" for the purposes of section 1983,
the techniques employed to determine whether a suit against state offi-
cials is actually a suit against the state appear applicable in deciding
whether an action against municipal authorities is in essence an action
against the city and thus subject to the Monroe and Kenosha exemption.
In an attempt to avoid this seemingly logical approach, courts allowing
suits against officials in their representative capacities have developed
two lines of reasoning to justify their decisions. The first argument
adopts by analogy the limitations on state immunity defenses in equit-
able proceedings,44 while the second approach simply confines Monroe
and Kenosha to their literal holdings without regard to the rationale
underlying them. The Fourth Circuit in Burt and Thomas adopted
both of these approaches.
EX PARTE YOUNG AND EQUITABLE RELImE.
In the landmark decision of Ex Parte Young45 the Supreme Court
ruled that the eleventh amendment did not bar an action to enjoin the
Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing an unconstitutional rail-
road rate statute. In order to reach its result, the Court resorted to
the creation of a legal fiction:
[I]n every case where an official claims to be acting under the au-
thority of the State. . . the use of the name of the State to en-
force an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a pro-
ceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the
State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an ille-
gal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of
the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. . . . [Ie is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his per-
son to the consequences of his individual conduct.46
The Young result clearly exalted form over substance, since it disquali-
fied a suit against the Minnesota Attorney General but allowed the
41. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
42. Id.
43. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
44. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HIAv. L. REv. 252 (1973).
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
46. Id. at 159-60.
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same action against the person occupying that office. Obviously, the
effect of the injunction on the State of Minnesota in either situation
was the same.47
In Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,48
the Supreme Court rejected the application of the Young fiction to suits
for monetary remedies. In addition to the Department, the complain-
ants joined the Governor, the Treasurer, and the State Auditor in their
official capacities as the Board of the Treasury Department. Despite
the joinder of these individuals, the Court determined that the payment
of back taxes from the state treasury clearly involved direct action
against the State's resources and sustained eleventh amendment immu-
nity.49 After Ford Motor, therefore, it appeared that equitable actions
could be brought against state officials but that the eleventh amend-
ment barred damage actions against them. However, the precedents
left uncertain the result in a suit seeking an equitable reimbursement
remedy accompanied by a claim for injunctive relief.
In 1974, Edelman v. Jordan50 confronted that specific issue. Plain-
tiff welfare recipients brought an action alleging denial of equal protec-
tion in the Illinois method51 of administering federally supported family
assistance. The district court ordered Illinois to comply with federal
guidelines for welfare distributions and, in addition, required state
welfare officials to release retroactive benefits wrongly withheld from
eligible applicants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's result and concluded that the Young rationale properly sanc-
tioned the grant of a monetary award in the nature of equitable
restitution."Z
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court went
beyond a simple characterization of the suit as "equitable" or "legal"
and emphasized instead the nature of the relief sought. Since the
funds would come directly from the state treasury, the Court concluded
that the rule in Ford Motor applied and that the eleventh amendment
effectively barred the action for retroactice payments.63  Edelman
47. See McCormack, supra note 27, at 36.
48. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
49. Id. at 464.
50. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
51. Under Illinois procedure, grants were authorized beginning only with tho
month in which an application was approved. Id. at 665. The federal law allowed ret-
roactive payments for all prior eligible months. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(6) (1972).
52. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. 415 U.S. at 665.
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therefore limited the Young rationale to suits for prospective relief
only. Any suit requiring retroactive payment from a state treasury,
regardless of the label placed on it, was deemed a suit against the state,
irrespective of the naming of officials as nominal parties.
Given the Supreme Court's conclusion that a suit against a
welfare official for reimbursement is in essence an action against the
state, to insist that an action against a school board official for back pay
is not in essence an action against the county defies logic as well as
the thrust of the Supreme Court's decisions. Yet many federal courts
have adopted this viewpoint54 by refusing to consider the impact and
rationale of Edelman in equitable actions against local officials. The
Fourth Circuit in Burt, for example, cited two pre-Edelman circuit court
decisions 5 interpreting officials as "persons" for equitable relief.
Neither of these cases, however, could have considered the effect of
Edelman on the Young fiction. In addition, the court cited two Su-
preme Court cases56 in which plaintiffs were awarded equitable relief
against local officials under section 1983. Both of these cases involved
prospective relief only and consequently did not confront the issue of
equitable reimbursement.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF MONROE AND KENOSHA
A second method used by the lower courts to define officials as
"persons" under section 1983 involves the limitation of the Monroe
rationale to its literal holding. Although recognizing the clear ratio
decidendi of Monroe and Kenosha, these decisions allow jurisdiction
against the officials simply because neither case specifically denied it.57
The Fourth Circuit took this approach in Harper v. Kloster,5 its first
expression on section 1983 jurisdiction after Kenosha. In Harper, four
black employees sued the City of Baltimore, its mayor, and the city
54. See Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (lst Cir.
1974); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Canty v.
City of Richmond Police Dept., 383 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Va. 1974).
55. Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 197-4). These cases
were cited at 521 F.2d at 1205.
56. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Douglas v. City of Jean-
ette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). These cases were cited at 521 F.2d at 1205.
57. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Il. 1974); Richmond
Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Va. 1974).
58. 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
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council as officials under section 1983 for racial discrimination in hiring
and promotion. The district court granted substantial relief in the form
of injunctions to prevent further discriminatory practices."" On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit dismissed the action against the City of Baltimore
on the basis of Kenosha but affirmed jurisdiction over the officials.
The court specifically failed to give Kenosha "any wider application,"
although acknowledging that the dismissal of the City as a party would
have absolutely no effect on the district court's relief. 0
Harper's narrow reading of Kenosha may be justifiable, even in
the post-Edelman context, since the remedy sought in Harper was
prospective injunctive relief. In Burt and Thomas, however, the cir-
cuit court extended its application of the restrictive Harper approach 1
to cases involving equitable reimbursement. Although the Burt trial
court 2 and other district judges within the circuit08 have afforded
Kenosha considerable weight, the Fourth Circuit seems willing to enter-
tain suits against municipal officials in their representative capacities
until the Supreme Court specifically rules otherwise. Thus, it appears
that the Fourth Circuit will continue to ignore the well reasoned
approach of Edelman and the clear import of Kenosha.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although in neither Burt nor Thomas did the Fourth Circuit
discuss the policies lying behind its construction of "person" under sec-
tion 1983, that court and other lower courts seem cognizant of the
results of extending the Monroe and Kenosha rationale to its logical
conclusion. 4 The elimination of municipal officials as proper defend-
ants would practically deny plaintiffs effective redress under section
1983 against unconstitutional actions by municipal bodies,06 since
actions against the individual board members almost inevitably will face
59. Harper v. Mayor and City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973).
60. "The decree of the district court will be just as effective if it applies only to
the defendants, excluding Baltimore City, a municipal corporation, as if Baltimore City
were also a defendant." 486 F.2d at 1138.
61. 521 F.2d at 1205.
62. Id. at 1204-05.
63. See Moye v. City of Raleigh, 503 F.2d 631, 635 n.11 (4th Cir. 1974); Rich-
mond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Va.
1974); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974).
64. See, e.g., Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.
1975).
65. See authorities cited notes 27 & 34 supra. See also Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197, 202 (4th-Cir. 1966).
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assertions of official immunity."s Nevertheless, the MonroelKenosha
rationale is plainly designed to limit actions against local governments.
In Monroe,6 7 Moor v. Alameda County,68 and Kenosha,"9 the Supreme
Court at least implicitly rejected these policy arguments by relying on
distant legislative history to support its statutory construction.7°
Through its narrow reading of that history, the Supreme Court has
determined that section 1983 will not be used as a statute to adjudicate
any injured party's constitutional claims against municipal authorities.
Closing the loophole created by cases such as Burt and Thomas
does not guarantee that plaintiffs will have no recourse, since several
jurisdictional alternatives exist. Many plaintiffs will be able to meet
the 10,000 dollar federal question requirement under 28 U.S.C.
section 1331. 71 Claims against municipalities under state law may also
be heard by federal courts under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.72
Finally, some commentators have asserted that federal courts should
allow claims under 28 U.S.C. section 1343(3)73 regardless of whether
they state a proper cause of action under section 1983.
66. See note 30 supra.
67. 365 U.S. at 191.
68. 411 U.S. at 700-01.
69. 412 U.S. at 516-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
71. 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) provides: 'The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
Although this provision grants federal jurisdiction, the real issue in the section 1331
context is the ability to state a cause of action for which relief might be granted. Some
courts attempt to expand the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which granted a direct cause of action against
federal officers directly from the Constitution. Attempts to formulate a federal cause
of action against municipal officials have met with mixed success. See Smetanka v. Bor-
ough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366, 1377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (rejection of first
amendment claim); Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (re-
jecting fourth amendment claim). But see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 516
(Brennan, J., concurring); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 914-16 (ED. Pa.
1974) (claim under thirteenth and fourteenth amendments allowed). See generally
Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" for the Dep-
rivation of Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REv. 213 (1974); Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAv. L. Rv. 1532, 1558-59 (1972);
Note, Municipal Liability in Damages for Violations of Constitutional Rights-Fash-
ioning a Cause of Action Directly from the Constitution-Brault v. Town of Milton,
7 CONN. L. REV. 552 (1975).
72. See Note, A Federal Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth
Amendment Violations by Its Agents, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REa. 850, 863 (1974). But
see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
73. See Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 12 .(5th Cir. 1969); Bodensteiner,
supra note 71, at 229-34. But see Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 148 (1961).
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If existing jurisdictional procedures prove inadequate, Congress
may change the statutes in any of three ways: (1) it could amend
section 1983 to include specifically local governments as "persons";74
(2) it could amend 28 U.S.C. section 1343 to confer original federal
jurisdiction in any claim involving a deprivation of civil rights; and (3)
it could simply add a new statute to allow jurisdiction over local govern-
mental units to redress civil rights. These alternatives seem superior to
the current lower court policy of ignoring the logical Edelman approach.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court on three occasions has unequivocably
declared that Congress did not intend local governmental units to be
subject to liability as "persons" under section 1983. 71 Despite this
mandate, the Fourth Circuit in Burt v. Board of Trustees and Thomas
v. Ward allowed plaintiffs to recover equitable back pay judgments
against defendant school boards simply by naming the members as
nominal defendants. In light of recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments in the analogous state sovereignty context, the reasoning in these
cases seems strained and illogical. The division of authority on the
issue indicates the need for further Supreme Court definition of
"person" in the section 1983 context. The ultimate solution, however,
would be a congressional overhaul of the federal civil rights statutes
to provide an effective method of redressing constitutional wrongs in
a federal forum.
JERRY ALAN REESE
Judicial Discipline-The North Carolina Commission System
"Courts, be they high or low, should and must be like Caesar's
wife, above suspicion. Any other standard is one which undermines the
trust and confidence of the average citizen in his government."' Re-
cently, North Carolina took steps to ensure that its judiciary exhibit this
74. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL
PRO'rECION IN nmE SouTH 179-80 (1965). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RoHs, 1961 REPORT, BK. 5: JUs CE, at 73-75 (1961).
75. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. at 710 n.27.
1. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 698, 304 A.2d 587, 607 (1973).
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high standard of conduct. In addition to the traditional devices of
impeachment' and address,3 North Carolina now has, by virture of a
constitutional amendment4 and enabling legislation,5 a new method of
handling judicial misconduct-the Judicial Standards Commission.6
Traditional methods of handling judicial discipline have proven
generally cumbersome and ineffective.' In recent years many jurisdic-
tions have realized that a better system of judicial discipline is needed,
especially when the judicial misconduct does not clearly warrant remov-
al." In response to this need, new discipline machinery has been
established in a majority of the states over the past three decades.9
California created the first judicial qualifications commission in 1960 by
constitutional amendment. 10 The California model, in whole or in part,
has been copied in many jurisdictions," including North Carolina.
-Upon recommendation of the Courts Commission"z in 1971 a con-
2. Impeachment is a procedure in which the House of Representatives brings
charges and the Senate sits as the court. Two-thirds of the senators present can convict.
Judgment cannot extend beyond removal from and disqualification to hold office. N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 4.
3. Address is a procedure whereby a judge may be removed for mental or physical
incapacity by a joint resolution of two-thirds of the General Assembly. N.C. CONST.
art. IV, § 17(1).
4. The amendment changed art. IV, § 17(1), and added art. IV, 9 17(2).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. H 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. Hereinafter referred to as Commission.
7. W. BRArrHwArrE, WHO JUiES TmE JuDGEs? 12-13 (1971); Frankel, The Case
for Judicial Disciplinary Measures, 49 AM. Jun. Soc'Y J. 018, 218-20 (1966). Address
has apparently never been used in North Carolina. Since 1868, only two North
Carolina judges have been impeached. Neither was convicted. A third judge had
impeachment articles preferred, but they were withdrawn. Prior to 1868, judges were
selected by General Assembly vote so it is unlikely that any were impeached. NORTH
CAROLINA COURTS COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COURTS REPor]. There are no digested cases of the
North Carolina Supreme Court removing judges based on its supervisor power.
8. AMERcAN JuDicATURB SociETY, JUDICIAL DISABILITY AND REMOVAL Com-
MISSIONS, COURTS AND PROCEDURES i (1972) [hereinafter cited as AJS]; COURTS REPORT
at 19-22.
9. AJS at i; COURTS REPORT at 22. New York became the first state to
establish a modem disciplinary system when, in 1947, it created a court on the
judiciary. The court is convened when a complaint is filed by officials specifi-
cally authorized by law to do so. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 22. Delaware and Okla-
homa have similar courts on the judiciary. Compared to a commission system, the
judiciary court system is more formal and cumbersome and, therefore, less desirable. It
works on an ad hoc basis and handles only the most serious matters. COURTS REPORT
at 25.
10. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 18.
11. Jurisdictions adopting a commission plan include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia. AMS, supra note 8, at i.
12. The Courts Commission was originally established as a temporary commission
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stitutional amendment was proposed and adopted, adding the following
language to the North Carolina Constitution:
(2) Additional method of removal of Judges. The General
Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in addition to impeachment
and address set forth in -this section, for the removal of a Justice or
Judge of the General Court of Justice for mental or physical in-
capacity interfering with the performance of his duties which is,
or is likely to become, permanent, and for the censure and removal
of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful
misconduct in office, wilful and pergistent failure to perform his
duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.13
The General Assembly, acting on constitutional mandate, created the
North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission effective January 1,
1973.14
The Commission has power to recommend to the supreme court
the censure or removal of any judge or justice for the reasons given in
the constitution.1 5 The Commission may institute a preliminary investi-
gation either upon citizen complaint or upon its own motion.10 If
further proceedings are warranted, a formal due process hearing is held
on the exclusive basis of which the Commission may recommend disci-
pline to the supreme court.1 7 The entire process is confidential except
for the recommendation and supporting record sent to the court and the
courts subsequent proceedings.1 8  Only the supreme court has the
actual power of censure or removal. 9 The court, in its descretion, may
dismiss the case, follow the Commission's recommendation, or remand
for further proceedings.2"
The commission system offers an excellent means of dealing with
judicial impropriety. It is inexpensive, fair, and flexible. Easy access
allows members of the public to raise their greviances, while confiden-
in 1963 to design a modern, efficient court system for North Carolina. Res. of June 11,
1963, No. 73, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1815. The Courts Commission was made
permanent in 1969, Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 910, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. Laws 1046,
but in 1975 was disestablished. Law of June 26, 1975, ch. 956, § 18, 11975] N.C. Sess.
Laws 1405.
13. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2).
14. N.C. GEN. STA'r. §§ 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
15. Id. § 7A-376.
16. Id. § 7A-377(a).
17. Id.
18. The accused has a right to have the proceedings open to the public. Id.
19. Id. § 7A-376.
20. Id. § 7A-377(a).
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tiality protects judges from unjustified harrassment. Most importantly,
the Commission acts as a strong deterrent to the kinds of offenses that
are unlikely to result in impeachment but that, nevertheless, lower the
public's respect for the justice system.2  A recent case, In re Crutch-
field,2 2 is a good example of such misconduct.
Crutchfield provided the supreme court with its first recommenda-
tion from the Commission. The court, following the Commission's
recommendation, censured Judge Crutchfield for "conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute" 2 when he signed orders allowing limited driving privileges to
defendants who were not entitled to such privileges. 24  The orders were
signed upon mere ex parte applications of the defendants' attorneys,
violating the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.25  More serious,
however, was the judge's total failure to determine the facts or control-
ling law.2 6  The court found the judge's good faith defenses unavail-
ing.27
Curiously, the defendant, Judge Crutchfield, never questioned
the constitutionality of the untried Commission process in his brief.
However, in a vigorous dissent, Justice Lake raised due process and
equal protection issues on his own motionl and found that Commission
procedure violative of both the United States and North Carolina Con-
21. CounTs REPORT, supra note 7, at 25-26.
22. No. 97 (N.C. Sup. Ct., Dec. 17, 1975) (unreported).
23. Majority Opinion at 7, quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2).
24. Persons arrested for driving under the influence are disallowed limited driving
privileges by statute if they refuse to take a breathalyzer test. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-
16.2, -179 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
25. "A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceed-
ing, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by
law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending
or impending proceeding." N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CowDUCr Canon 3(A) (4). Two
Florida supreme court judges were similarly reprimanded for their mishandling or misuse
of an ex parte memorandum. In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Dekle, 308
So.2d 5 (Fla. 1975).
26. Majority Opinion at 6.
27. Id. at 5-6. Crutchfield raised three basic defenses: (1) justifiable reliance on
an attorney to draw a proper order, (2) no bad faith, and (3) no financial gain. Brief
for Petitioner at 1.
Two Maryland judges were removed for "conduct prejudicial," due to irregularitiet
in disposing of traffic cases, although they received no financial benefit, and followed
practices of predecessor courts. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
28. The dissent raises the constitutional issues on its own motion under the
principle that jurisdiction is always a proper inquiry. The statute contains jurisdictional,
procedural, and substantive provisions. The dissent reasons that because the substantive
and procedural provisions violate the constitution, the statute is void, and the court lacks
jurisdiction. Dissenting Opinion at 1-2.
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stitutions.29 Because the supreme court may act "only upon the recom-
mendation of the Commission,""° and because the Commission has
broad discretion in determining the sanction it will recommend, Justice
Lake argued that there is an "invitation to gross favoritism" that violates
equal protection.31 The dissent also found due process violations in the
procedural aspects of the Commission proceeding. The fact that the
hearing is closed,32 that the Commission is judge, jury, and prosecutor, 3
and that the Commission can write its own rules"s all bear on Justice
Lake's conclusion. Justice Lake would also hold void for vagueness the
disciplinary ground of "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice."3 5
The majority opinion is noticeably unresponsive to the dissent's
concerns. Whether the majority felt that the issues were improperly
raised or well settled is unclear; however, the latter is a sound conclusion
based upon an examination of other cases.36 This note will identify the
responses of other courts to Justice Lake's arguments, and then examine
some North Carolina constitutional issues not raised in Crutchfield.
The weight of authority at the federal level holds that wide discre-
tion vested in an administrative body, in and of itself, does not vio-
late the Constitution. 7  Stricter doctrines of non-delegation are justi-
fiably found at the state level since "state legislatures much more than
Congress tend to delegate [responsibility] to petty officials who are
authorized to act without adequate safeguards." s38 Such concerns are
inappropriate in the Commission setting where, not only is the Commis-
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 4. The word "only" is inserted by the dissent. The statute reads:
"[u]pon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may... ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Thus, the court retains whatever authority it pre-
viously had, unless the court itself reads a negative implication into the statute.
31. Dissenting Opinion at 5.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
36. See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Hanson, 532
P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975); In re Kelley, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md.
659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
37. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINim-&ATrvB LAW TEATISB § 2.01 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvIs]. Equal protection does not assure uniformity of decisions, only freedom
from intentional and purposeful discrimination. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8
(1944). It is significant that there were no allegations in Crutchfield that intentional or
purposeful discrimination had actually occurred. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608,
615-16 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
38. 1 DAvis § 2.07, at 101.
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sion a distinguished body of officials, 9 but the Commission's power is
limited to recommending, and court review of Commission recommen-
dations is mandatory.40
In those cases that have found an unconstitutional delegation of
authority to an administrative body, the opportunity for arbitrary exer-
cise of power went well beyond what was reasonably necessary for
proper administration of the program involved.41 The discretion grant-
ed thd North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission is an integral and
necessary part of the program. 42 The wide range of possible charges,
fact situations, and substantiation, requires that the Commission have
flexibility to respond to both major and minor cases.43 Not suprisingly,
it was the rigidity of the traditional methods of policing the judiciary
that made them ineffective deterrents.44
Due process does not preclude delegation of decisions involving
penalties to administrative agencies, so long as those penalties are not
criminal. 45 The line between civil and criminal penalties is difficult to
draw, but monetary penalties can clearly be civil.46  Nor is there a
distinction based on the severity of the penalty. Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) orders depriving persons of their professions as
brokers have been upheld, even when the SEC determined not only that
a penalty should be imposed, but also its extent.47
Commission systems in other jurisdictions have been upheld
against many of the same due process attacks leveled in Crutchfield.4"
Unless some distinguishing feature of the North Carolina system is fatal,
it too should pass constitutional muster. It is well settled law that an
administrative body can be judge, jury, and prosecutor.4 9 The full
39. The Commission consists of one court of appeals judge, one superior court
judge, one district court judge, two senior members of the state bar, and two lay citizens.
The judges are appointed by the Chief Justice, the citizens by the Governor, and the
attorneys are elected by the State Bar Council. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 7A-375(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
40. See N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 7A-376, 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). It is not
clear precisely what standard of review the court is using, but other jurisdictions have
adopted one in which the court reviews the transcript and makes its own independent
findings of fact and law. In re Hanson, 352 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Alaska 1975).
41. 1 DAVIS § 2.10, at 114.
42. CourS REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 19-20.
45. See 1 DAvis § 2.13, at 133-34.
46. Id. at 135.
47. Id. at 134.
48. See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
49. 2 DAvis § 13.02, at 181. The judge-jury-prosecutor due process objection has
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extent of due process is not required in a disciplinary proceeding
because it is not criminal in nature."0 The standard normally applied in
this situation is "minimum due process" with the emphasis on notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 1 Minimal due process protection is
provided by the Judicial Standards Commission Rules. 52 Furthermore,
the independent court review of facts and law upon any recommenda-
tion would seem adequate to insure that the system is not abused.58
Statutes are generally said to enjoy a presumption of constitutional-
ity. Consequently, if a statute can be exercised in a constitutional
manner it should be given that chance and not struck down on its face."4
Thus, the fact that the statute does not outline specific due process
safeguards to be followed, but instead instructs the Commission to devel-
op procedures "affording due process of law,"55 should not be fatal.
The Crutchfield dissent also charged that the confidentiality of the
commission process up to the supreme court level is inconsistent with
due process. 58 By contrast, the advocates of the system herald the
confidentiality of the system as one of its greatest assets, and consider it
vital. 57  Allegations of misconduct may be groundless and thus the
faultless judge is protected from the publicity of an unsupported charge.
Public confidence in the integrity of the court system is likewise protect-
ed from diminution by unfounded allegations. In addition, complain-
ants and witnesses need not be reluctant to complain or testify for fear of
publicity or reprisal. 58 Once the Commission recommends discipline,
been rejected in every jurisdiction in which the issue was raised in a judicial commission
context. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975).
50. Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In the judicial discipline
context, all jurisdictions which have considered the question have rejected the criminal
standard of proof. Most have also rejected a preponderance standard in favor of a clear
and convincing test. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307-08 (Alaska 1975). In Crutch-
field, both majority and dissent agree the proceeding is not criminal. Majority Opinion
at 5. Dissenting Opinion at 3.
51. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1971).
52. JurucrA.L STANDARDS COMM'N R. 8 provides for notice. R. 13 provides for
opportunity to be heard.
53. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307 (Alaska 1975).
54. Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S.
1043 (1974). In Smith the court upheld a regulatory ordinance by inferring a hearing
would be held and that decisions would be made on reasonable grounds. Id. at 537, 206
S.E.2d at 207.
55. The Commission is authorized to write its own rules, but must do so within an
express due process limitation. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cur. Supp. 1975).
56. Dissenting Opinion at 6.
57. Confidentiality provisions are found in nearly all the commission systems of
other jurisdictions. Coutxs REPORT, supra note 7, at 25.
58. Id. at 24-25.
1080 [Vol. 54
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
the purpose of confidentiality disappears and subsequent proceedings
are, by law, public. 9 In sum, there seems to be a valid exercise of
legitimate state interests, interests closely related to those served by the
use of a grand jury in criminal proceedings. Again there is an ultimate
check on abuse-the right of the accused to request public proceedings
at any time.60
The void for vagueness attack on the power to discipline for "con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of Justice" has been rejected else-
where."1 The North Carolina General Assembly intended the Code of
Judicial Conduct to be read into the phrase to give it meaning.62 Indeed,
if the Code is to have any real meaning such a provision is essential."3
"Conduct prejudicial" is no more vague than many other valid con-
cepts of law.64 It should be noted that, not merely would the statute be
void if this attack were sustained, but the constitutional amendment as
well, since the grounds for discipline are enumerated therein.
One problem, not raised in Crutchfield and peculiar to North
Carolina, poses a serious question of the constitutionality of the commis-
sion system as it is presently structured. The words of the commission
statute, "[u]pon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme
Court may censure or remove,"'65 clearly either assume, or attempt to
grant, supreme court jurisdiction. In North Carolina, supreme court
jurisdiction is conferred by the state constitution and not by the General
Assembly.6 6 Supreme court jurisdiction to remove judges. is not appar-
59. See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
60. See id.; JuDicAL STANDIARDS COMM'N R. 4.
61. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also In re
Diener, 268 Md. 659, 671, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (1973), where the court says that "conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" is incapable of precise definition "but
it is unlikely we shall ever have much trouble recognizing and identifying such conduct."
62. COuRTS REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. The majority approves of such a use of
the Code. Majority Opinion at 7, citing with approval Spruance v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 796, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841,
853 (1975).
63. The Code of Judicial Conduct, unlike the Code of Professional Responsibility,
does not have mandatory disciplinary rules. The Judicial Code is phrased in terms of
"should" like the ethical considerations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While
the Code may be used to give meaning to the constitutional provision, discipline may be
based only on a violation that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. In re
Haggerty, 257 La. 2, 17, 241 So. 2d 469, 474 (1970).
64. See generally In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 476-77, 318 A.2d 523, 537-38 (1974).
See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding discipline of a military officer
for conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" against a vagueness attack); Allen
v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971) (policeman).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cor. Supp. 1975).
66. State ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 422,
142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1965).
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ent on the face of the constitution. In fact, supreme court jurisdiction
seems limited solely to appeals from "the courts below."67
Thr new discipline section in the North Carolina Constitution
provides that "[tihe General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in
addition to impeachment and address . . . for the removal of [judges]
... 1)68 The import of that language would seem to be that the
Assembly can exercise its removal power through a procedure other
than impeachment or address. However, the same constitutional
amendment altered another section to read: "[riemoval from office by
the General Assembly for any other cause [other than address] shall be
by impeachment." 69 The two sections read together mandate that the
Assembly prescribe a procedure for the removal of judges by a body
other than the General Assembly.
The issue then becomes whether the Assembly can grant the power
of removal to another body, or whether it is limited to merely prescrib-
ing a procedure for a body that already possesses the removal power. If
the Assembly can vest the power of removal in another body, it may be
restricted in the body it can choose. If the power of removal is
characterized as a "judicial power," then the Assembly would seem
limited by article IV, § 1 of the constitution to vesting the power of
removal in the judiciary.70 If the power of removal is non-judicial, or if
the new discipline section71 overrides the judicial power section 2 of the
constitution, the Assembly may be able to give the power of removal to
any body--executive, judicial, legislative (except itself).73 There are of
course many policy reasons why the Assembly might not want to vest
the power in anyone other than the judiciary, 74 but that result is not
necessarily mandated by the constitution. If the power were given to a
non-judicial body, the scope of judicial review, if any, would be an
unavoidable issue.
67. N.C. CONST. art. [V, § 12(1); State ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort
Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 422, 142 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (1965).
68. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 17(2).
69. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(1) (emphasis added to words affixed by amend-
ment).
70. Art. I.r, § 1 requires that the "judicial power of the State" be vested in a court.
Some judicial powers can be given to administrative agencies, but ultimate power
remains in the courts via appeal. Id. § 3.
71. Id. § 17(2).
72. Id. § 1.
73. Id. § 17(1).
74. A primary reason for giving the discipline power only to the judiciary is to
retain a measure of judicial independence, an idea basic to our system of justice. See
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 136-
37 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1082 [Vol. 54
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
If the General Assembly cannot vest the power of removal in
another body but may merely prescribe a procedure for a body that
already has the power, it apparently must rely on the supreme court's
supervisory power over the other courts, found in article 1, § 12(1) of
the constitution or at common law.75 If the scope of the court's
supervisory power under either theory extends to removal, the Assembly
can comply with its constitutional mandate to "prescribe a procedure." 76
There are no disciplinary decisions as such in North Carolina, so the
possibility that the supervisory power includes removal is at least not
foreclosed.
In England the supervisory power of the common-law courts clear-
ly extended to removal.17 The writs used were scire facias and quo
warranto.7 The scire facias writ is especially analogous to removal
under article IV, § 17 (2). Scire facias was applied against judges who
held office "during good behavior." The causes for which a writ would
issue were similar to those listed in the constitutional provisions of
article IV, § 17(2)." 9 Some authorities argue that the judicial pow-
er of forfeiture in England was abolished by statute as early as 1700.
Others consider removal by scire facias still available."0 There appear
to be no modem cases which rely on these early writs.8 '
Whether the common-law removal doctrines are good law in the
United States is open to some question. The author can find no cases in
which a court has directly removed a judge from office based on either
its inherent common-law or constitutional supervisory powers.8 2 Some
courts have relied on their supervisory power to discipline members of
the bar in an indirect attempt to deter judicial midconduct. 3 Some
75. It is difficult to say how the constitutional supervisory power relates to the
common law power, but it would seem safe to assume the common law power is still
viable either as an independent power or as a way to interpret the constitution.
76. If the legality of the Commission is based on this theory, one wonders why a
constitutional amendment was necessary.
77. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475, 1479-82 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Shartel, Federal Fudges-Appoint-
ment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MicH.
L. Rnv. 870, 882-83 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Shartel]; Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 882, § 3
(1973).
78. Shartel, supra note 77, at 882-83.
79. Id. at 883.
80. Berger, supra note 77, at 1482, 1500.
81. Id at 1482 n.38.
82. For a good review of the cases on supervisory power and discipline see In re
Diener, 268 Md. 659, 699-715, 304 A.2d 587, 608-16 (1973) (Smith, J., dissenting).
83. In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973) and In re DeSaulpier, 360 Mass.
787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972) appear to be such cases. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 688,
304 A.2d 587, 602 (1973).
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courts find a direct power to suspend a judge in their supervisory
jurisdiction, but exclude more severe penalties.84 Others go no further
than censure.85  There are no North Carolina decisions on point. It
may be said that courts are uniformly reticent about using their supervi-
sory power for direct removal.8 6
Even if the supreme court is constitutionally authorized to remove
judges, procedural problems remain. If the power is based on the
court's supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts, it may be inapplicable
to supreme court justices.8 7 Regardless of the source of the authority,
its exercise would seem governed by article IV, § 12(1) of the constitu-
tion which provides that the supreme court is strictly an appellate court
with jurisdiction to hear cases solely from "the courts below."88 This
jurisdiction does not include direct appeals from agencies even though
they may be quasi-judicial.89 In spite of article IV, § 12(1), the direct
commission to supreme court route might be justified. Under the
statutory grant of power theory, the authorizing section of the constitu-
tion (article IV, § 17(2)) might be found to override article IV, § 12
(1). Under a supervisory power theory it might be held that the
supervisory jurisdiction is separate and independant from other jurisdic-
tion, and therefore, the "appellate only" limitation does not apply. 0
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission is a signifi-
cant improvement over traditional methods of judicial discipline. The
Commission offers great promise in deterring activities such as those for
which Judge Crutchfield was censured, activities which previously were
virtually immune from control, but which jeopardize the citizen's confi-
84. See Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, 131 N.W.2d 201 (1964); In re
Graham, 366 Mich. 268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962).
85. In re Municipal Court, 188 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa 1971).
86. See In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 699-715, 304 A.2d 587, 608-16 (1973) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
87. But cf. McDonald v. Morrow, 119 N.C. 666, 672, 26 S.E. 132, 134 (1896),
where the supreme court held individual justices could be treated as lower courts by the
General Assembly in at least some contexts.
88. The Commission could arguably be considered a court, but this is an unlikely
result since it would raise other problems. The constitution defines the court system in
detail and does not provide for a court like the Commission. N.C. CoNsr. art. IV, §§ 2-
10. Neither would the constitution allow delegation of rule making power to the
Commission if classified as a court. N.C. CONsr. art. IV, § 13(2).
89. See State ex reL N.C. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416,
420, 422, 142 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1965).
90. See In re Huff, 352 Mich. 402, 418, 91 N.W.2d 613, 620 (1958).
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dence in his judicial system. The Commission system also adds some
needed bite to the Code of Judicial Conduct. In light of the judicial
commission cases from other jurisdictions, the North Carolina system
seems unlikely to run afoul of the due process and equal protection
challenges raised by the Crutchfield dissent. There are, nevertheless,
some jurisdictional problems posed by the judicial article of the North
Carolina Constitution. Hopefully, the General Assembly will remedy
these problems, or the court will find a way to reconcile them, so that
the Commission can fulfill its promise in North Carolina.
EDWIN WAPREN SMALL
Property Law-The Beneficiary's Rights to the Proceeds of an
Insurance Policy When He Takes the Life of the Insured
Enacted in 1961, Chapter 31A of the North Carolina General
Statutes precludes one who is convicted of a wilful and unlawful homi-
cide from acquiring a proprietary benefit because of the death of his
victim.' In Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
life insurance provisions of this chapter.' Faced with the issue whether
1. Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. REv. 175, 193 (1962).
2. 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
3. For the purposes of this note the relevant sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A
(1966) are:§ 31A-3. Definitions.-As used in this article, unless the context other-
wise requires, the term-
(3) "Slayer" means
a. Any person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have
been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the
wilful and unlawful killing of another person; ....
§ 31A-11. Insurance benefits.-(a) Insurance and annuity proceeds pay-
able to the slayer:
(1) As the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insur-
ance on the life of the decedent, or
(2) In any other manner payable to the slayer by virtue of his surviving
the decedent, shall be paid to the person or persons who would
have been entitled thereto as if the slayer had predeceased the
decedent.
31A-13.-Record determining slayer admissible in evidence.-The rec-
ord of the judicial proceeding in which the slayer was determined to be such,
pursuant to § 3 1A-3 of this chapter, shall be admissible in evidence for or
against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this chapter.
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a beneficiary who had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter for
the killing of the insured could retain the proceeds of the insurance
policy, the court held that proof of a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter did not disqualify the beneficiary under the statute. 4  Never-
theless, because the statute was not intended to supplant completely
the common law in this area,' the court, in an unprecedented holding,
concluded that such a conviction was sufficient to bar the beneficiary
on the common-law principle that "no one shall be allowed to profit
from his own wrong."'
Jill Quick, having shot and killed her husband, Gary Quick, was
indicted for murder, convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and sen-
tenced to serve five to seven years in state prison. At the time of the
killing, Jill was the named beneficiary of an insurance policy in the
amount of $10,000 on the life of her husband. The present case
arose when the administratrix of her husband's estate brought an action
for declaratory judgment to determine the ownership of the life insur-
ance proceeds. Named as defendants in the action were Jill Quick
and United Benefit Life Insurance Company. The insurance company,
however, was permitted to withdraw after paying the proceeds to the
clerk of superior court.7
§ 31A-15. Chapter to be broadly construed.-This chapter shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect
the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own
wrong. As to all acts specifically provided for in this chapter, the rules,
remedies, and procedures herein specified shall be exclusive, and as to all acts
not specifically provided for in this chapter, all rules, remedies, and pro-
cedures, if any, which now exist or hereafter may exist either by virtue of
statute, or by virtue of the inherent powers of any court of competent juris-
diction, or otherwise, shall be applicable.
4. 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 567.
5. Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
6. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71. Under the statute, a beneficiary who is pre.
cluded from receiving the proceeds of insurance on the life of the insured cannot receive
these proceeds indirectly as an heir of the insured's estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-
4 (1966). This section confirms prior North Carolina case law. E.g., Parker v. Potter,
200 N.C. 348, 354, 157 S.E. 68, 71 (1931). In other states, however, there is authority
to the contrary. E.g., Moore v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42
(1941).
7. 287 N.C. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564. As a general rule, an insurance company
is not relieved of its obligation to pay the proceeds of the policy when the beneficiary
kills the insured. See, e.g., Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918). There are exceptions, however, (1) if the policy contains provisions voiding it
when the beneficiary causes the death of the insured, Grand Circle Women of Woodcraft
v. Rausch, 24 Colo. App. 304, 134 P. 141 (1913); (2) if the beneficiary obtained the
policy fraudulently, that is, intending at the time he procured it to kill the insured, Gold-
stein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 642, 234 N.Y.S. 250 (1929), modifying
133 Misc. 106, 231 N.Y.S. 161 (1928); see Henderson v. Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 100,
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At trial, neither party introduced evidence as to the factual circum-
stances immediately preceding the death of the insured." The only
evidence before the court that related to the killing was the record of
Jill's conviction of involuntary manslaughter which was submitted with-
out objection from the defendant. Based on this evidence and a stipu-
lation of the parties that the only issue to be decided was whether Jill
was barred under the statute,9 the court concluded that involuntary
manslaughter was an unlawful and wilful killing within the meaning of
section 31A-3(3)a of the General Statutes.'" Hence, Jill's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter disqualified her as a "slayer" under the
statute. Alternatively, the court held that apart from any statutory
grounds for forfeiture, Jill was barred from retaining the proceeds on
the basis of common-law doctrine and public policy." In light of these
two conclusions of law, the trial court entered judgment ordering the
clerk of superior court to pay the proceeds to the ancillary administra-
tor.12  Jill appealed,'" and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed on the grounds that involuntary manslaughter is not a wilful
killing within the meaning of the statute 4 and that the enactment of
the statute had abrogated otherwise applicable common-law rules.' 5
On further appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that a
"wilful killing' as used in section 31A-3 of the North Carolina General
Statutes means an intentional homicide, and thus, a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter does not, per se, bar recovery of the pro-
ceeds.' 6 The court, however, reversed the conclusion of the court of
appeals that the enactment of the statute had supplanted the common
law, holding instead that "G.S. § 31A-15 preserved the common law
179 S.E. 680 (1935); or (3) if the beneficiary is the only person having an interest
in the policy, Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910) (dictum). Ac-
cord, 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAw oF TRUSTS § 494.2 (3d ed. 1967). These exceptions would
still have application under chapter 31A since the statute uses the word "proceeds" and
a court faced with this issue could hold that no proceeds had accrued. [N.C.] GEN-
ERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT ON AN ACT TO BE ENTITLED "ACTS BAR-
RING PROPERTY RIGHTs" 26 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT].
8. 281 N.C. at 58, 213 S.E.2d at 570.
9. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
10. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 565.
11. Id.
12. Because Ida Mae Quick was a resident of South Carolina, an ancillary admin-
istrator, Lester G. Carter, Jr., was appointed. Id. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
13. 23 N.C. App. 504, 209 S.E.2d 323 (1974).
14. Id. at 505, 209 S.E.2d at 324.
15. Id. at 507, 209 S.E.2d at 325. Judge Campbell dissented on grounds that sec-
tion 31A-15 controlled and Jill Quick's act was an unlawful killing which would bar re-
covery. Id.
16. 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 567.
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both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically pro-
vided for in Chapter 3 1A."
Having determined that common law applied, the court confronted
the issue whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to bar
recovery under North Carolina common law. The court held that al-
though the record of a criminal conviction was generally not admissible
in a common-law proceeding,"8 the trial judge did not err in consider-
ing such evidence because Jill had failed to object to its admission.'0
Moreover, the court concluded that such evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court's conclusion that Jill was disqualified under the
common law since "[clulpable negligence proximately resulting in
death comes within the purview of the common law maxim that no one
shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong." 20  Accordingly, the
supreme court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the trial
court's original judgment.2
In Quick the court grounded its decision barring defendant on a
maxim that has been the source of many common-law rules and statu-
tory provisions disqualifying a beneficiary from receiving insurance pro-
ceeds when he has killed the insured.22 Several problems frequently
arise in applying these common-law and statutory rules to particular
cases. The principal concerns are the type of homicide that will disqual-
ify the killer and the admissibility of the criminal conviction record in
the civil proceeding.23
17. Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
118. Id. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
19. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570.
20. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 571.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., cases cited notes 25-28 and statutes cited notes 36 & 37 infra. See
generally Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. Rnv. 175 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Bolich]; Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer Where the Death of the
Insured is Caused by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee, 10 B.U.L. REV. 281 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as Grossman]; Lipscomb, Insurer's Liability and Rights When In-
sured's Death is Caused by the Beneficiary or Assignee, 8 Miss. L.J. 476 (1936); Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 H~av.
L. REv. 715 (1936); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1961).
23. A third problem is who is entitled to the insurance proceeds when the benefi-
ciary is determined to be a slayer. The answer to this question depends on factors such
as the relation of the beneficiary to the insured and the provisions of the insurance pol-
icy. If the beneficiary is not the insured's next of kin, generally the beneficiary will
hold the proceeds as constructive trustee for the estate of the insured. 5 A. ScoTr, T
LAw oF Thus'rs § 494.1 (3d ed. 1967) and cases cited therein. On the other hand, if
the beneficiary is the next of kin, the majority of the courts have held that the proceeds
are to pass as if the beneficiary predeceased the insured. Id. Accordingly, the person
next in line of succession would take, or if there were no possible takers other than the
beneficiary the proceeds would escheat to the state. Id.
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With respect to the first of these questions, the maxim itself provides
no logical point at which to draw the line.2" Applied literally, it could
encompass all wrongs from premeditated murder to mere accident. 25
In the absence of a statute, however, courts uniformly hold that a bene-
ficiary is not prohibited from taking insurance proceeds when the act
causing death is merely a civil wrong.26 At the other end of the scale,
it is virtually certain that a beneficiary who kills the insured for the pur-
pose of acquiring the proceeds would be barred.27  Between these ex-
tremes there is at least some surface disagreement as to the test to be
applied in determining which acts will preclude recovery. Several
cases have held that the killing of the insured under circumstances that
would constitute the crime of murder is sufficient to bar recovery;28
other decisions hold specifically that manslaughter does not disqualify.29
Finally, if the primary beneficiary murders the insured and there is a contingent
beneficiary named in the policy, the contingent beneficiary will take the proceeds.
Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931). But see Bullock v. Expressmen's
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951), in which the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that when a policy designated a contingent beneficiary to take
if the primary beneficiary failed to survive the insured, and the primary beneficiary
feloniously killed the insured, the failure of the contingency to occur prevented the con-
tingent beneficiary from receiving the proceeds which passed to the insured's estate. Ac-
cord, Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1951), vacated per curiam, 343 U.S. 912
(1952).
24. Grossman, supra note 22, at 290.
25. Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 5, 3 N.E.2d 17, 18-19 (1936).
26. E.g., Schreiner v. High Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 I1. App.
576 (1890). The beneficiary also is not disqualified when the killing is justifiable
or excusable. E.g., Holdom v. Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159
Ill. 619, 43 N.E. 772 (1895) (insanity); American Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Shaddinger,
205 La. 11, 16 So. 2d 889 (1944) (self-defense); Campbell v. Ray, 102 N.J. Super. 235,
245 A.2d 761 (Ch. Div. 1968), affd per curiam, 109 N.J. Super. 509, 259 A.2d 473
(App. Div. 1969).
27. E.g., Goldstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 Misc. 106, 231 N.Y.S. 161
(1928), modified on other grounds, 225 App. Div. 642, 234 N.Y.S. 250 (1929); see New
York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886). Although these cases hold
that the existence of a purpose to obtain the proceeds is sufficient to disqualify a benefi-
ciary, they do not say whether such a motive is required. That such a purpose is neces-
sary has been suggested in a few concurring and dissenting opinions in cases not directly
in point. Grossman, supra note 22, at 285, citing Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349,
128 N.W. 292 (1910) (concurring opinion); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W.
1042 (1904) (dissenting opinion). Other cases indicate that a purpose to accelerate the
maturity of the policy is not necessary. Grossman at 286, citing Schreiner v. High
Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 Ill. App. 576 (1890) (dictum); Smith v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 Misc. 136, 203 N.Y.S. 173 (1923), aff'd, 125 Misc.
670, 211 N.Y.S. 755 (1925) (dictum); cf. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 378, 137
S.E. 188, 191 (1927) (dictum).
28. E.g., Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900); Slo-
cum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923). See also Gar-
ner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
29. E.g., Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936); see
RESTATEMENT OF RESTIrION § 187, comment e at 766-67 (1937).
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Although these cases seem to indicate that the determinative factor
is whether the homicide involved is technically murder or some lesser
criminal offense, the few cases that have directly considered what ele-
ments are necessary to bar the beneficiary have held that the true test
is whether the beneficiary intentionally killed the insured. 0 As one
court noted in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McDavid,31
"the real reason for not permitting recovery is that the beneficiary
intentionally took the life of the insured and that the intentional act
should not place the beneficiary in position to enjoy a benefit which
would not have been enjoyed and could not have been enjoyed except
for the wicked intentional killing. 32
In the North Carolina cases on point, the rule generally has been
stated to the effect that a beneficiary is barred who "feloniously takes"
the life of the insured.3" While a felonious act in the criminal law con-
text includes involuntary manslaughter,34 the decisions in North Caro-
lina, and in other jurisdictions where similar statements of the rule
exist, indicate that courts have not used the word "felonious" in the
strict criminal law sense but had in mind an intentional homicide.35
30. E.g., Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1938);
Schreiner v. High Court Catholic Order of Foresters, 35 IIl. App. 576 (1890);
Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966); Schifanelli
v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974); cf. Wells v. Harris, 414 S.W.2d 343
(Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1967).
31. 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
32. Id. at 232; accord, Throop v. Western Indemnity Co., 49 Cal. App. 322, 193
P. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920). See also United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847,
852 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
33. E.g., Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71
(1951); Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1969) provides:
Punishment for manslaughter.-If any person shall commit the crime of
manslaughter he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail or
State prison for not less than four months nor more than twenty years:
Provided, however, that in cases of involuntary manslaughter, the punishment
shall be in the discretion of the court, and the defendant may be fined or
imprisoned, or both.
In State v. Dunn, 208 N.C. 333, 180 S.E. 708 (1935), the North Carolina Supreme
Court in an opinion by Justice Brogden held that the proviso to section 14-18 was in-
tended merely to mitigate punishment for involuntary manslaughter and did not make
involuntary manslaughter a separate offense classifiable as a misdemeanor.
35. In Parker, for example, a statement by the court that "if a husband insures
his life for the benefit of his wife and afterwards feloniously takes her life, neither he
nor his estate will be permitted to profit by his wrong," 200 N.C. at 352, 157 S.E. at
70 (emphasis added), is followed by a series of examples that suggest that the court
was referring to an intentional killing. Id. Moreover, the court cited New York Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886), a case that also contains language
that "strongly suggests that the court had in mind an intentional taking." Grossman,
supra note 22, at 289. But see Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53
(1910), in which the supreme court noted that "[ilt is a principle very generally ac-
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Thus, historically, the dividing line between homicides that bar recov-
ery and those that do not has been drawn short of involuntary
manslaughter both by the North Carolina courts and courts in other
jurisdictions.
Several states have enacted statutes that deal expressly with this
problem, and, of course, in these jurisdictions the language of the stat-
ute controls.3 6 Although these statutes lack uniformity in describing the
acts that will bar recovery, 37 the courts, in interpreting them, generally
have agreed that they apply only to intentional killings.38
An additional issue raised where such statutes are in force is wheth-
er they are intended to abrogate the common law. Most courts have held
cepted that a beneficiary who has caused or procured the death of the insured under
circumstances amounting to a felony will be allowed no recovery on the policy." Id.
at 2, 67 S.E. at 53 (emphasis added). Apparently, this statement of the rule explains
the dictum in the court of appeals' opinion in Quick that Jill Quick could not have re-
covered on the policy if the statute had not superseded the common law. 23 N.C. App.
at 507, 209 S.E.2d at 325. However, the precise issue in Anderson was whether the
estate of a beneficiary could recover on a life insurance policy when the beneficiary mur-
dered the insured and committed suicide. Thus, for felonies other than murder, the rule
stated in Anderson is merely dictum. Moreover, as noted by Grossman in cases such
as Anderson, "the requirement that the homicide be wilful as well as felonious usually
appears more or less definitely from the language of the decisions as a whole." Gross-
man at 289. (emphasis added). See also Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245
Mass, 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923); Johnson v. Metropolitan Life, 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E.
865 (1919). In addition, where statutes simply require that the killing be felonious, the
courts have interpreted this to mean an intentional killing. E.g., Dowdell v. Bell, 477
P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970); accord, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163
N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curiam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969).
In Thompson, the court in interpreting a statute that disqualified a beneficiary who "fe-
loniously takes" the life of the insured, held that "the statute is meant to apply to those
wrongdoers who intentionally cause the wrong and not to those who have been negli-
gent." Id. at 557, 163 N.W.2d at 296; accord, Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), modified on other grounds, 182 F. Supp.
633 (D. Kan. 1960). See also Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808, 810-
11 (D. Ore. 1952).
36. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-
5 (1962); W. VA. CoDn ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966).
37. E.g., IowA CoDE ANN. § 633.536 (1964) (feloniously takes); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-5 (1962) (unlawfully kills). The South Carolina statute specifically exempts in-
voluntary manslaughter.
38. E.g., Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970) in which the court held that
although the word "intentionally" is not used in the Wyoming statute, the statute codifies
the common law, which historically was limited to intentional and felonious acts causing
the death of the insured. Id. at 172; accord, Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex.
166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1949); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547,
163 N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curiam, 395 U.S. 161
(1969). But cf. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918). At the time
of the Hamblin decision, however, the Kansas statute made conviction of any killing a
bar. Id. at 509, 175 P. at 678-79. The statute was amended to require a felonious kill-
ing which has been interpreted to mean an intentional homicide. Rosenberger v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), modified on other
grounds, 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960).
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that the statutes only supplement common-law rules and do not
supplant them.39 Thus, when the act of the beneficiary is not specifi-
cally barred by the statute, it is still possible to prohibit recovery if it
is shown that the beneficiary intended to kill the insured.40
A second problem encountered by courts when the beneficiary kills
the insured involves the admissibility and weight to be accorded the
record of the criminal conviction in the civil proceeding. As a general
rule of evidence, the judgment of conviction is neither admissible nor
conclusive.41 The reasons given by the courts for this rule of exclu-
sion include lack of mutuality,42 the fact that the record of convic-
tion is hearsay,43 and differences in the burdens of proof44 and in the
rules as to competency of witnesses in criminal and civil proceedings."
Thus, in the absence of a statute, a party seeking to bar a beneficiary
must produce evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing in
39. See, e.g., Keels v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931);
Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill,
115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934). But see Rose v. Rose, 79 N.M. 435, 444 P.2d
762 (1968).
40. See cases cited note 39 supra.
41. E.g., Beckworth v. Phillips, 6 Ga. App. 859, 65 S.E. 1075 (1909) (not con-
clusive); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301
(1922) (not admissible). The North Carolina cases follow this rule. E.g., Watters v.
Parrish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960); see cases cited in 1 D. STANSBuRY, NORTH
CAROLNA EVIDENCE § 143 (H. Brandis rev. 1973). There is an exception to this rule
when a convicted criminal attempts to profit from his crime in a civil action. In such
instances, some courts have held that a criminal conviction record is admissible, see, e.g.,
Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932), and others have held
that the judgment of conviction is conclusive. E.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130,
125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
42. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
(1968), appeal dismissed and cert. .denied per curtam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969); In-
terstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922). The
courts have held that there is no mutuality of estoppel because the defendant in the crim-
inal case could not have used an acquittal in the subsequent civil action. Clearly, it
is reasonable to deny giving conclusive effect to an acquittal in the civil proceeding, if
not to exclude it entirely, because of the differences in the burdens of proof and the
parties in the two proceedings. However, when the defendant has been convicted by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt after having a full opportunity to present his case, it
would seem both logical and convenient to allow the conviction at least to be used in
the civil case. Apparently, however, the courts in denying the use of the judgment of
conviction have found the desirability for preserving symmetry in the law more compel-
ling.
43. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curfam, 395 U.S. 161 (1969). See also 1 D.
STA 1sBURy, NoamH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 143 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
44. E.g., Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 127 S.E.2d 900 (1962); State v. Roach,
83 Kan. 606, 112 P. 150 (1910).
45. SPECIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 29; see Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 127
S.E.2d 900 (1962). See also Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156,
112 S.E. 301 (1922).
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order to establish a prima facie case.4"
Where statutes have been enacted their language controls the use
of the criminal conviction in the subsequent civil proceeding. If a stat-
ute does not require a criminal conviction in order to bar recovery, the
court in the civil case must itself determine whether the killer was guilty
of a proscribed homicide.47  In such instances, the criminal conviction
is not admissible to prove guilt for the same reasons applicable where
no statute is in effect.48  On the other hand, when the statute defines
a slayer as one who has been convicted of a wilful homicide, the
principle issue in the civil action is simply whether the person has been
so convicted. 49  As the court noted in Quick, where such statutes are
in effect, the record of the conviction is admissible in the civil action
"not to prove guilt, but to prove the conviction as a separate relevant
fact which would of itself bar the beneficiary from acquiring or retain-
ing the proceeds. 50
The court in Quick resolved many of the problems that arise when
a beneficiary takes the life of the insured. In many respects, the
opinion of the court merely reiterates well established common-law
rules. In particular, the holding that a criminal conviction record is not
admissible in a common-law civil proceeding is clearly supported by the
weight of authority in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions.5 '
Similarly, the holdings of the court that the statute applies only to inten-
tional homicides and was not intended to supplant the common law are
consistent not only with the legislative history of the statute52 but also
with the majority of decisions of other courts interpreting similar
statutes.53
However, the conclusion of the court that "culpable negligence" is
sufficient to bar recovery at common law marks an unprecedented
extension of the rule disqualifying a beneficiary who caused the death
46. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. at 58, 213 S.E.2d at 570. See
also Lillie v. Modem Woodmen, 89 Neb. 1, 130 N.W. 1004 (1911).
47. See 5 A. SCoTT, THE LAW oF TRUSTS § 492.4, at 3508 (3d ed. 1967).
48. SPEcuIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
49. Id. at 29-30; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 &E.
188 (1934).
50. 287 N.C. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569; accord, Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960), modifying 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan.
1959); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934). As
the court also notes in Quick, "evidence that the 'slayer' was not in fact guilty of the
crime would be both immaterial and inadmissible." 287 N.C. at 57, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
51. See cases cited note 41 supra.
52. 287 N.C. at 54-56, 213 S.E.2d at 568-69.
53. See cases cited notes 35, 38 & 39 supra.
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of the insured.54 The court cited no cases from North Carolina or other
jurisdictions supporting its conclusion. Instead, the court apparently
justified its holding on the basis of comments to the proposed act con-
tained in a report by the Special Drafting Committee of the General
Statutes Commission.re Specifically, the court seems to have relied on
the observation by the committee that "the fact that this Chapter covers
only certain acts of wrongful killing does not necessarily preclude other
wrongful acts from barring property rights by common law, such as
involuntary manslaughter or an acquitted killer in some cases."" The
court also quoted an article by Professor Bolich, a member of the Com-
mittee, in which he stated that "the fact that this chapter covers only
wilful and unlawful homicide does not necessarily preclude other
wrongful killings from barring property rights by common law, such as
an unintentional killing resulting from reckless disregard for human
life or during the commission of a felony. ' '1 7  Apparently, the court
inferred from the comments of the committee and the statement of Pro-
fessor Bolich that the common-law rule of North Carolina is that a bene-
ficiary convicted of involuntary manslaughter should not be allowed to
profit by his own wrong. Yet clearly, the purpose of these comments
was merely to insure that common-law remedies were preserved as to
acts not specifically provided under the statute. They are not ad-
dressed to the specific problem of what elements are necessary to
disqualify a beneficiary in a common-law proceeding and certainly do
not support the conclusion of the court that a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter alone is sufficient evidence to bar recovery of the
proceeds.
Moreover, other comments by the committee indicate that the better
public policy is simply to bar one who intentionally takes the life of
the insured. For example, in their comments on section 31A-3(1)a
the committee states that "[t]he requirement that the killing be wilful
and unlawful isn't the only possible rule, but does seem a fair policy
criterion."8 Furthermore, the opinion of the court contains a state-
54. See cases cited notes 30-32 supra.
55. [N.C.] GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT ON AN AcT TO BE
ENTITLED "Acs BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS" (1961). The members of the committee
were Fred B. McCall, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School; W.
Bryan Bolich, Professor of Law, Duke University Law School; and Norman A. Wiggins,
Professor of Law, Wake Forest College Law School. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 1.
56. SPEcIAL REPORT at 31, quoted at 287 N.C. at 55, 213 S.F_.2d at 568.
57. Bolich, supra note 22, at 221, quoted at 287 N.C. at 55-56, 213 S.E.2d at 568.
58. SPECIAL REPORT at 12 (emphasis added).
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ment by Professor Bolich that "this section utilizes the criterion adopted
by a majority of the statutes and common law decisions on the subject-
an intentional criminal homicide. As an expression of public policy it
seems a fair standard which requires the killing to be both unlawful
and wilful."5
While it is true that both these statements relate specifically to
the meaning of the word "slayer" as used in the statute, the statutory
requirement that the killing be wilful in order to bar the beneficiary
is an expression of the public policy of the state preventing one who
intentionally kills another from unjustly enriching himself through his
criminal act. It would seem, therefore, that the same policy and the
same test should govern a proceeding at common law. In sum, the hold-
ing of the court that culpable negligence will bar recovery is not only
unprecedented but also arguably contrary to the intent of the legislature
and the public policy of North Carolina as expressed in the statute.
Even if one accepts this unique holding of the court, the result
reached in Quick is certainly inequitable on the facts of the case. At
trial both parties stipulated that the only issue to be decided was whether
Jill Quick was barred from taking the proceeds under chapter 31A.s1
Arguably, this stipulation could be viewed as an agreement by the
parties that Jill Quick was to be disqualified as a slayer under the stat-
ute or not at all. That is, the stipulation could be interpreted as a
waiver by the plaintiff administratrix of any common-law. remedy.61 In
that case, Jill should have been allowed to recover the proceeds since
she was not a slayer under the court's interpretation of the statute. The
court, however, held that it was not bound by the stipulation since it
was one of law.6 2  While it is true that the parties cannot stipulate as
59. Bolich, supra note 22, at 193-94, quoted at 287 N.C. at 52-53, 213 S.E.2d at
567 (emphasis added).
60. 287 N.C. at 49, 213 S.E.2d at 564.
61. In Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 193 S.E.2d 79 (1972), the court stated:
"'[s]tipulations will receive a reasonable construction with a view to effecting the in-
tent of the parties; but in seeking the intention of the parties, the language used will
not be so construed as to give the effect of an admission of a fact obviously intended
to be controverted, or the waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished,
..' Id. at 380, 193 S.E.2d at 83 (emphasis added). See also J.L. Roper Lumber
Co. v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 137 N.C. 431, 49 S.E. 946 (1905).
If the parties had agreed that the stipulation was a waiver of the administratrix's
common law remedy, it seems that Jill would have objected to the trial court's second
conclusion of law on the grounds that it was contrary to the terms of the stipulation.
Thus, Quick's failure to object is evidence that there was no mutual intent that the stipu-
lation was to have the effect of a waiver of any common-law remedy.
62. 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
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to matters of law,63 they can limit the issues to be considered by relin-
quishing otherwise available rights.64 Thus, the manner in which the
court dispenses with the stipulation fails to give sufficient consideration
to the question whether the stipulation shows that the administratrix
intentionally waived any common-law remedy existing independent
of the statute.
Moreover, regardless of the legal effect of the stipulation, it is
evident from its terms that Jill was under the impression that the
"decisive question" was whether she was barred by the statute,"5 and
since the statute, contrary to the common law, made the conviction
record admissible, it is understandable that she failed to object.00
Furthermore, there was simply no way she reasonably could have
known that a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, even if admitted,
would have been sufficient to bar recovery since all the authorities indi-
cate that a person seeking a common-law remedy would have to prove
by the preponderance of evidence that she intentionally killed the
insured.67  Thus, the holding of the court that the record of the criminal
conviction though generally inadmissible was not only entitled to be
considered in the civil case but was also conclusive as to the issue
amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice.68
In conclusion, the supreme court in Quick v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Company provided "considerable guidance' in the resolution
of issues that often arise when a beneficiary of a life insurance policy
63. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 200 N.C. 300, 156 S.E. 806 (1931).
64. See Forbes v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1936).
65. 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
66. Moreover, it would not have been unreasonable for Jill Quick to have intro-
duced the conviction into evidence as a defense to her prosecution under the statute.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934).
67. See cases cited note 30 supra.
68. There are a few other explanations for the result reached by the court. First,
the court may have construed section 31A-15 to empower the courts to consider all the
circumstances of each case in determining whether the act of the defendant was the type
of unlawful killing that should prohibit recovery. That is, the legislature may have in-
tended that the courts adopt a "functional test," see Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105
F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1952), in deciding these cases under which "intent" would
be an important but not necessarily determinative factor. Although such a test would
introduce considerable uncertainty into this area of the law, it potentially would avoid
the undesirable results which could be reached by barring any beneficiary who has acted
in a culpably negligent manner in causing the death of the insured. Second, the court
may have viewed the verdict of involuntary manslaughter as a compromise or sympathy
verdict-Jill being in fact guilty of murder. However, the only significant fact from
which the court could draw such an inference was the severity of the sentence handed
down by the judge. Finally, the court may not have wished to remand the case for a
hearing on the question of intent or for a new trial because of the likelihood that a new
round of litigation would sevdrely deplete the insurance proceeds.
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takes the life of the insured. Unfortunately, the benefits gained
through such guidance are more than offset by the unjust manner in
which the court reached its final result. Besides the unfairness on the
peculiar facts of this case, the abandonment of the heretofore univer-
sally recognized common-law test of intent to kill has the potential for
producing results that most courts and commentators would find
inequitable. 9 For example, under the rule laid down by the court in
Quick, a son whose reckless driving caused the death of his father
would not be allowed to recover any insurance proceeds accruing as
a result of his father's death.
It is submitted that the court should have remanded the case for a
hearing to determine whether Jill Quick intentionally killed the in-
insured. In disposing of the case in this manner, the court could have
avoided setting an unwarranted and inequitable precedent in North
Carolina.
JOHN MULL GARDNER
Real Property-Implied Warranty: Seller of Land Limited by
Restrictive Covenants Implicitly Warrants That the Land Was
Usable for the Restricted Purpose
In a case of first impression and without appellate court precedent
in any other jurisdiction,' the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the venerable maxim that in a sale of land by deed there are no implied
warranties.2 By extending the implied warranty concept developed for
new home sales,3 the court created a new substantive right based on
69. E.g., Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1952).
1. Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102
(1975). But cf. Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (S. Ct.
1932) where it was held a landlord who specifically restricts the use of a leased premise
for one purpose guarantees the fitness of the premise for that particular purpose.
2. Huntley v. Waddell, 34 N.C. 33 (1851). In some states the prohibition against
implied warranties for real property is statutorily sanctioned. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 93.140 (1973). In these states it is unlikely that the decision of Hinson v. Jefferson,
287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) can be followed without statutory changes, implied
warranty cases for new homes notwithstanding. Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019
(1974) (en bane). For unlike the implied warranty in new home cases in which the
courts attempt to avoid merger and preserve the contractual obligations, the implied
warranty in Hinson is derived from the deed itself. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
3. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The case is analyzed
in Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quality in New Housing
Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 1090 (1975)
1976] 1097
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
implied warranty for lands covered by restrictive covenants. As formu-
lated in Hinson v. Jefferson,4 whenever a deed contains a restrictive
covenant that limits the use of conveyed property to one specific use, the
grantor implicitly warrants that the land conveyed was at the time of the
conveyance usable for the purpose to which it was specifically limited.
The decision is significant because it carves out a limited exception
to the doctrine of caveat emptor and thus provides greater protection for
the purchaser. The basis for the Hinson decision was not consumer
protection, however. The state supreme court was dissatisfied with the
vagaries of alternative restitutionary theories, such as mistake, particu-
larly in the light of the countervailing policy in favor of stability in
executed land sales. The Hinson warranty was thus created to ensure
greater certainty.5 An examination of the opinion reveals, however,
that failure by the court to discuss the substantive issues that inhere in
warranty actions could undermine its efforts.6
In 1971, "defendants sold a small parcel of land in rural Pitt County
to plaintiff, Mrs. Hinson, for $3,500.7 Contained within the deed
that conveyed the parcel were restrictive covenants that greatly limited
the use of the land. Foremost among these restrictions was the require-
ment that the land be used exclusively for residential purposes." Be-
cause the lot was not serviced by a municipal sewage system, Mrs.
Hinson applied to the Pitt County Health Department for the required
permit for the installation of a septic tank or an on-site sewage disposal
system.' Subsequent inspections by the Health Department and the
United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service dis-
closed that the lot purchased by Mrs. Hinson was only 2.6 feet above the
water level of the Black Swamp. Consequently, unless several hundred
thousand dollars were expended for channel improvements the lot could
and Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 11 WAKE
FoRsESr L REv. 155 (1975).
4. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
5. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 30-49 infra.
7. 287 N.C. at 424, 427, 215 S.E.2d at 104, 105.
8. Id. at 424-25, 215 S.E.2d at 104. In addition to restricting the parcel to
exclusively residential uses, according to the covenants no residence at all was permitted
on the parcel unless its construction cost exceeded $25,000. Id. at 424, 215 S.E.2d at
104. The deed prohibited the placing of trailers and mobile homes on the parcel. Id.
Similarly, subdividing the lot into smaller lots was also prohibited. Id. at 425, 215
S.E.2d at 104. Finally, prior to any construction the buyer was required to submit the
building plans and specifications to the defendants for their written approval. Id. at 424,
215 S.E.2d at 104.
9. Id. at 425-26, 215 S.E.2d at 105.
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not comply with septic tank or on-site sewage disposal regulations. 10
Neither the buyer nor the seller knew of the subterranean hydrologic
conditions of the lot."1 Unable to build because of these, conditions,
Mrs. Hinson attempted to rescind the deed. The trial court held for
defendants.1 2
The court of appeals refused to adopt plaintiffs implied warranty
theory13 but accepted the mutual mistake contention and reversed the
trial court.14 The court relied extensively on MacKay v. Mcintosh, 5 an
earlier North Carolina case in which a Florida realty company attempted
to specifically enforce an executory land contract made by its agent and
the buyer. The facts revealed, however, that prior to signing the
contract of sale the buyer advised the seller's agent that her sole purpose
for acquiring the property was to build a retail store. The agent assured
her that the property was zoned for business purposes when in fact the
local zoning ordinances prohibited business uses. The North Carolina
Supreme Court therefore accepted defendant's contention that both
parties acted on an honest mistake and rescinded the contract. 16 The
MacKay decision recognized, however, that generally a contract is bind-
ing and only when a mistake was of a material fact which formed the
basis of a contract could a contract be voided on the grounds of mutual
mistake.' 7
10. Id. at 426, 215 S.E.2d at 105.
11. Id. at 427, 215 S.E.2d at 105-06.
12. Id. at 427-28, 215 S.E.2d at 106.
13. Id. at 429, 215 S.E.2d at 107. At the appeals court it was contended that the
deed should be rescinded for either of two reasons. First, the terms and conditions of
the covenants restricting the use of the conveyed property to a single use gave rise to a
mutually dependent warranty on behalf of the grantor that the land was in fact usable
for its restricted purpose. Second, since neither party knew about the high watertable at
the time of the conveyance, a mutual mistake concerning the utility of the parcel had
occurred. Two other contentions, although not made, appear relevant. First plaintiff
could have argued that an existing impossibility at the outset of the transaction
invalidated the deed. See D. DOBBs, HANDnOOK ON THE LAW OF REmmDIEs 965-66
(1973). The impossibility theory, however, is subject to the same basic uncertainties as
the mistake cases, id. at 965, and would probably have been rejected by the supreme
court. Second, it could be argued that since it was impossible to comply with the
restrictive covenant and build the contemplated single family house, *the restrictions
should be removed to permit development of the land for some other purpose. See, e.g.,
Abate v. Hebert, 100 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). However, under this
approach purchasers can receive a windfall since presumably their purchase price
reflected the restricted use of the property. Thus the effect of this type of decision is to
give the buyer an unrestricted fee at restricted prices. Furthermore, if the property was
within a subdivision, removal of the covenant may adversely affect -the interests and
expectations of neighboring property owners.
14. Hinson v. Jefferson, 24 N.C. App. 231, 238-39, 210 S.3E.2d 498, 502-03 (1974).
15. 270 N.C. 69, 153 S.E.2d 800 (1967).
16. Id. at 73, 153 S.E.2d at 804.
17. Id.
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The state supreme court in Hinson replaced the mistake rationale
of the court of appeals with a warranty theory. The court feared that
the mistake doctrine was too uncertain a standard to rescind a complet-
ed land transaction.18 Recent writings and cases lend support to this
fear. One commentator has observed that in any mistake case the
several factors' 9 used by the courts may point toward different results,
and one factor although important in one case may be ignored in
another. Consequently neither lawyer nor judge can be assured what
factors will be decisive in a particular case. 20  Even when a definite
standard is developed, it is difficult to apply. In MacKay, it will be
recalled, the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that the sine qua
non for applying the mistake doctrine was that the mistake form the
basis of the contract.2 Although easily stated, in practice this test is
extremely difficult to apply. Differentiating between basic and collat-
eral matters is highly subjective. The Michigan Supreme Court, for
example, refused to apply the mistake doctrine in A&M Land Develop-
ment Co. v. Miller, even though nearly one-half of the ninety-one lots
purchased were unsuitable for septic tanks, the only available form of
sewage disposal.22 The court simply held that the buyer received the
property for which he contracted.2 1 Generally, when the courts apply
the mistake doctrine their decisions are predicated on their perceptions
about culpability, assumption of risk, and the relative hardships to the
parties.24 Although this balancing approach may reach an equitable
result in a particular case it fails to provide any guidance to the seller or
the purchaser.2 5 In the Hinson case this uncertainty was, in the judg-
ment of the supreme court, fatal to the mistake cause of action.
In contrast, a warranty action minimizes the discretionary judg-
ment of the courts, and therefore increases the control the parties have
over their own transaction. As applied in Hinson the warranty of
fitness is coextensive with the restrictive covenant of the deed.20  Thus,
the legal obligations of the parties are defined by the provisions of the
deed executed by the parties rather than by retrospective and unpredict-
18. 287 N.C. at 430-33, 215 S.E.2d at 108-09.
19. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
20. Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in
Bargain Transactions, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1967).
21. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
22. 354 Mich. 681, 94 N.W.2d 197 (1959).
23. Id. at 694, 94 N.W.2d at 203.
24. D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 723-32.
25. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
26. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
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able judicial analysis of factors such as culpability, unjust enrichment, or
relative hardship. Another advantage of the Hinson opinion is the
lighter evidentiary burden required to sustain a warranty action. Gen-
erally, plaintiffs in a warranty action must prove only: (1) the exist-
ence of a warranty; (2) the scope of the warranty; and (3) that the
breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss.27 By
contrast, because the mistake cases are based on subjective evaluations,
the evidence required to prevail is much greater. This does not mean,
however, that the warranty doctrine applied in Hinson removes all
factual disputes. One very important but difficult element critical to the
buyer's cause of action under the Hinson rationale is proving that at the
time of the conveyance the property was unusable for its restricted
purpose. If either the seller or the purchaser had actually known the
physical condition of the lan($ at the time of the conveyance, the
transaction undoubtedly would not have occurred in its present form.
The passage of substantial periods of time between the conveyance and
actual development will exacerbate the problem of proof.28
The major difficulty with a warranty action and the Hinson deci-
sion in particular is not evidentiary but substantive. The decision leaves
too many important warranty issues unresolved. Moreover, since
the opinion departs substantially from previous statutory and case analo-
gies,29 these analogies are inadequate guides to resolve these issues
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1965), Comment 13.
28. The evidentiary problem was not at issue in Hinson; the Court determined that
the physical conditions existed at the date of the conveyance. 287 N.C. at 426, 215
S.E.2d at 105. The evidentiary problem is closely related to selecting an appropriate
statute of limitations. This problem has troubled many commentators discussing the
implied warranty in new home cases. Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of
Workmanlike Quality in New Housing Sales: New Protection for the North Carolina
Homebuyer, 53 N.C.L Rnv. 1090, 1094 n.28 (1975). Generally, the duration of the
warranty adopted by the courts in the new home area has been a case by case test of
reasonableness. Id. at n.30. Although the types of defects in the Hinson context are less
numerous than in new home construction (see text accompanying note 40 infra), none-
theless, the reasonableness standard is preferable to some fixed period. The reason for
this lies with the nature of the product. Unlike goods which are used immediately after
purchase, realty is sometimes acquired for future use and defects cannot be determined
until later.
29. There are at least three analogous warranties. First, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-
315 (1965) provides:
[wihere the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
The second is the implied warranty of workmanlike quality for new homes. Hartley v.
Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974). Finally, a third analogy is the
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without further court elaboration. In this respect the Hinson decision
suffers from the same lack of guidance the court found so objectionable
in the mistake cases.
The first serious omission in the Hinson decision was the court's
failure to delineate a standard for determining what conditions consti-
tute a breach of warranty. Because the land in Hinson was totally
unusable in any practical sense for its restricted use,30 it was clear that if
a warranty existed at all, it was breached. Suppose however, the
contemplated use was not frustrated but instead was $3,000 more costly
to achieve. Would this constitute a breach of warranty under Hinson?
Similarly, suppose the land was restricted to both single and multifamily
housing, and later it was learned that the land was only suitable for
single family housing. Clearly the value of the land is worth less, but
does this constitute a breach of an implied warranty? Although the
Hinson decision is silent about these circumstances, it hints at a strict
standard of liability. First, unlike analogies from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code"1 and implied warranties for new homes,32 where it is
inferred that the businessman has superior knowledge on which the
consumer relies, neither the seller nor the buyer had knowledge of the
hydrologic conditions03 in Hinson. Apparently, the court believed, as
between two innocent parties, the party who imposed the restriction
ought to bear the risks that are attributable to the restrictions. Second,
in contrast to Hartley v. Ballou3 4 and its kindred cases, 35 the Hinson
decision omits language limiting the scope of liability. Whenever the
courts have resorted to implied warranties and imposed liability in the
past, as in the case of defective new home construction, they have
carefully circumscribed the scope of liability.36 For example, in Hartley
the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically held that the implied
landlord's implied warranty of habitability. See Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALiF. L. Ray. 1444 (1974).
30. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-315 (1965); Covington & Medved, The Implied
Warranty of Fitness for A Particular Purpose: Some Persistent Problems, 9 GA. L. REv.
149, 151 (1975).
32. Commentary, Real Property-Implied Warranties-Sale of House by Builder-
Vendor Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24 ALA. L. REv. 332,
335 (1972).
33. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
34. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
35. See generally Annot., 25 A.L'R.3d 383, 413-15 (1969).
36. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) the Idaho Supreme
Court held "[t]he implied warranty of fitness does not impose upon the builder an
obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without defects. . . ." Id. at
68, 415 P.2d at 711.
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warranty fell short of an absolute guarantee.a7 Therefore, in North
Carolina liability for new home construction is imposed only when
there is a breach of workmanlike quality."8 In other states habita-
bility39 and reasonableness standards4" are used to limit liability.
These limitations are, however, based on policy considerations which
are inapplicable to the Hinson land purchase context. The courts, for
example, have recognized that there are too many considerations in-
volved with housing construction and maintenance to require a builder-
vendor or a landlord to build or rent a perfect house and that an
absolute standard of liability would be unreasonable.41 By contrast, the
concern in Hinson is unidimensional- whether the parcel is suitable to
accommodate the restricted use--and as such, the seller can more easily
avoid liability. Another important policy difference between Hartley
and Hinson is the disparate transactional impact of the two decisions.
Since the courts are involved with the indispensable commodity of
shelter when deciding housing warranty cases, their decisions are likely
to have broad societal consequences. For example, unreasonable court
requirements could discourage housing construction, encourage disin-
vestment in housing, or increase drastically the cost of housing to
consumers. However, since the fact situation in Hinson occurs less
frequently, its probable impact is slight. Therefore, in this situation the
courts should be willing to include lesser impairments within the protec-
tive scope of the warranty.
Finally, a stricter standard of liability is consistent with the remedi-
al flexibility provided by a warranty action.42 Unlike the Hobbesian all-
or-nothing choice of the mistake cases where the remedy is generally
37. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev., 479 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Mo. 1972) (en
bane).
41. For a listing of the multitudinous types of defects that can occur in new home
construction, see Commentary, Real Property-Implied Warranties--Sale of House by
Builder-Vendor Creates an Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 24 ALA. I
RaV. 332, 338-39 n.30 (1972). In the landlord-tenant field, although the landlord is not
liable for all defects, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974), certain general principles have emerged for imposing
liability on landlords. When defects deprive tenants of essential services, such as
bathing, sleeping, and eating, liability is imposed. Similarly, liability is upheld when
tenants are exposed to hazardous conditions which would result in tort liability if injury
actually occurred. Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1444, 1455-62 (1974).
42. For a discussion about the advantages of a warranty action and when a
landowner may want damages instead of rescission, see Skillern, Implied Warranties in
Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER LJ. 387, 391-93 (1967).
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limited to rescission,"3 damages are an available alternative in a breach
of warranty action." Thus, in other fact patterns, in which the hard-
ship to the buyer is less severe than in Hinson, the courts can avoid the
difficulties45 of rescission and subsequent changes in property records by
giving the buyer either the difference between the market value as
implicitly warranted and the market value in its actual condition or the
amount of money required to bring the property into compliance with
the implied warranty."
The second major shortcoming of the Hinson decision related to the
issue of liability is uncertainty about the right of the buyer and seller to
exclude the implied warranty. Nowhere in the decision is this problem
discussed. However, if the court applied the Uniform Commercial
Code warranty of fitness analogy to the restrictive covenant warranty,
then clearly a waiver clause is permissible. The code expressly pro-
vides a simple procedure for excluding implied warranties.47 However,
despite the obvious statutory parallel, the case law is hostile to waiver
clauses. In new housing sales this hostility is evidenced by restrictive
interpretation given to waiver clauses. 4" The courts are even more
adamantly opposed to waiver clauses in cases involving landlords' im-
plied warranty of habitability. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has held that a tenant does not waive the protection of an implied
warranty even when he accepts a patently defective premise for reduced
monthly rental payments.49 Whether this reasoning will be followed by
43. See 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1542 (3d ed. 1970).
44. See Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 63, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
45. Id. at 490, 219 S.E.2d at 194; see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
46. Cf. Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 63, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316(3)(a) (1965) provides: ". . . [AIIU implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like as is, with all faults, or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty .... "
48. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1101, 449 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1970);
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
49. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d, 160 (1973). In Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925(1970), Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625 n.9, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 n.9, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 n.9 (1974), and Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973), explicit waiver clauses were not enforced by the courts.
The decisions are based on two reasons. The Javins decision, for example, relied on the
landlords' independent statutory duty imposed by the housing code to provide tenants
with habitable premises as the basis for its opinion. Viewed in this context the
prohibition against waiver clauses merely illustrates the principle that private parties can
not by agreement remove a statutory duty. See Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C.&St. L.
Ry., 96 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899). Another reason which is given to support the
court's determination that a tenant may not waive the implied warranty of habitability
centers on the adverse societal impact of renting substandard housing. Foisy v. Wyman,
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North Carolina courts in the Hinson land purchase context is uncer-
tain.50 It would be anomalous, however, for the court to create a
warranty right based on a policy of stability and then allow the buyer
and seller to easily undermine this policy. For if the mere inclusion of a
waiver clause can protect sellers from an implied warranty action,
buyers would have no choice but to sue on a mistake theory, and thus
reintroduce the uncertainty the court attempted to prevent.
The third critical issue for a warranty action left unanswered by the
Hinson decision is deciding which individuals are protected by the
warranty. Traditionally, North Carolina has taken a restrictive attitude
towards privity.51 In Hartley, for example, the implied warranty of
workmanship protected only the "initial vendee." 52  hi Hinson, how-
ever, the warranty of the grantor extends to the initial grantee and any
subsequent grantees through mesne conveyances.5 3 The reason for this
departure from past precedent is not discussed in the opinion. More
importantly, it is unclear whether the court truly intends to protect all
subsequent buyers. For example, the implied warranty does not
protect a buyer with knowledge. The decision therefore fails to pro-
vide a framework for determining when privity should be extended to
subsequent grantees.
A solution for obviating this confusion is for the court in future
cases firmly to equate the Hinson warranty to privity decisions under
restrictive covenant law. 4 Apparently, the supreme court had this in
mind when it held that the restrictive covenants in Hinson ran with the
land.5 5  The advantage of such a holding is twofold. First it would
provide lawyers with a readily identifiable area of the law from which
83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164-65. Whether these policies can be used to extend
the prohibition against waiving implied warranties to other areas is uncertain. Pappas v.
Hershberger, 85 Wash. 2d 152, 530 P.2d 642 (1975) (per curiam) (en banc).
50. The North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that implied warranties do
not protect buyers from patent defects or from reasonably ascertainable facts. Hinson v.
Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 436, 215 S.E.2d 102, 111.
51. See, e.g., Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753
(1964); Byrd & Dobbs, Torts Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 906,
936-38 (1965).
52. 286 N.C. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
53. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
54. See, e.g., Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949).
55. 287 N.C. at 424, 215 S.E.2d at 104. It is not clear, however, whether
characterizing the covenants in Hinson as running with the land is correct. In Julian v.
Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 440, 82 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1954), the court held that a covenant
providing among other things that no building should be erected unless approved by the
grantor or by an architect selected by him was a covenant personal to the grantor.
Accord, Chappell v. Winslow, 144 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1944).
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they can delimit the warranty obligations. Second, because restrictive
covenants that run with the land cannot be altered by subsequent
buyers5 absent court assistance,"1 it is only equitable that the original
grantor who imposed the restriction be held liable.
Although the Hinson decision has left many important questions
unanswered and therefore has undermined the efforts of the court to
achieve stability in the land market, nevertheless, the problems are not
insurmountable and future decisions along the lines suggested can
achieve the desired objectives of the court. However, the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court's novel decision in Hinson v. Jefferson does reflect an
increasing willingness on behalf of the court to use implied warranties to
protect purchasers of real property. Moreover, the decision may fore-
shadow future expansion of the implied warranty doctrine to other
areas, such as landlord tenant relations.
IRA J. BOTVINICK
Security Interests-Garagemen's Liens and Duress of Goods
The doctrine that an artisan who enhances the value of a chattel
at the request of its owner has a lien on that chattel for his reasonable
charges is deeply rooted in the common law.' Equally venerable is
the concept of duress of goods, a rule that protects an individual who
finds himself coerced in some fashion through the wrongful seizure or
detention of his property.' These two principles are similar in that
each finds its application in a bailment of goods situation. 3 In Adder
v. Holman & Moody, Inc.,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court was pre-
sented with a question that involved an interplay between the two
concepts: whether duress of goods was perpetrated when a garageman
insisted that an owner-bailor sign a document purporting to waive all
defenses based on poor workmanship before the garageman relin-
quished an automobile on which he had made repairs. The court, in
56. Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 431, 20 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1942).
57. E.g., Muilenburg v. Blevins, 262 N.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 493 (1955).
1. R. BRowN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.1, at 394-95 (3d ed. 1975);
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.2, at 873 (1965).
2. This concept had its origin in the early eighteenth century. See note 23 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 23-35 infra.
4. 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
[Vol. 541106
GARAGEMAN'S LIENS
finding no duress of goods, determined that the garageman had a valid
lien on the car for the amount owing for services rendered. The court
then held that although the owner-bailor had waived certain defenses
by signing the document, he could still bring an affirmative suit.5
Adder was an action to recover damages for injuries allegedly
resulting from defendant's negligence and breach of implied warranty
in rebuilding plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff James B. Adder entered
into a contract with defendant that provided that defendant would
convert plaintiff's 1971 Maverick automobile into a vehicle suitable for
use on a drag strip or race track. By the time of the completion of
the work, plaintiff had paid defendant approximately 10,000 dollars.
Of this sum, twenty-five hundred dollars was borrowed from a bank
by plaintiff, and defendant co-signed the bank note. Upon delivery of
the automobile, defendant received plaintiff's personal check for
$1538.03, the balance due on the contract. The check, however, was
not honored due to insufficient funds. Several weeks later, as plaintiff
was warming up the car for a race, the engine "blew." Plaintiff re-
turned the automobile to defendant and requested that defendant
determine the trouble.
A few weeks after the incident, plaintiff asked defendant for the
automobile but was told that it would not be released until plaintiff
tendered the amount due on the contract and also paid the bank note
endorsed by defendant. After telephone negotiations between the
parties' attorneys, plaintiff went to defendant's place of business with
a certified check to pay the note. Defendant, however, refused to
return the car unless provisions were made regarding the balance due;
plaintiff subsequently agreed to pay the balance in several weeks.
Defendant then telephoned its lawyer, who dictated a promissory note6
and a second instrument referred to by the parties as a "release,"7
which attempted to limit entirely defendant's liability.8 Plaintiff signed
5. This latter finding was the subject of a dissenting opinion. See text accom-
panying notes 47-53 infra.
6. The text of this note is found in 288 N.C. at 487-88, 219 S.E.2d at 193.
7. Id. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
8. The text of the instrument is as follows:
This will acknowledge my indebtedness of $1538.03 representing the bal-
ance due for labor and parts to finish my drag race car and that I have no
defenses or set-offs against such indebtedness grounded upon poor workman-
ship or other objections.
In consideration for an extension of time until August 10, 19-72, I agree
to execute and deliver to you my promissory note in the amount of $1538.03
and further agree that should I fail to pay by August 10, 1972, and you are
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both documents and later testified that he had read and understood the
writings before signing them and that he did not contact his attorney
because the latter was in court at the time.'
The trial judge, at the close of testimony, ruled that the "release"
was binding and dismissed plaintiff's action. 0 The court of appeals
reversed the dismissal,1 holding that plaintiff had been the victim of
a scheme of duress designed to exact a release that would free defend-
ant from liability. The supreme court similarly refused to dismiss the
complaint, 2 but on different grounds. The court found the elements
necessary for duress of goods to be absent because defendant's garage-
man's lien, which the court of appeals had thought to be extinguished,
was still in existence. 3 The court, however, found the instrument's
waiver provisions ambiguous, construed the "release" against the de-
fendant-drafter, and concluded that plaintiffs affirmative suit for negli-
gence and breach of warranty was not barred.' 4
Duress of goods is but one component of the larger doctrine of
economic duress.' 5 "Duress is a form of coercion. . . . [which] usually
involves the transfer of money or property as a result of that coer-
cion."' 6  Although its limits are not clear,'" the doctrine may be
employed, for example, by the coerced party in a suit to void a transfer
or a contract,'8 or it may furnish an affirmative defense in a suit brought
to enforce a transaction.' 9 Duress is related to and sometimes confused
required to turn this note over to an attorney for collection, I will pay reason-
ably [sic] attorney fees.
I further agree that in the event that you should undertake suit against
me on the note, I will not plead any defenses against payment of same.
Signed: JAMES B. ADDER
Id. at 487, 219 S.E.2d at 193.
9. Id. at 486, 219 S.E.2d at 192.
10. Id. at 488, 219 S.E.2d at 193. Judgment was also entered on defendant's
counterclaim, plaintiff being required to pay defendant the amount due on the contract
plus interest. Id. at 489, 219 S.E.2d at 194.
11. 25 N.C. App. 588, 214 S.E.2d 227 (1975).
12. 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d (1975) (two justices dissented).
13. Id. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195; see text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
14. Id. at 493, 219 S.E.2d at 196; see text accompanying notes 47-53 infra.
15. See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1942).
16. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.2, at 655 (1973); see
Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1971).
17. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MiCH. L. Rnv.
253, 288-89 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
19. See, e.g., People ex rel. Carpentier v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 17 I11. 2d
214, 161 N.E.2d 318 (1959); Gallagher Switchboard Corp. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 34
Misc. 2d 256, 229 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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with the doctrines of fraud and undue influence. The victim of duress
is fully aware that he is being coerced to act contrary to his will. The
victim of fraud, however, does not know that he is the object of wrong-
ful action, for "[firaud rests upon deception by misrepresentation or
concealment. '20  The distinguishing feature of undue influence is the
fiduciary relationship of the parties, with one party trusting and relying
on the judgment of the other. Undue influence is exerted when the
dominant party uses his position of trust to affect the judgment of the
dependent party, who, like the fraud victim, is unaware of any wrong-
doing.2 ' Undue influence may therefore exist when the conduct falls
short of duress. 22
"Duress of goods" is the label applied when economic duress is
attempted or accomplished through the seizure or detention of an-
other's personal property."3 In order to establish duress of goods
under North Carolina law, it must be shown that (1) the person who
has seized or detained the property has done so wrongfully, and (2)
the owner of the property has been compelled to act in a way that oper-
ated to deprive him of "free will."''z  The courts, in determining the
existence of duress of goods, will look beyond the form of the transac-
tion to all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 5
Duress of goods will not be found by the North Carolina courts
when personal property is withheld from its owner by means of a valid
lien, because the requirement of wrongful seizure or detention is not
met.2 Such is the case when the possessor is a garageman or other arti-
san with a lien27 on the property. At common law a garageman has "a
20. 278 N.C. at 191, 179 S.E.2d at 703.
21. Edwards v. Bowden, 107 N.C. 58, 62-63, 12 S.E. 58, 59 (1890).
22. 278 N.C. at 191, 179 S.E.2d at 703.
23. Originally at common law, relief was restricted to those situations in which
duress took the form of physical violence, imprisonment, or threats of such action. See
Dawson, supra note 17, at 254. In the early eighteenth century it was recognized that
economic pressure as well could constitute duress, and the first such pressure acknowl-
edged as duress was the wrongful detention of another's property, which was termed
"duress of goods." See Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B.
1732).
24. Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1965); Smithwick v.
Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 371, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (1910). The concept of "free will" has
long been criticized as being of little analytical value. See, e.g., Dalzell, supra note 15,
at 238-40; Dawson, supra note 17, at 266-67.
25. See Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 67 S.F. 913 (1910).
26. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
27. It is necessary to distinguish artisans' liens--of which the garagemen's lien is
one type-from "mechanics' liens." The latter term is more commonly employed to re-
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possessory interest in a vehicle left in his care by the owner or legal
possessor and in which he has invested labor and materials. '28  North
Carolina General Statutes section 44A-2(d) codified this common law
lien. 29 The power of a garageman to enforce his lien by sale of the
motor vehicle, a right unavailable at common law,30 is granted by North
Carolina General Statutes section 44A-4.s1 Possession of the motor
vehicle is essential to the lien,32 and two rules relating to possession
that had long been part of the case law are now statutory:38 (1) the
fer to security interests in real property, the word "mechanic" being used in its older
sense to mean "laborer." See R. BROWN, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 393. Liens on real
property are governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-7 to -24 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
28. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 648 (M.D.N.C. 1975). Artisans' liens in
North Carolina also have a constitutional basis. N.C. CoNST. art. X, § 3 instructs the
General Assembly to "provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanics and laborers
an adequate lien on the subject-matter of their labor." Provisions for liens on personal
property are contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-1 to -6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Any person who repairs, services, tows, or stores motor vehicles in the or-
dinary course of his business pursuant to an express or implied contract with
an owner or legal possessor of the motor vehicle has a lien upon the motor
vehicle for reasonable charges for such repairs, servicing, towing, or storing.
This lien shall have priority over perfected and unperfected security interests.
30. 1 L. JONES, THE LAw OF LIENS §§ 11, 1033, 1038 (3d ed. 1914).
31. The original provisions of section 44A-4 enabled sale of the property to
be accomplished without affording the owner the opportunity for notice and a hear-
ing to determine judicially the validity of the underlying debt. These provisions
were held to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because "actual
[permanent] dispossession" of the personalty was possible without notice or hearing.
Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The Caesar decision is primarily
based on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), which "make it clear that due process requires notice and a prior
hearing before property may be taken from a debtor." 387 F. Supp. at 649. The statute
was amended to comply with the Caesar ruling. Act of May 29, 1975, ch. 438, § 1,
[1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 436-39.
The statutes that provide for the existence of artisans' liens, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
44A-2 & -3 (Cum. Supp. 1975), survived that same due process attack in Caesar. The
district court termed the lien "a balancing of the interests between ownership rights and
the right of a craftsman to have security for payment for his service," and held, on the
basis of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), that "interim retention" of
the property without fulfilling notice and hearing requirements was not unconstitutional.
387 F. Supp. at 648, 649.
32. See Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
When lien arises and terminates.-Liens conferred under this article
arise only when the lienor acquires possession of the property and terminate
and become unenforceable when the lienor voluntarily relinquishes the posses-
sion of the property upon which a lien might be claimed, or when an owner,
his agent, a legal possessor or any other person having a security or other in-
terest in the property tenders prior to sale the amount secured by the lien plus
reasonable storage, boarding and other expenses incurred by the lienor. The
reacquisition of possession of property voluntarily relinquished shall not rein-
state the lien.
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lienor loses his possessory lien if he voluntarily surrenders possession
of the property to the bailor,34 and (2) once the lien is lost by volun-
tary surrender of possession, it cannot be reinstated by subsequent
reacquisition.3 5
Thus, the issue of possession was crucial to the validity of the lien
in Adder. The court of appeals found the defendant's refusal to return
the car "wrongful" because its lien had been terminated by the previous
surrender of the car.16  Although seeming to comport with the statutes
concerning possessory liens, the court of appeals committed a glaring
error, for it ignored precedent nearly a half-century old which defined
voluntary surrender of possession. In Reich v. Triplett,37 a situation
almost identical to the one in Adder, a check was tendered to a garage-
man for the full amount owed for repairs on an automobile and the
vehicle was surrendered but the check was returned for insufficient
funds. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the garageman's
lien still existed, for in those circumstances possession was not surren-
dered "voluntarily and unconditionally" as required. 8  In Adder the
supreme court correctly applied Reich, held the lien to be valid, and
thus found absent an essential element of duress of goods: wrongful
possession of the property.3
This analysis by the supreme court was all that was necessary to
find that plaintiff's signing of the "release" was a "voluntary adjustment
of a dispute" and not duress of goods.4" Unfortunately, the court con-
34. See, e.g., Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957); Tedder v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 124 N.C. 342, 32 S.E. 714 (1899); Block v.
Dowd, 120 N.C. 402, 27 S.E. 129 (1897).
35. See, e.g., Barbre-Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d
381 (1957); Block v. Dowd, 120 N.C. 402, 27 S.E. 129 (1897).
It is possible for a garageman to deliver the motor vehicle to its owner under an
agreement that preserves the lien. However, such a preserved lien is one created by con-
tract and does not arise by operation of law. See Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson,
247 N.C. at 148, 100 S.E.2d at 385. A contractual lienholder does not have the statu-
tory assurance that his lien will have priority over perfected and unperfected security
interests. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (set forth in note 29 supra);
see Lee, Liens on Personal Property Not Governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
44 N.C.L. Rnv. 322, 330-31 (1966).
36. 25 N.C. App. at 591, 214 S.E.2d at 229.
37. 199 N.C. 678, 155 S.E. 573 (1930). The court of appeals correctly cited
Reich for the proposition that "[plossession is necessary to the existence of the lien."
25 N.C. App. at 591, 214 S.E.2d at 229.
38. 199 N.C. at 682, 155 S.E. at 575. The court relied on Maxton Auto Co. v.
Rudd, 176 N.C. 497, 97 S.E. 477 (1918), in which payment was stopped on a check
tendered to a garageman and the court used an estoppel theory to reinstate the lien. Id.
at 499, 97 S.E. at 478.
39. 288 N.C. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
40. Id. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
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fused the problem by engaging in an unnecessary discussion of whether
the parties were "on equal footing."41 The relationship of the parties,
particularly if it is a fiduciary one, is probative of the issue of whether
the second element of duress of goods-the deprivation of the victim's
"free will"-is present. 2  Even if the parties had been found to be
on unequal footing, and they were not,4" the absence of the element
of wrongful possession alone would mean that there could be no
duress of goods. The court seemed to say that, even if there is rightful
possession by the bailee, a showing that he took advantage of an
unequal relationship would support a finding of duress of goods.44
Such a view is at odds with the court's affirmance of the two necessary
elements of duress of goods (wrongful possession and subversion of
"free will") 45 and is clearly incorrect. A finding of wrongdoing based
solely on the abuse of an unequal relationship or of a position of trust
is not duress of goods but rather undue influence."
Although duress of goods was found not to be present, the court's
final disposition of the case turned on an interpretation of the "release"
signed by plaintiff.47  The court found certain language to be ambigu-
ous and construed it against the defendant-drafter. This language in
the release acknowledged plaintiff's indebtedness and further stated
that plaintiff had "no defenses or set-offs against such indebtedness
grounded upon poor workmanship or other objections."'48 The court
held that the writing only limited plaintiff's defenses or set-offs in the
event defendant sued plaintiff for the amount due on the note that
plaintiff contemporaneously executed and had no effect on plaintiffs
claims based on negligence or implied warranty.49 The serious diffi-
41. Id. at 491, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
42. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967); Ingram v. Lewis,
37 F.2d 259, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1930); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 711 (1931).
43. 288 N.C. at 491, 219 S.E.2d at 195. The court placed great emphasis on the
fact that plaintiff had counsel but chose to act without seeking his advice. Some courts
have ruled that there can be no duress if the victim had an opportunity to consult with
an attorney. See, e.g., Alloy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 302 F.2d 528, 530-31 (Ct.
CI. 1962); Smith v. Lenchner, 204 Pa. Super. 500, 504, 205 A.2d 626, 628 (1964);
Oremus v. Wynhoff, 20 Wis. 2d 635, 641, 123 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1963).
44. 288 N.C. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
45. Id. at 490, 219 S.E.2d at 194; see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. See generally D. DonBs, supra note
16, § 10.3, at 672-74.
47. See note 8 supra for the text of this instrument.
48. 288 N.C. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 196.
49. Id. at 493, 219 S.E.2d at 196.
[Vol. 541112
GARAGEMAN'S LIENS
culty presented by this holding was the basis of the dissent,50 which
found such a reading of the document to be "impermissible and totally
illogical." 51
The final result in Adder is not sound for the reason cited in the
dissent: those defenses determined by the court to have been waived
by plaintiff are the very subjects of his affirmative suit, an action that
the court permitted to be brought.52 Had defendant brought suit first,
the negligence and warranty claims, since they arose out of the same
transaction, would have been compulsory set-offs and counterclaims.5 3
As such they would have been disallowed by the language in the instru-
ment as interpreted by the court. The court has thus imparted a
schizophrenic quality to the negligence and warranty claims, a trait that
is wholly devoid of any logical basis.
Both the supreme court and the court of appeals had the protec-
tion of the consumer in mind in their treatments of the case. The
difference between the opinions is in the tools chosen to achieve that
aim. The court of appeals reached the desired result through an appli-
cation of the duress of goods doctrine, while the higher court, in a
slightly more sophisticated fashion, employed contract interpretation.
The reasoning of each court, however, is equally incorrect. Plaintiff
Adder, although forced to scratch at the drag strip, won the supreme
court-sponsored race to the courthouse and the spoils of victory were
his warranty and negligence claims.
CHARLES B. WAYNE
50. Chief Justice Sharp wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Copeland
joined. Id.
51. Id. at 495, 219 S.E.2d at 198.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 495, 219 S.E.2d at 197. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
Compulsory Counterclaims.-A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudi-
cation the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdic-
tion. But the pleader need not state the claim if
(1) At the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action, or
(2) The opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any
counterclaim under this rule.
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Sovereign Immunity-Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations
Operating Public Hospitals in North Carolina: Sides v. Cabarrus
Memorial Hospital
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as first declared by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Moffitt v. City of Asheville' in 1889,
and as more recently affirmed by the court in Steelman v. City of New
Bern,2 municipal corporations enjoy immunity from suit in tort if the
tortious conduct complained of arose from the exercise of their govern-
mental function.3 However, there is no immunity from suit if the
municipal corporation caused the alleged tort while functioning in its
private or proprietary capacity.4 The judicial classification of the vari-
ous activities undertaken by municipal corporations as either govern-
mental .or proprietary is therefore crucial to the tort plaintiff seeking
damages from such entities under North Carolina law. In Sides v.
Cabarrus Memorial Hospital5 the North Carolina Supreme Court
confronted for the first time the question whether the construction,
maintenance, and operation of a hospital by a county or a city is a gov-
ernmental or proprietary function. In holding that it was a proprietary
function, 6 and thus one in which the county or city was subject to
unlimited liability in tort, the court followed the modern trend of
restricting the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal
corporations.7
1. 103 N.C. 237, 254, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889). See text accompanying notes 32-
33 infra.
2. 279 N.C. 589, 592-93, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1971). The plaintiff in Steel-
man urged the court to completely abrogate the doctrine as applied to municipal corpo-
rations. He contended that the court was the appropriate body to do so since it had
originally adopted the doctrine in North Carolina. The court refused to accept this
challenge; instead it affirmed the historical approach taken in Moffitt and deferred any
modifications or abrogations of the doctrine to the General Assembly. Id. at 594-95,
1894 S.E.2d at 242-43.
3. For a definition of a "governmental function" and a full discussion of the sub-ject see notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra. The N.C. General Assembly has au-
thorized municipal corporations to waive their immunity under specific circumstances.
N.C. GN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1974), allows municipal corporations to waive their tort
immunity for the operation of motor vehicles by purchasing liability insurance. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (1974), which is set forth in note 17 infra, permits a county
to waive its immunity in tort by purchasing liability insurance coverage. Under both
sections the waiver is only to the extent of such coverage.
4. For a definition of "proprietary function" and a more detailed discussion of
the subject see notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra.
5. 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
6. Id. at 24-25, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
7. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text infra.
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Plaintiff in Sides was the administrator of the estate of Mrs. Terry
Compton Sides. He instituted suit against Cabarrus Memorial Hos-
pital and others,8 alleging negligence in the treatment and care of
the intestate which resulted in her personal injury and wrongful death.9
His claims against the hospital were based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Defendant hospital moved under rules 12(b)(1), (2) and
(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the com-
plaint. 10 It argued that Cabarrus Memorial Hospital was an agency of
the State of North Carolina, separate and apart from Cabarrus
County," and that therefore the North Carolina Tort Claims Act 2
8. The named defendants were: Cabarrus Memorial Hospital; Drs. J. Vincent
Arey and John R. Ashe, Jr., and their employer Cabarrus Clinic for Women P.A.; path-
ologists Drs. J.O. Williams and William J. Reeves; and nurse Nancy E. Deason. Brief
for Appellee at 3-4, Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 22 N.C. App. 117, 205 S.E.2d
784 (1974).
9. The plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Terry was admitted to the defendant hospital
on the evening of March 8, 1971 under the advice and care of Drs. Arey and Ashe for
the delivery of her third child, and that approximately one hour later she gave birth to
a healthy female child but subsequently began to lose blood. It was further alleged that
Nurse Deason, who was working for Drs. Reeves and Williams, failed to match and
cross match her blood when a transfusion was necessary, which contributed to the al-
leged negligent transfusion by Dr. Arey of B-positive blood into her body when her
blood type was A-negative. As a consequence of these alleged acts of negligence plain-
tiff contended that Mrs. Terry suffered a "transfusion reaction" resulting in great pain
and suffering and eventually her death. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298. See also
Brief for Appellee at 3-10, Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 22 N.C. App. 117, 205
S.E.2d 784 (1974).
10. The grounds were that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that the court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, and that the plaintiff failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298.
11. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298. Defendant's contention that Cabarrus
Memorial Hospital was an agency of the state, separate and apart from Cabarrus
County, was based upon defendant's interpretation of the Special Act of the General As-
sembly from which it derived its charter. See ch. 307, [1935] N.C. Pub.-Loc. L. 276.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This statute constitutes a
waiver by the state of North Carolina of its sovereign immunity from suit in tort up
to $30,000. This section reads as follows:
The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court
for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board
of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institu-
tions and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine
whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act of
any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting
within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under
circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If
the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of an officer,
employee, involuntary servant, or agent of the State while acting within the
scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, which was the
proximate cause of the injury and that there was no contributory negligence
on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted,
the Commission shall determine the amount of damages which the claimant
is entitled to be paid, including medical and other expenses, and by appropriate
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placed exclusive jurisdiction of the claim in the North Carolina Indus-
trial Commission, rather than in the superior court. Alternatively,
defendant argued that even if the hospital were found to be an agency
of the county, its operation was a governmental function and was insu-
lated from suit in tort since there had been no waiver of its governmen-
tal immunity. 3  Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, 14
Superior Court Judge (now North Carolina Supreme Court Justice)
James G. Exum, Jr. rejected both of these arguments.
Holding that the hospital was an agency of Cabarrus County, not
of the State, 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Judge
Exum's denial of summary judgment."0 It further ruled that the pur-
chase of medical malpractice liability insurance for the hospital by the
County Commissioners constituted a waiver of the County's sovereign
immunity, thus making it subject to liability in tort in the superior court
to the extent of the insurance coverage. 17  Though the court of appeals
never directly addressed the issue, it is consistent with its analysis to
order direct the payment of such damages by the department, institution or
agency concerned, but in no event shall the amount of damages awarded exceed
the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
13. See notes 17, 20-21 and accompanying text infra.
14. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
15. 22 N.C. App. at 122, 205 S.E.2d at 788. The court devoted its entire opinion
to this issue. In holding that the hospital was an agency of the county, the court thereby
destroyed defendants' argument that section 143-291 of the General Statutes applied
since that section is limited to the state and its "agencies." Therefore the limited waiver
of sovereign immunity authorized by that section ($30,000) was not applicable. The
court based its decision on this issue on its interpretation of the special act of tile Gen-
eral Assembly by which the hospital was authorized. Id. at 120-22, 205 S.E.2d at 787-88.
The court also relied upon several rulings by various state and federal agencies that the
hospital was an agency of the county. Id. at 122, 205 S.E.2d at 788.
16. 22 N.C. App. 117, 205 S.E.2d 784 (1974). The court accepted the hospital's
appeal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1974) which provides that "[a]ny inter-
ested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant or such party may
preserve his exception for determination upon any subsequent appeal in the cause."
17. 22 N.C. App. at 122-23, 205 S.E.2d at 788. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435(a)
(1974) allows a county to waive its sovereign immunity as to governmental functions
in this limited manner. This section reads as follows:
A county may contract to insure itself and any of its officers, agents, or
employees against liability for wrongful death or negligent or intentional dam-
age to person or property or against absolute liability for damage to person or
property caused by an act or omission of the county or of any of its officers,
agents, or employees when acting within the scope of their authority and the
course of their employment. The board of commissioners shall determine what
liabilities and what officers, agents, and employees shall be covered by any in-
surance purchased pursuant to this subsection.
Purchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the county's gov-
ernmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for any act or omis-
sion occurring in the exercise of a governmental function. By entering into
an insurance contract with the county, an insurer waives any defense based
upon the governmental immunity of the county...
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
assume that the court considered the County's operation of the hospital
to be a governmental function,18 for otherwise the issue of waiver would
not have arisen.
The North Carolina Supreme Court devoted much of its opinion
to the affirmation of the court of appeals decision that the hospital was
an agency of Cabarrus County.' 9 However, because of its resolution
of the issue whether the operation of the hospital by Cabarrus County
was a governmental or proprietary function, 20 the court never reached
the lower courts' decision concerning the County's waiver of its sover-
eign immunity.2' Holding that such an activity is proprietary in nature,
the court exposed Cabarrus Memorial, and all other similarly situated
hospitals, to unlimited liability in tort for the negligent acts of employ-
ees committed within the course and scope of their employment. 22
To evaluate the Sides decision properly, it is necessary to review
the judicial history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, specifically
as applied to municipal corporations, and to examine the present status
of its application to the operation of a hospital by such entities. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity apparently evolved in the English
common law from the monarchistic principle that "the King can do no
wrong." It followed from that assumption that there was no reason for
suits against the sovereign. 21 In 1798, Russell v. Men of Devon24
extended this principle in England to cover the activities of a county.
As was true of many other common law principles, the idea that govern-
ment could not be sued in tort without its consent was soon embraced
by American courts.2- The extension of the doctrine to the activities
18. This approach would have limited the plaintiff's recovery to the amount of lia-
bility insurance purchased by the county which would be a larger maximum than the
$30,000 in the Industrial Commission but still less than unlimited liability.
19. 287 N.C. at 16-20, 213 S.E.2d at 299-301. The court relied upon the same
rationale as the court of appeals. See note 16 supra.
20. 287 N.C. at 20, 213 S.E.2d at 301.
21. Id. at 26, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
22. Id. This holding is most favorable to the plaintiff since there is no limit to
the county's liability, as there would have been under the court of appeals approach and
under defendants' argument that jurisdiction was with the North Carolina Industrial
Commission.
23. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970-71 (4th ed.
1971); 72 AM. Jun. 2d States, Territories and Dependencies § 99 (1974).
24. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
25. E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) in which Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall's opinion applied the doctrine to activities of the federal government.
The doctrine has also been applied to the activities of state governments at one time
by all the jurisdictions. W. PnossEn, supra note 23, at 975. See also Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), in which Mr. Justice Holmes stated that "[a]
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of a town was first accepted in the United States in 1812 in Mower
v. Inhabitants of Leicester,26 in which a Massachusetts court held that
no action at common law could be brought against a town for defective
highways.
The dual character of a municipal corporation, that it is at the
same time both a governmental unit and a corporation, was utilized by
a New York court in Bailey v. City of New York 27 in 1842 to limit
the immunity of these entities. In that case the court distinguished
between those activities of municipal corporations that were "public"
or "governmental" in nature and those that were "private" or "proprie-
tary"; the court limited the tort immunity to those activities classified
as "public" or "governmental. 28
There are several policy reasons that have been historically reiter-
ated to support the immunity of municipal corporations from suit in tort
when the activity involved can be classified as governmental in nature:
[T]he municipality derives no profit from the exercise of govern-
mental functions, which are solely for the public benefit; ...in
the performance of such duties public officers are agents of the
state and not of the corporation, so that the doctrine of respondent
superior does not apply; ... cities cannot carry on their govern-
ments if money raised by taxation for public use is diverted to
making good the torts of employees; and ... it is unreasonable to
hold the corporation liable for negligence in the performance of
duties imposed upon it by the legislature, rather than voluntarily as-
sumed under its general powers.29
At first the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and its application to municipal corporations.
In 1848 the court stated, "[b]ut -s the maxim is somewhat harsh in its
mildest sense, we are not disposed to extend its application .... ",30
Although this view was again approved in 1885,1' the court eventually
accepted the doctrine's application to municipal corporations. Using
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
26. 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812).
27. 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
28. Id. at 539-40. For an excellent historical account of this distinction and an
analysis of the Bailey decision see BARNETT, The Foundations of the Distinction Be-
tween Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of
Municipal Corporations: The Antecedents of Bailey v. City of New York, 16 OR. L.
REv. 250 (1937).
29. W. PRossER, supra note 23, at 978 (footnotes omitted).
30. Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73, 86 (1848) (per
curiam).
31. Wright v. City of Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156, 159 (1885).
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the Bailey governmental-proprietary distinctions in Moffitt v. City of
Asheville 2 in 1889, the court held that:
The liability of cities and towns for the negligence of their of-
ficers or agents, depends upon the nature of the power that the
corporation is exercising, when the damage complained of is sus-
tained ...
When such municipal corporations are acting . . in their
ministerial or corporate character ... they are impliedly liable for
damage caused by the negligence of officers or agents ....
On the other hand, where a city or town is exercising the
judicial, discretionary or legislative authority, conferred by its char-
ter, or is discharging a duty, imposed solely for the benefit of the
public, it incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers. .... a3
This approach is the one still utilized by the court today.
An examination of the decisions in which the North Carolina
Supreme Court has had to draw the difficult line between governmental
and proprietary activities reveals that it has considered two factors to
be crucial. It has classified an activity as proprietary only when it has
involved a monetary charge of some type, 4 regardless of whether this
charge has generated a profit.3 5 On the other hand, the court has
classified as governmental only those activities that have historically
been performed by government rather than by private corporations."t
However, two further considerations enunciated by the court in Sides
32. 103 N.C. 237, 9 S.E. 695 (1889).
33. Id. at 254-55, 9 S.E. at 697.
34. 287 N.C. at 22, 213 S.E.2d at 302. See, e.g., Koontz v. City of Winston-
Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972) (charge for use of garbate landfill); Glenn
v. City of Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957) (charge for admission to public
park); Foust v. City of Durham, 239 N.C. 306, 79 S.E.2d 519 (1954) (supplying water
to customers for which a charge was made and from which a profit was realized); Rice
v. City of Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 69 S.E.2d 543 (1952) (distributing electricity for
profit); Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 2.30 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (operation
of an airport); Lowe v. City of Gastonia, 211 N.C. 564, 191 S.E. 7 (1937) (operation
of a golf course).
35. 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See, e.g., Glenn v. City of Raleigh, 246
N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957) (charge collected for use of park did not meet operating
expenses, held operation of park was a proprietary function); Rhodes v. City of Ashe-
ville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (airport operated by the city at a loss yet
held to be a proprietary function).
36. 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings,
240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Ham-
ilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (195-3) (installation and main-
tenance of traffic light signals); Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937)
(operation of police car); Cathey v. City of Charlotte, 197 N.C. 309, 148 S.E. 426
(1929) (erection and maintenance of police and fire alarm system); Howland v. City
of Asheville, 174 N.C. 749, 94 S.E. 524 (1917) (furnishing water for extinguishing
fires).
1976] 1119
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
exemplify the leeway built into the traditional tests that has allowed the
court to choose one classification or the other in order to effectuate its
policy goals or to "do justice" in a particular case. 7 First, even though
an activity may be labeled in general a governmental one, liability may
be attached to certain of its phases; and conversely, although an activity
may be determined in general to be proprietary, certain phases may
be held exempt from liability. 8 Secondly, even though prior cases
have held an identical activity to be of such a public necessity that
funds expended in connection with it were held to be for a public pur-
pose, this prior determination does not guarantee that the classification
will be deemed governmental for tort purposes.89
The imprecision of the governmental-proprietary test and the
court's ability to manipulate it in order to achieve a particular result
are especially evident in the Sides case. Although Sides presented the
North Carolina Supreme Court with an issue of first impression, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had earlier held in Hitchings v. Albe-
marie Hospital ° that if presented with the issue of immunity of a
municipal hospital, the North Carolina Supreme Court would construe
such an activity to be governmental in nature.4 The Hitchings deci-
37. 'In Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 528, 186 S.E.2d 897, 907
(1972) Mr. Justice Branch said: "[Aipplication of [the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction] to given factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable splits of authority and
confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions are proprietary."
The same opinion is expressed in Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the
Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910, 938 (1936), in which the author
states that "[t]he rules sought to be established are as logical as those governing French
irregular verbs."
38. 287 N.C. at 21, 213 S.E.2d at 302. Compare Woodie v. Town of North
Wilkesboro, 159 N.C. 353, 74 S.E. 924 (1912) (operation of municipal water plant held
proprietary) with Klassette v. Drug Co., 227 N.C. 353, 42 S.E.2d 411 (1947) and Mabe
v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N.C. 486, 130 S..E. 169 (1925) (furnishing of water to
extinguish fires held governmental).
39. 287 N.C. at 22, 213 S.E.2d at 302. Compare Turner v. City of Reidsville, 224
N.C. 42, 29 S.E.2d 211 (1944) (expenditure of public funds for construction and main-
tenance of airport was for a public purpose) with Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C.
134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (operation and maintenance of airport a proprietary func-
tion); compare James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N.C. 630, 112 S.E. 423 (1922) (city
engaged in governmental function when it removed garbage for its inhabitants for a fee
that covered only its actual collection and disposal expenses) with Koontz v. City of
Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972) (city engaged in proprietary func-
tion in operating a landfill for disposal of garbage where city had contracted with county
to dispose of county garbage for a fee).
40. 220 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1955).
41. Id. at 718. The court reasoned as follows:
We must, of course, follow the law of North Carolina. No case directly
in point has been found. We think, however, that the North Carolina cases
show a distinct tendency to hold to the so-called majority rule, which would
grant immunity in the instant case. We think, under these cases, the munici-
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sion therefore points out that another well qualified court can apply the
same tests utilized in Sides and yet reach the opposite conclusion
concerning immunity.
Although Hitchings rather than Sides represents the majority rule
in the United States as to municipal hospital liability,42 this rule, like
the doctrine of charitable immunity, is being increasingly abandoned.43
Modem courts often apply the traditional classification tests in such a
way as to restrict rather than to extend the tort immunity of municipal
corporations, especially when they are considering the operation of a
public hospital. The reason for this judicial trend is that "the traditional
arguments used to justify municipal tort immunity are no longer consid-
ered valid. The most plausible of these justifications was based upon
the fact that municipal activities and treasuries were extremely limited;
courts therefore concluded that holding municipalities liable for
the torts of their employees would place an unbearable burden upon
cities' treasuries, thus adversely affecting their service to the public."
Today, however, municipal operations have mushroomed to encompass
a myriad of activities. Also, municipal revenues have grown dramatic-
ally on account of new tax levies and direct payments from citizens for
services rendered. Considering the relatively inexpensive availability
of liability insurance, the cost of paying for the torts of municipal
employees can be absorbed as a normal operating expense. This addi-
tional outlay from the municipal treasury appears inconsequential when
viewed against the gross inequity involved in totally denying relief to
a tort victim just because his injury is attributable to the actions of a
municipal employee or agent performing a governmental function.4"
palities here were, in operating the hospital, exercising a goverunental func-
tion. Certainly, the health of its citizens is a matter of grave public concern
to a State, or municipal subdivisions thereof.
Id.
42. For a state-by-state analysis see II A HosprrAs LAw MANUAL, Negligence, Im-
munity to Suit, Section 3, 45-55 (1973); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952).
43. See note 42 supra. For a thorough discussion of the demise of the doctrine
of charitable immunity see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
The North Carolina Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity
as applied to hospitals in North Carolina in Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269
N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
44. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
45. Commentators for years have been calling for the abrogation of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.L 1, 129, 229 (1924); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MiNN. L. Ruv.
751 (1956); Note, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964
DUKE L.J. 888; Note, Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal Immu-
nity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1963). See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d
1198 (1958); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
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The North Carolina court was cognizant of these considerations in
reaching its result in Sides.46
Although adhering to the historical classification approach, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Sides joined the ranks of a growing
minority of jurisdictions that have refused to extend the immunity doc-
trine to the operation of a hospital by a municipal corporation. Noting
the existence of this judicial trend and approving the policy reasons
supporting it, the court applied the traditional tests and found that the
hospital derived "substantial revenues" from room rents, nursing care,
and laboratory work. 7 It also found that the operation of a public
hospital was not one of the "traditional" services rendered by local gov-
ernments.48  Therefore, the court concluded that this activity possessed
all of the characteristics that had been traditionally labeled as proprie-
tary in nature.
The Sides decision indicates that, although steadfast in its refusal
to modify or abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity, considering
any such action exclusively within the domain of the General Assem-
bly,49 the court is nevertheless willing to manipulate the traditional
classification tests to ensure that the doctrine's coverage is not ex-
tended. Had it not so strongly desired to hold the hospital accountable
for the acts of its employees, the court could just as easily have con-
cluded, as did the Fourth Circuit in Hitchings, that the operation of a
public hospital is a uniquely governmental function and is therefore
shielded from liability.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Sides decision may have
a significant impact on future cases involving the application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity to other activities of municipal corporations.
As a practical matter, this decision indicates that a tort plaintiff seeking
damages from a municipal corporation and alleging negligence on the
part of the municipality's employees or agents should structure his argu-
ments within the framework of the traditional tests applied by the court
in Sides, rather than attempting to convince he court to abrogate the
immunity of such entities entirely. In a case in which there is not
strong North Carolina precedent for classifying the municipal activity
involved as governmental, the plaintiffs chances for recovery are
46. 287 N.C. at 24, 213 S.E.2d at,304.
47. Id. at 24, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
48. id. at 25, 213 S.E.2d at 304. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
49. E.g., Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243
(1971).
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excellent considering the court's statement in Sides that in cases of
doubtful applicability, the rule should be resolved against the munic-
ipality. 50
F. JOSEPi TREACY JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Apportionment of Disabilities Is
Limited Under the North Carolina Act
The purpose' of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act2 is to relieve employees injured in industrial accidents from the cost
of their resulting disabilities by passing the cost on to the consuming
public.3 To effectuate this purpose the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina has adopted a policy of liberal construction of the Act, particularly
of the coverage clauses 4  In Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co.,5
a case of first impression,6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that a disability resulting from an industrial accident aggravation
of a previous non-compensable injury cannot be apportioned under
the North Carolina Act: the employer is responsible for the entire
disability.7 In so holding, the court followed the rule adopted by
50. 287 N.C. at 25, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
1. The North Carolina Act itself contains no statement of purpose; the purpose
may be inferred from the critics' discussions of the North Carolina Act and the Work-
men's Compensation Acts generally. See note 3 infra. The North Carolina Supreme
Court has spelled out the purpose of the Act in several decisions, e.g., Barnhardt v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966); Lewis v. W.B. Lea To-
bacco Co., 260 N.C. 410, 412, 132 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1963); Kellams v. Carolina Metal
Prods., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1972), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3. ComrmissioN OF THE AMEwICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION: REPORT UPON OPERATION OF STATE LAws 13 (1914); Malone, The Limits of
Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-the Dual Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 705 (1973).
4. E.g., Hollman v. Public Util. Dep't, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882
(1968); Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 576, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862
(1965); Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 480, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762
(1950) (dictum); Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 192, 41 S.E.2d
592, 597 (1947) (concurring opinion); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38,
40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930).
5. 27 N.C. App. 254, 218 S.E.2d 876 (1975).
6. No supreme court or appellate court case on the Pruitt issue has been found.
Since the North Carolina superior court decisions and the North Carolina Industrial
Commission decisions are unreported, it is not possible to say with certainty whether
the issue has previously been presented in those forums.
7. 27 N.C. App. at 257, 218 S.E.2d at 878.
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the large majority of jurisdictions." As the dissent in Pruitt pointed
out, however, the effect of the Pruitt decision may be to encourage dis-
crimination in the hiring of handicapped persons and persons with
previous injuries.9  -
The industrial accident in Pruitt occurred when plaintiff employee
suffered a back injury while struggling to dislodge a stuck top from the
gear box of a machine."0 Both sides stipulated that plaintiff's injury
resulted from an accident arising out of, and in the course of, plaintiff's
employment with defendant employer." Plaintiff sustained temporary
total disability for one year, for which the employer compensated him.' 2
A controversy arose, however, over the payment of plaintiff's
permanent partial spinal disability of thirty-five percent. Approxi-
mately ten years prior to the industrial accident, plaintiff suffered a
noncompensable back injury in an automobile accident.' 8 Plaintiff's
doctor testified that the industrial accident aggravated the previous back
injury, and he attributed twenty-five percent of plaintiff's permanent
partial spinal disability to the original back injury and the other ten per-
cent to the industrial accident aggravation of that injury.' 4
In conformity with the doctor's testimony, the hearing commis-
sioner based plaintiff's award on a ten percent permanent partial dis-
ability and the full commission affirmed the award.' 5 On appeal, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with directions to
award compensation for the entire thirty-five percent disability.'6 One
judge dissented from the court's opinion.' 7 The Pruitt decision is the
first that a North Carolina appellate court has rendered on the subject of
apportionment in industrial accident aggravations of previous noncom-
pensable injuries.'" Both the supreme court and the court of appeals,
however, have considered similar issues which bear discussion in
relation to Pruitt.
8. See A. LARsoN, THE LAw OF WO MEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.20, 59.20
(1972; 1976). 11 W. ScHNEiDER, ScHmmE's WoEKMEN's COMBNSATIoN § 2303
(perm. ed. 1957).
9. 27 N.C. App. at 260, 218 S.E.2d at 880 (dissenting opinion).
10. Id. at 255, 218 S.E.2d at 877-78.
11. Id. at 255, 218 S.E.2d at 878.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
17. Id. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
18. See note 6 supra.
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In Schrum v. Catawba Upholstery Co."' the Supreme Court of
North Carolina disallowed apportionment in the case of a workman who
had a forty percent uncorrected loss of vision in his right eye due to
astigmatism and then lost the entire vision of that eye in an industrial
accident.20 The court reasoned that since most adults have some
impairment of vision2 and the Act sets out a scheduled payment for
the loss of vision in an eye, 2 an apportionment rule would require
many people to come away with less compensation than the Act pro-
vides.23 Such a result would be inconsistent with the court's policy of
liberal coverage under the Act. 4 The court also pointed out that dis-
allowance of apportionment avoids the necessity of examining into the
condition of every employee's vision who suffers an industrial loss of
vision. 5
In two later supreme court cases, 26 the court in dicta foreshadowed
the outcome of Pruitt. In both cases, the court expressed the view that
an employee should be compensated under the Act for a disability aris-
ing out of his employment, even if the employee's own pre-existing
disease or infirmity contributed to the disability. 7 Each time, how-
19. 214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938).
20. The court held that the Act of 1929, ch. 120, § 33, [1929] N.C. Pub. L. 131
(now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-33 (Cum. Supp. 1975)), requiring apportionment in certain
circumstances, was inapplicable. Section 97-33 of the General Statutes provides:
Prorating permanent disability received in other employment-If any
employee is an epileptic, or has a permanent disability or has sustained a per-
manent injury in service in the army or navy of the United States, or in an-
other employment other than that in which he received a subsequent permanent
injury by accident.., he shall be entitled to compensation only for the degree
of disability which would have resulted from the later accident if the earlier
disability or injury had not existed.
21. 214 N.C. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387.
22. Section 97-31 of the North Carolina Act (similar to the Act of 1929, ch. 120,
§ 31, [1929] N.C. Pub. L 130-31) in pertinent part provides:
Schedule of injuries; rate and period of compensation.-In cases in-
cluded by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid
for disability during the healing period and ,in addition the disability shall be
deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other
compensation, including disfigurement, to wit:
(16) For the loss of an eye, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66%%)
of the average weekly wages during 120 weeks.
(19) Total. . . loss of vision of an eye shall be considered as equivalent
to the loss of such. . . eye. ...
23. 214 N.C. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951) and
Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).
27. In Vause, the employee's hip injury resulted from an epileptic seizure which
the employee suffered while doing business in his company's truck. 233 N.C. at 89,
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ever, the court found that the claimant was not entitled to com-
pensation on another ground,28 which precluded any consideration of
apportionment. 9
In Wyatt v. Sharp30 the Commission awarded compensation for the
death of the employee when his weak heart gave out after a very minor
fall in the course of his employment.3' The North Carolina Supreme
Court limited its review of the case to the evidentiary question whether
the facts supported the Commission's award.3 2  Its affirmative an-
swer,33 however, necessarily implies that, as a matter of substantive
law, a job-related accident gives rise to compensation even though it
merely aggravates a pre-existing infirmity of the employee. Full com-
pensation was awarded without consideration of the possibility of
apportionment.3 4
Two 1972 North Carolina Court of Appeals cases dealt with the
closely related problem of occupational disease. In Self v. Starr-Davis
Co.3" the court upheld an award of compensation when the employee's
death was caused primarily by a non-job-related tumor and only sec-
ondarily by his industrial asbestosis.3" As in Wyatt,"7 the award was one
of full compensation for the death of the employee and the court did not
discuss the possibility of apportionment at all.38 Apportionment was con-
sidered, however, and rejected in Mabe v. North Carolina Granite
Corp.3" In that case the employee's pre-existing infirmity consisted of
63 S.E.2d at 174. In Anderson, the claimant wrenched his back while lifting a heavy
safe out of a truck. His physician testified that, due to a congenital infirmity of the
spine, the claimant was more prone to receive back injuries than the normal man. 233
N.C. at 373, 64 S.E.2d at 265-66.
28. In Vause, the employee parked the company truck in awareness of the impend-
ing seizure. The court found that by stopping the truck, the employee severed any
causal relation between his employment and the injury. 233 N.C. at 98, 63 S.E.2d at
180-81. In Anderson, the court found no disability, since the employee lost no time
from work or wages as a result of the injury. Therefore, there was lhothing to compen-
sate. 233 N.C. at 375, 64 S.E.2d at 267.
29. It is not clear whether the court's dicta mean that, if no other obstacle to com-
pensation existed, the claimants would be entitled to full compensation or only an appor-
tioned compensation.
30. 239 N.C. 655, 80 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
31. Id. at 657, 80 S.E.2d at 763.
32. Id. at 658, 80 S.E.2d at 764.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1972).
36. Id. at 699, 187 S.E.2d at 470.
37. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
38. 13 N.C. App. at 696, 187 S.F.2d at 468.
39. 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
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his old age and lack of education. 40  When he became forty percent
disabled from industrial silicosis, he could no longer perform the hard
labor that had previously been his source of income.41 Due to his old
age and lack of education, he could get no other type of employment.42
In affirming an award of one hundred percent permanent disability, the
court of appeals said:
[Ain employer accepts an employee as he is. If a compensable
injury precipitates a latent physical condition, such as heart disease,
cancer, back weakness and the like, the entire disability is com-
pensable and no attempt is made to weigh the relative contribution
of -the accident and 'the pre-existing condition .... By the same
token, if an industrial disease renders an employee actually inca-
pacitated to earn any wages, the employer may not ask that a
portion of the disability be charged to the employee's advanced age
and poor learning on the grounds that if it were not for these
factors he might still retain some earning capacity.43
All of these North Carolina appellate cases demonstrate a strong
tendency on the part of the courts to compensate fully employees for
disabilities caused by industrial accident or disease, even when the
industrial accident or disease is only a secondary cause of the disability
and the primary cause is the employee's own pre-existing infirmity.
Pruitt was the first case to present the court of appeals squarely
with the question whether a disability resulting from the combined
effects of an industrial accident and a previous noncompensable injury
should be apportioned between the two causes under the North Caro-
lina Act, or whether the employer should pay for the entire disability.
The court concluded that apportionment was neither required by the
Act nor proper in Pruitt.44  In support of its conclusion, the court
reasoned that the Act provides compensation for disabilities, which are
defined in terms of loss of earning power.45 Since the employee suf-
fered no loss of earning power until the industrial accident occurred,46
that accident is the sole cause of his disability and he should receive
full compensation for it.47  The court further noted that the majority
of jurisdictions disallow apportionment in a Pruitt situation unless they
40. Id. at 254, 189 S.E.2d at 805.
41. Id.
42. id.
43. Id. at 256, 189 S.E.2d at 807 (citation omitted).
44. 27 N.C. App. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
45. Id. at 257, 218 S.E.2d at 879. See note 54 infra.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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are compelled to require it by express provisions of their Workmen's
Compensation Act.4s Two provisions of the North Carolina Act do
require apportionment; 49 but the court held that they were inapplicable
to the facts of Pruitt.5 ° Since the Act does not expressly provide for
apportionment in a Pruitt situation,51 the court followed the majority
rule. 2
Policy considerations are important when one is construing a
humanitarian statute like the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two
such considerations support the majority's holding in Pruitt. First is the
belief "that industry in general should bear the financial burden of all
industrial accidents rather than the workers who happen to be victims
of particular accidents and that the only way this can be accomplished
is through the agency of the employer who in computing costs and fix-
ing the price of his finished product will include the industrial losses
due to accidents."53 This emphasis on the "financial burden" is
reflected in the North Carolina Act, which provides for the compensa-
tion of "disabilities" anddefines "disability" in financial terms. 4 Not
until an employ( 's earning capacity is impaired is he entitled to com-
pensation. If an employee has a latent physical impairment which does
not impair his earning capacity, then there is no economic loss to be
borne by either the employee or the industry. It is only when an acci-
dent triggers the defect into becoming a disability that economic loss
occurs. If the accident is industrially related, then the purpose of the
Act is served by placing the economic burden on the employer.55
48. Id. at 258, 218 S.E.2d at 879-80.
49. See note 22 supra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-35 (1972) provides:
How compensation paid for two injuries; employer liable only for sub-
sequent injury.-If any employee receives a permanent injury as specified in
G.S. § 97-31 after having sustained another permanent injury in the same em-
ployment, he shall be entitled to compensation for both injuries, but the total
compensation shall be paid by extending the period and not by increasing the
amount of weekly compensation, and in no case exceeding 500 weeks.
If an employee has previously incurred permanent partial disability
through the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg or eye, and by subsequent accident
incurs total permanent disability through the loss of another member, the em-
ployer's liability is for the subsequent injury only.
50. 27 N.C. App. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
51. Sections 97-33 and 97-35, see notes 20 and 49 supra, are the only apportion-
ment provisions in the Act.
52. 27 N.C. App. at 258, 218 S.E.2d at 879.
53. COMMISSION Op THE AmcAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S CoMIEN-
SATION: REPORT UPON OPERATION OF STATE LAws 13 (1914).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1972) provides that "[t]he term 'disability' means
incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of injury in the same or any other employment."
55. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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Secondly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
evinced the policy that "our Workmen's Compensation Act should be
liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for
injured employees or their dependants, and its benefits should not be
denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction."56 As pointed
out in Schrum, an apportionment rule would necessitate an inquiry into
the exact percentage of disability attributable to the employee's pre-
existing defect.5 7  Such a requirement would have caused no problem
in Pruitt, in which there was no lack of apportionment evidence. In a
case, however, in which no apportionment evidence exists, the court
would have either to award full compensation or to deny compensation
altogether. If the court were to adopt the latter rule, then claimants
would be denied the benefits of the Act because of their inability to
produce evidence which is difficult to obtain. If it were to adopt the
former rule, then these claimants would be awarded fuli compensation
whereas the Pruitts (i.e. those who can prove apportionment) would
be denied the full benefits of the statute." Either rule contravenes
the policy of the Act that benefits not be denied on a technical ground.
Judge Clark's dissent in Pruitt points out a countervailing policy
consideration. If the employer must pay for the entire disability when
part of it is traceable to an earlier noncompensable injury, then em-
ployers may protect their pocketbooks by discriminating in their hiring
practices against persons with physicial infirmities. One commentator
suggests that such discrimination is lessened by the fact that the types of
latent infirmities involved in these cases are not visible.59 Many of these
infirmities are visible, however, to a trained medical eye after a
thorough medical examination. Employers can, therefore, avoid high
risk employees by requiring prospective employees to submit to a medi-
cal examination, or by requiring them to provide a complete medical
history. Another way employers may protect themselves is to delegate
previous-injury employees to tasks that are not hazardous to their con-
dition. If the pay-scale corresponds to the risk level of the task, then
the previous-injury employees again suffer from economic discrimina-
56. Hollman v. Public Util. Dep't, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968).
See also note 3 supra.
57. Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353, 355, 199 S.E. 385, 387
(1938).
58. In practice, of course, such a rule would encourage the Pruitts to hide their
apportionment evidence.
59. Note, Workmen's Compensation--Successive Insurers and the Accident Which
Aggravates a Pre-existing Condition, 1956 Wis. L. Rnrv. 331, 333.
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tion. The Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act contains a special
provision designed to discourage the former type of discrimina-
tion.60 North Carolina's Act does not protect against either type of
discrimination.
In other jurisdictions, as in North Carolina, the courts have
rejected apportionment unless the legislature clearly indicated that it
was appropriate. 6' When required, the resulting diminished compen-
sation has usually been mitigated by application of a legislative Second
Injury Fund to the situation. 2 North Carolina has a Second Injury
Fund which supplements the compensation received by employees
under the Act's apportionment provisions.68 The combined effect of
the apportionment provisions and the Second Injury Fund is to compen-
sate fully the injured employee 4 without placing an undue burden on
the employer. In fact, the purpose of these provisions is to relieve the
employer of part of his burden when that burden is too great,
60. Wis. STAT. § 102.31(5) (1973) provides that insurance companies will have
their license revoked if they "encourage, persuade or attempt to influence any employer,
arbitrarily or unreasonably to refuse employment to, or to discharge employees . .. ."
Also, an employer who qualifies for exemption from the insurance coverage requirement
will have that status revoked if he "shall arbitrarily or unreasonably refuse employment
to or shall discharge employees because of a nondisabling physical condition ... 
Wis. STAT. § 102.31(4) (1973).
61. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
62. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 59.20, at 10-268
(1976).
63. Section 97-40.1 of the North Carolina Act in pertinent part provides:
Second Injury Fund-
(b) The Industrial Commission shall disburse moneys from the Second
Injury Fund in unusual cases of second injuries as follows:
(1) To pay additional compensation in cases of second injuries referred
to in G.S. 97-33; provided, however, that the original injury and the subsequent
injury were each at least twenty percent (20%) of the entire member; and,
provided further, that such additional compensation, when added to the com-
pensation awarded under said section, shall not exceed the amount which would
have been payable for both injuries had both been sustained in the subsequent
accident.(2) To pay additional compensation to an injured employee who has sus-
tained permanent total disability in the manner referred to in the second par-
agraph of G.S. 97-35, which shall be in addition to the compensation awarded
under that section; provided, however, that such additional compensation, when
added to the compensation awarded under said section, shall not exceed the
compensation for permanent total disability as provided for in G.S. 97-29.
Since the Second Injury Fund provision is keyed to the apportionment provisions, the
monies automatically become available to employees who qualify under the terms of sec-
tion 97-40.1.
64. Once found qualified under section 97-40.1, the claimant automatically receives
the difference between what he receives under the apportionment provision and what he
would receive if he were entitled to full compensation. Telephone conversation with Ms.
Christine Denson, Deputy Commissioner, North Carolina Industrial Commission, on
February 25, 1976.
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thus removing any motive to discriminate against the employees who
present the risk of such a burden. 5
The Pruitt situation should fall within the above category. When,
as in Pruitt, a definite percentage of the disability can be attributed to
the prior injury, requiring the employer to compensate the employee
for that portion of his disability seems an undue burden. Moreover, dis-
crimination is feasible in a Pruitt situation because weaknesses due to
prior injuries can readily be discovered by employers and because the
North Carolina Act provides no deterrent to discrimination. Concededly,
the difficulty of obtaining accurate apportionment evidence hinders the
process of making a fair apportionment. The fairest solution seems to
be to put the burden of proving a basis for apportionment on the em-
ployer. The employer would fully compensate the employee unless he
met his burden, in which case he would compensate the employee only
for that portion of the disability attributable to the industrial accident
and the Second Injury Fund would take up the slack. Under this sys-
tem, the employee would be assured of full compensation while the
employer would be given an opportunity to mitigate his burden.
One way of achieving this result is to construe the Act such that
the apportionment and Second Injury Fund provisions are applicable
to the Pruitt situation. The court of appeals, however, properly
rejected this construction, because the plain language of the North
Carolina apportionment provisions clearly does not extend to the Pruitt
situation. Rather, the solution appears to be a legislative amendment
to the Act, bringing disabilities caused by the combined effects of an
industrial accident and a- prior non-disabling weakness within the ambit
of the apportionment provisions of the North Carolina Act when the
employer successfully carries the burden of proving a basis for
apportionment.
HELEN L. WINSLOW
65. 12 W. SCHNEMER, SCHNEIEa'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2544, at 336
(perm. ed. 1959).
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